The epilogue of this book focuses on the demarcation problem, viz. the problem of distinguishing science from non-science. It is argued that popular solutions and resolutions are unsatisfying. In particular, (i) Popper’s falsifiability is both too strong and too weak to serve as a successful demarcation criterion, (ii) Laudan’s deflationary approach inherits the problems of Popper’s account and additionally lacks normative force, and (iii) applications of the Wittgensteinian idea of ‘family resemblance’ to the usage of the term ‘science’ have substantial weaknesses. Instead, it is argued that science is to be delineated from non-science via a paradigm or ‘basic predicate’. Although there are properties that are necessary and sufficient for it, this solution nevertheless satisfies the Wittgensteinian sentiment that the sciences are diverse and that there may not be many features that all sciences share.