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  • Cited by 9
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    This chapter has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

    Dobrić, Dana 2017. Local Government and Urban Governance in Europe. p. 113.

    Plunkett, David and Shapiro, Scott 2017. Law, Morality, and Everything Else: General Jurisprudence as a Branch of Metanormative Inquiry. Ethics, Vol. 128, Issue. 1, p. 37.

    Levenbook, Barbara Baum 2015. Dworkin's Theoretical Disagreement Argument. Philosophy Compass, Vol. 10, Issue. 1, p. 1.

    Hershovitz, Scott 2014. The Model of Plans and the Prospects for Positivism. Ethics, Vol. 125, Issue. 1, p. 152.

    Lopez-Lorenzo, Miguel-Jose 2012. The Planning Theory of Law. Res Publica, Vol. 18, Issue. 2, p. 201.

    Den Otter, Ronald C. 2011. To Deviate or Not to Deviate. Res Publica, Vol. 17, Issue. 4, p. 405.

    SHAPIRO, SCOTT J. 2009. Was Inclusive Legal Positivism Founded on a Mistake?. Ratio Juris, Vol. 22, Issue. 3, p. 326.

    MORESO, JOSÉ JUAN 2009. Legal Positivism and Legal Disagreements. Ratio Juris, Vol. 22, Issue. 1, p. 62.

    COLEMAN, JULES L. 2009. Beyond Inclusive Legal Positivism*. Ratio Juris, Vol. 22, Issue. 3, p. 359.

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  • Print publication year: 2007
  • Online publication date: June 2012

1 - The “Hart–Dworkin” Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed

Summary

For the past four decades, Anglo-American legal philosophy has been preoccupied – some might say obsessed – with something called the “Hart–Dworkin” debate. Since the appearance in 1967 of “The Model of Rules I,” Ronald Dworkin's seminal critique of H. L A. Hart's theory of legal positivism, countless books and articles have been written either defending Hart against Dworkin's objections or defending Dworkin against Hart's defenders. Recently, in fact, there has been a significant uptick in enthusiasm for the debate from its already lofty levels, an escalation no doubt attributable to the publication of the second edition of The Concept of Law, which contained Hart's much anticipated, but alas posthumous, answer to Dworkin in a postscript. Predictably, the postscript generated a vigorous metadebate about its cogency, with some arguing that Hart was wrong to reply to Dworkin in the way that he did and others countering that such criticisms of Hart are unfounded.

In this essay, I will not take sides in this controversy over Hart's reply to Dworkin. I will be interested, rather, in a more preliminary matter, namely, in attempting to set out the basic subject matter of the debate. My chief concern, therefore, will be to identify the core issue around which the Hart–Dworkin debate is organized. Is the debate, for example, about whether the law contains principles as well as rules? Or does it concern whether judges have discretion in hard cases?

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Ronald Dworkin
  • Online ISBN: 9781139167109
  • Book DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139167109
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