In Chapter 2, I tried to help repair the reparations debate. I argued that too many defenders of the reparations position devote too much of their energies to defending the unjust enrichment argument, and that while that argument isn’t as bad as some people think it is, it isn’t good enough to justify the reparations position either. And I argued that a better alternative was available in what I called the compensation argument, an argument that’s strong enough to overcome all ten of David Horowitz’s famous objections to slave reparations. In this chapter, I want to try to advance the debate further by turning to the question of whether there are any other objections to the compensation argument that might succeed where Horowitz’s objections fail. Since the compensation argument consists of five steps, it seems plausible to suppose that if there is such an objection, it will be one that gives us a reason to reject one of these five steps. As a result, I’ll begin my consideration of additional objections to the reparations position in this chapter by going back through these five steps in order before turning to some further objections that can’t be readily understood as objections to any one step of the argument in particular.

Governments Aren’t People

Step one of the compensation argument endorses what I called the compensation principle. When I first introduced this principle, I presented it in general terms by saying that if someone wrongfully harms another person, then he incurs a moral obligation to compensate his victim for the harms that he has wrongfully caused. Horowitz didn’t raise any doubts about this step in the argument and, so far as I am aware, neither have any other critics of the reparations position. People on both sides of the reparations debate generally accept the view that when you wrongfully harm someone, you owe them some kind of compensation as a result. And so, I concluded, step one of the compensation argument is perfectly secure.