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Ronald Dworkin

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Ronald Dworkin occupies a distinctive place in both public life and philosophy. In public life, he is a regular contributor to The New York Review of Books and other widely read journals. In philosophy, he has written important and influential works on many of the most prominent issues in legal and political philosophy. In both cases, his interventions have in part shaped the debates he joined. His opposition to Robert Bork's nomination for the United States Supreme Court gave new centrality to debates about the public role of judges and the role of original intent in constitutional interpretation. His writings in legal philosophy have reoriented the modern debate about legal positivism and natural law. In political philosophy, he has shaped the ways in which people debate the nature of equality and has reframed debates about the sanctity of life.

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Bibliography
Bibliography
Introduction: Anti-Archimedeanism
Burley, Justine, ed. Dworkin and His Critics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004.
Fish, Stanley. Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies. Durham: Duke University Press, 1989.
Guest, Stephen. Ronald Dworkin. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991.
Hunt, Alan, ed. Reading Dworkin Critically. New York and Oxford: Berg, 1992.
Hurley, Susan. Natural Reasons: Personality and Polity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.
Perry, Stephen. “Interpretation and Methodology in Legal Theory,” in Law and Interpretation, ed. Marmor, A. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).
Posner, Richard A.Conceptions of Legal ‘Theory’: A Response to Ronald Dworkin.” Arizona State Law Journal 29 (1997): 377–88.
Raban, Ofer. “Dworkin's ‘Best Light’ Requirement and the Proper Methodology of Legal Theory.” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 23 (2003): 243–64.
Schlink, Bernhard. “Hercules in Germany?International Journal of Constitutional Law 1 (2003): 610–20.
Westmoreland, Robert. “Dworkin and Legal Pragmatism.” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 11 (1991): 174–192.
Chapter 1. The “Hart–Dworkin” debate: a short for the perplexed
Atkinson, Max. “Taking Dworkin Seriously.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (1983): 27–39.
Balkin, J. MTaking Ideology Seriously: Ronald Dworkin and the CLS Critique.” UMKC Law Review 55 (1987): 392–433.
Brubaker, Stanley C.Reconsidering Dworkin's Case for Judicial Activism.” Journal of Politics 46 (1984): 503–19.
Brubaker, Stanley C.Taking Dworkin Seriously.” The Review of Politics 47 (1985): 45–65.
Burton, Steven J.Ronald Dworkin and Legal Positivism.” Iowa Law Review 73 (1987): 109–29.
Cohen, Marshall, ed. Ronald Dworkin and Contemporary Jurisprudence. London: Duckworth, 1984.
Coleman, Jules. “Negative and Positive Positivism.” Journal of Legal Studies 11 (1982): 139–64.
Coleman, Jules, ed. Hart's Postscript. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
Coleman, Jules. The Practice of Principle. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
Coleman, Jules, and Shapiro, Scott, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001 (various chapters).
Corlett, J. Angelo. “Dworkin's Empire Strikes Back!Statute Law Review 21 (2000): 43–56.
Culver, Keith. “Leaving the Hart-Dworkin Debate.” The University of Toronto Law Journal 51 (2001): 367–98.
Donato, James. “Dworkin and Subjectivity in Legal Interpretation.” Stanford Law Review 40 (1988): 1517–41.
Endicott, Timothy. “Herbert Hart and the Semantic Sting.” Legal Theory 4 (1998): 283–300.
Endicott, Timothy. “Are There Any Rules?The Journal of Ethics 5 (2001): 199–219.
Endicott, Timothy. “Raz on Gaps – The Suprising Part,” in Rights, Culture and Law, ed. Meyer, L. H, Paulson, S. L, and Pogge, T. W (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
Galis, Leon. “The Real and Unrefuted Rights Thesis.” The Philosophical Review 92 (1983): 197–221.
Grafstein, Robert. “Taking Dworkin to Hart: A Positivist Conception of Institutional Rules.” Political Theory 11 (1983): 244–65.
Hart, H. L A. “American Jurisprudence through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream,” in Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983).
Hart, H. L A. “Legal Duty and Obligation,” in Essays on Bentham (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982).
Hart, H. L A.Postscript” to The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 239–44.
Hershovitz, Scott. Exploring Law's Empire: The Jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Himma, Kenneth Einar. “Waluchow's Defense of Inclusive Positivism.” Legal Theory 5 (1999): 101–16.
Kornhauser, Lewis A.No Best Answer?University of Pennsylvania Law Review 146 (1998): 1599–1637.
