Introduction

The classical definition of a game in extensive form includes the specification of the information players have about the sequential moves of other players. Although the role of information in games has always been central in game theory, it takes on new dimensions under the rules of play of TOM.

For example, because the standard theory pays little attention to possible differences in the power of players, it also has little to say when there is incomplete information about these differences. Yet a player's information about the power of its opponent is often as significant as its information about its opponent's preferences. In this chapter, I shall explore some consequences of both kinds of information, or the lack thereof, on the play and outcomes of games.

With the exception of North Vietnam's misperception of U.S. preferences at the end of the Vietnam war (section 4.5), I have assumed until now that players plot their moves and countermoves knowing each other's preferences for the different states. However, many games are not ones of complete information. As I shall show, President Jimmy Carter's attempt to gain release of the U.S. embassy hostages who were taken and held by Iran in 1979–81 illustrates not only an embarrassing lack of information on his part but also, as in the case of North Vietnam in 1972, misinformation about his antagonist's preferences.