Introduction

In Somalia, Rwanda, Angola, and Bosnia, UN multidimensional peacekeeping missions failed. For the purposes of this book, the main question for each case is whether the failure was an inevitable consequence of situational difficulties, namely, the lack of consent of the warring parties for the peacekeeping operation. Over the course of the following pages, I demonstrate that while lack of consent was undoubtedly one of the main factors driving the failures, in most of the cases, extreme Security Council interest or disinterest, combined with organizational dysfunction on the part of the UN Secretariat operation, were as important driving forces as situational factors. Moreover, often it appears that organizational dysfunction was indeed one of the main causes of failure. While organizational dysfunction itself is caused in part by the situation on the ground and by the Security Council's lack of support, or intense but not consensual interests, it is also caused in large part by internal processes that occur within the Secretariat, between clashing personalities and departments, and tensions between field offices and headquarters.

It is possible that an absence of any one of the three conditions for success can precipitate failure, but in all of the cases examined here, at least two, if not all three, conditions were not present. Although failure often has multiple causes, it is generally possible to judge which of the three sources of failure appears to be the strongest for any given case, based on evidence from the numerous assessments of the failures.