Kramer, Matthew H.Also Among the Prophets: Some Rejoinders to Ronald Dworkin's Attacks on Legal Positivism.” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence: An International Journal of Legal Thought 12 (1996): 53–82.
Kramer, Matthew H.Law Without Trimmings: A Defense of Legal Positivism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Kress, Ken, and Anderson, Scott W.. “Dworkin in Transition.” The American Journal of Comparative Law 37 (1989): 337–51.
Lyons, David. “Moral Aspects of Legal Theory.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 7 (1982): 223–54.
Lyons, David. “Principles, Positivism and Legal Theory.” Yale Law Journal 87 (1977): 415–35.
Leiter, Brian. “Beyond the Hart–Dworkin Debate.” American Journal of Jurisprudence 48 (2003): 17–51.
MacCallum, Gerald C. Jr.Dworkin on Judicial Discretion: Comments.” The Journal of Philosophy 60 (1963): 638–41.
MacCormick, D. NDworkin as Pre-Benthamite.” The Philosophical Review 87 (1978): 586–607.
Mackie, John. “The Third Theory of Law.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 7 (1977): 3–16.
Mureinik, Etienne. “Dworkin and Apartheid,” in Law and Social Practice, ed. Corder, H. (Cape Town: Juta, 1988) 181.
Nino, Carlos S.Dworkin and Legal Positivism.” Mind 89 (1980): 519–43.
Pannick, David. “A Note on Dworkin and Precedent.” The Modern Law Review 43 (1980): 36–44.
Raz, Joseph. “Authority, Law and Morality,” in Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).
Raz, Joseph. The Authority of Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979.
Regan, Donald H.Glosses on Dworkin: Rights, Principles, and Policies.” Michigan Law Review 76 (1978): 1213–64.
Soper, E. Philip. “Legal Theory and the Obligation of a Judge: The Hart/Dworkin Dispute.” Michigan Law Review 75 (1977): 473–519.
Waluchow, Wilfrid J.Strong Discretion.” The Philosophical Quarterly 33 (1983): 321–39.
Waluchow, Wilfrid J.Inclusive Legal Positivism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
Woodman, Gordon. “Dworkin's ‘Right Answer’ Thesis and the Frustration of Legislative Intent: A Case-Study on the Leasehold Reform Act.” The Modern Law Review 45 (1982): 121–38.
Woozley, A. DNo Right Answer.” The Philosophical Quarterly 29 (1979): 25–34.
Chapter 2. The rule of law as the rule of liberal principle
Altman, Andrew. “Policy, Principle, and Incrementalism: Dworkin's Jurisprudence of Race.” The Journal of Ethics 5 (2001): 241–62.
Lagerspetz, Eerik. “Ronald Dworkin on Communities and Obligations: A Critical Comment.” Ratio Juris: An International Journal of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law 12 (1999): 108–15.
Mian, Emran. “The Value Of Community, Or How Burke Compromises Dworkin.” Legal Theory 9 (2003): 125–56.
Neal, P.Liberalism & Neutrality.” Polity 17 (1985): 664–84.
Peerenboom, Randall P. “A Coup d'Etatin Law's Empire: Dworkin's Hercules Meets Atlas”. Law and Philosophy: An International Journal for Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy 9 (1990): 95–113.
Pildes, Richard. “Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism.” Journal of Legal Studies 27, no. 2 (June 1998): 725–63.
Richardson, Genevra. “The Legal Regulation of Process,” in Administrative Law and Government Action, ed. Richardson, Genevra and Genn, Hazel (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).
Waldron, Jeremy. “The Circumstances of Integrity.” Legal Theory 3 (1997): 1–22.
Waldron, Jeremy. “Pildes on Dworkin's Theory of Rights.” The Journal of Legal Studies 29 (2000): 301–7.
Winston, Kenneth I.Principles and Touchstones: The Dilemma of Dworkin's Liberalism.” Polity 19 (1986): 42–55.
Wolfe, Christopher. “Liberalism and Paternalism: A Critique of Ronald Dworkin.” The Review of Politics 56 (1994): 615–39.
Wolfe, Christopher. “The Egalitarian Liberalism of Ronald Dworkin,” in Liberalism at the Crossroads: An Introduction to Contemporary Liberal Political Theory and Its Critics (2nd ed.), ed. Wolfe, Christopher (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).
Chapter 3. Liberty and Equality
Anderson, Elizabeth. “What Is the Point of Equality?Ethics 109, no. 2 (Jan. 1999): 287–337.
Armstrong, Chris. “Equality, Risk and Responsibility: Dworkin on the Insurance Market.” Economy and Society 34 (2005): 451–73.
Arneson, Richard. “Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare.” Philosophical Studies 56 (1989): 77–93.
Arneson, Richard. “Liberalism, Distributive Subjectivism, and Equal Opportunity for Welfare.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 19 (1990): 158–94.
Arneson, Richard. “Egalitarianism and Responsibility.” Journal of Ethics 3 (1999): 225–47.
Arneson, Richard. “Equal Opportunity for Welfare Defended and Recanted.” Journal of Political Philosophy 7 (1999): 488–97.
Arneson, Richard. “Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism.” Ethics 110 (2000): 339–49.
Arneson, Richard. “Luck and Equality II.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp. vol (2001): 73–90.
Bennett, John G.Ethics and Markets.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 (1985): 195–204.
Champeau, Serge. “Ronald Dworkin, le Libéralisme et l'Égalité.” Revue Philosophique de Louvain 97 (1999): 550–80.
Christian, Arnsperger. “Reformulating Equality of Resources.” Economics and Philosophy 13 (1997): 61–77.
Christofidis, Miriam Cohen. “Talent, Slavery and Envy in Dworkin's Equality of Resources.” Utilitas: A Journal of Utilitarian Studies 16 (2004): 267–87.
Clayton, Matthew, and Williams, Andrew, eds. The Ideal of Equality. New York: Macmillan and St. Martin's Press, 2000.
Clayton, Matthew. “Liberal Equality and Ethics.” Ethics 113 (2002): 8–22.
Cohen, G. AOn the Currency of Egalitarian Justice.” Ethics 99 (1989): 906–44.
Ely, John Hart. “Professor Dworkin's External/Personal Preference Distinction.” Duke Law Journal (1983): 959–86.
Fleirbaey, Marc. “Equality of Resources Revisited.” Ethics 113 (2002): 82–105.
Halpin, Andrew. “Clamshells or Bedsteads?Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 20 (2000): 353–66.
Heath, Joseph. “Dworkin's Auction.” Politics, Philosophy & Economics 3 (2004): 313–35.
Hinton, Timothy. “Choice and Luck in Recent Egalitarian Thought.” Philosophical Papers 31 (2002): 145–67.
Hurley, Susan. Justice, Luck, and Knowledge. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003.
Jacobson, Daniel. “Freedom of Speech Acts? A Response to Langton.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 24 (1995): 64–79.
Kymlicka, Will. Contemporary Political Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.
Langton, Rae. “Whose Right? Ronald Dworkin, Women and Pornographers.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 19 (1990): 311–59.
Lippert-Rasmussen, Kaspar. “Egalitarianism, Option Luck, and Responsibility.” Ethics 111 (2001): 548–79.
Macleod, Colin M.Liberal Neutrality Or Liberal Tolerance?Law and Philosophy 16 (1997): 529–59.
Macleod, Colin M.Liberalism, Justice and Markets. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Matravers, Matt. “Responsibility, Luck, and the ‘Equality of What?’ Debate.” Political Studies 50 (2002): 558–72.
Narveson, Jan. “On Dworkinian Equality.” Social Philosophy and Policy 1 (1983): 1–23.
Nordahl, Richard. “Ronald Dworkin and the Defense of Homosexual Rights.” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 8 (1995): 19–48.
Otsuka, Michael. “Luck, Insurance, and Equality.” Ethics 113 (2002): 40–54.
Plaw, Avery. “Why Monist Critiques Feed Value Pluralism: Ronald Dworkin's Critique of Isaiah Berlin.” Social Theory and Practice 30 (2004): 105–26.
Rakowski, Eric. Equal Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
Rickard, Maurice. “Freedom, Equality, and the True Costs of Resources.” Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review 37 (1998): 761–7.
Roemer, John. “Equality of Talent.” Economics and Philosophy 1 (1985): 151–88.
Roemer, John. “A Pragmatic Theory of Responsibility for the Egalitarian Planner.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (1993): 146–66.
Roemer, John. Theories of Distributive Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996.
Roemer, John. Equality of Opportunity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998.
Rogerson, Kenneth F.The Inequality of Markets.” Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review 28 (1989): 553–67.
Sandbu, Martin E.On Dworkin's Brute-Luck-Option-Luck Distinction and the Consistency of Brute-Luck Egalitarianism.” Politics, Philosophy & Economics 3 (2004): 283–312.
Scheffler, Samuel. “What is Egalitarianism?Philosophy and Public Affairs 31, no. 1 (Winter 2003): 5–39.
Scheffler, Samuel. “Equality as the Virtue of Sovereigns: A Reply to Ronald Dworkin.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 31 (2003): 199–206.
Sherwin, Emily. “How Liberal Is Liberal Equality? A Comment on Ronald Dworkin's Tanner Lecture.” Legal Theory 1 (1995): 227–50.
Vallentyne, Peter. “Brute Luck, Option Luck, and Equality of Initial Opportunities.” Ethics 112 (2002): 529–57.
Veen, Robert. “Equality of Talent Resources: Procedures or Outcomes?Ethics 113 (2002): 55–81.
Varian, Hal R.Dworkin on Equality of Resources.” Economics and Philosophy 1 (1985): 110–25.
Wilkinson, T. MAgainst Dworkin's Endorsement Constraint.” Utilitas: A Journal of Utilitarian Studies 15 (2003) 175–93.
Williams, Andrew. “Dworkin on Capability.” Ethics 113 (2002): 23–39.
Williams, Andrew. “Equality for the Ambitious.” Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2002): 377–89.
Chapter 4. Rights, Responsibilities, and Reflections on the Sanctityof Life
Baird, Robert M.Dworkin, Abortion, Religious Liberty, and the Spirit of Enlightenment.” Journal of Church and State 37 (1995): 753–71.
Barclay, Linda. “Rights, Intrinsic Values and the Politics of Abortion.” Utilitas: A Journal of Utilitarian Studies 11 (1999): 215–29.
Belshaw, C.Abortion, Value and the Sanctity of Life.” Bioethics 11 (1997): 130–50.
David, Gregory B.Dworkin, Precedent, Confidence, and Roe v. Wade.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 152 (2004): 1221–53.
Kamm, F. MAbortion and the Value of Life. Ronald Dworkin: Life's DominionColumbia Law Review 95 (1995): 160–222.
Kamm, F. MRonald Dworkin on Abortion and Assisted Suicide.” The Journal of Ethics 5 (2001): 221–40.
Mitchell, David. “The Importance of Being Important: Euthanasia and Critical Interests in Dworkin's Life's Dominion.” Utilitas: A Journal of Utilitarian Studies 7 (1995): 301–14.
Naticchia, Chris. “Ronald Dworkin's Life's Dominion.” Journal of Law and Politics 10 (1997): 339–67.
O'Day, Ken. “Intrinsic Value and Investment.” Utilitas: A Journal of Utilitarian Studies 11 (1999): 194–214.
Rakowski, Eric. “Ronald Dworkin, Reverence for Life, and the Limits of State Power.” Utilitas: A Journal of Utilitarian Studies 13 (2001): 33–64.
Scanlon, T. MPartisan for Life.” New York Review of Books (July 15, 1993), 40 (13): 45–50.
Stroud, Sarah. “Dworkin and Casey on Abortion.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 25 (1996): 140–70.
Tomasi, John. “Liberalism, Sanctity, and the Prohibition of Abortion.” The Journal of Philosophy 94 (1997): 491–513.
Chapter 5. Hercules, Abraham Lincoln, the United States Constitution, and the Problem of Slavery
Aronovitch, Hilliard. “A Liberal Reading of the American Constitution.” Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence: An International Journal of Legal Thought 10 (1997): 521–35.
Chaskalson, Arthur. “From Wickedness to Equality: The Moral Transformation of South African Law.” International Journal of Constitutional Law 1 (2003): 590–609.
Eisele, Thomas D.Taking Our Actual Constitution Seriously.” Michigan Law Review 95 (1997): 1799–1838.
Levinson, Sanford. “Taking Law Seriously: Reflections on ‘Thinking Like a Lawyer.’Stanford Law Review 30, no. 5 (May 1978): 1071, 1090–1.
Levinson, Sanford. Constitutional Faith. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.
McCaffery, Edward J.Ronald Dworkin, Inside-Out.” California Law Review85 (1997): 1043–86.
Neeley, G. Steven. “Dworkin, Vague Constitutional Clauses, and the Eighth Amendment's Admonition Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment.” Contemporary Philosophy 16 (1994): 18–27.
Pildes, Richard H.Dworkin's Two Conceptions of Rights.” The Journal of Legal Studies 29 (2000): 309–15.
Posner, Richard A.Dworkin, Polemics, and the Clinton Impeachment Controversy.” Northwestern University Law Review 94 (2000): 1023–47.
Sebok, Anthony. “Judging the Fugitive Slave Acts.” Yale Law Journal 100 (1991): 1835–1854.
Sebok, Anthony J.Legal Positivism in American Jurisprudence. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Zagrebelsky, Gustavo. “Ronald Dworkin's Principle Based Constitutionalism: An Italian Point of View.” International Journal of Constitutional Law 1 (2003): 621–50.

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