The reintroduction of multiparty elections threatened the survival of the Togolese regime, but they also represented an opportunity to remove potential enemies in neighbouring countries. In Togo, the transition to multiparty elections initiated a period of power contestation where the dictatorial regime of Gnassingbé Eyadema had to adapt, and by doing so, used cross-border mechanisms to its advantage. Chapter 8 shows the implications of cross-border voting in the international relations between Ghana and Togo when Rawlings and Eyadéma used elections in an attempt to topple each other in the 1990s. As a consequence, the chapter concludes on showing the far-reaching international consequences of the ways in which the local level scales up to the national and the transnational levels.

The chapter discusses the role of the UK in supporting African Union (AU) peace and security structures, particularly the AU’s Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), since 2010. It argues that UK Governments – especially that led by Tony Blair (1997–2007) – gave Africa policy a high profile characterised inter alia by a desire to build the capacity of African states and institutions. Nevertheless, the chapter also notes that since the year 2010, when the Labour Party lost power, tensions, contradictions and ambiguities in the UK–AU/APSA relationship have emerged, partly exacerbated by the continued illegal immigration of Africans to Europe, and the UK intervention in Libya in 2011 in total disregard of African views on the matter.

This chapter introduces, and sets out the rationale for, the edited collection, which examines the extent to which UKAfrica policy has taken on a distinctive character since the end of the New Labour era (1997–2010). The central argument advanced is that there is a need for scholars to explore the connections between different domestic and international drivers of UK Africa policy if they are to better understand the relationships between Britain and Africa, as well as the successes and failures of efforts to influence policy in this area. The chapter outlines the main areas of focus for the collection, and reviews and synthesises existing literature on the UK–Africa relationship. The authors situate the collection within three areas of inquiry: change and continuity in UK interests in Africa (instrumentalisation), power dynamics within UK–Africa relationships (agency) and the place of Africa in domestic UK politics (identity).

Under David Cameron’s leadership from 2005 the Conservative Party embarked upon a campaign to rebrand the Party in the minds of voters. In the arena of international policy, a commitment to meet development spending targets and to maintain a separate Department for International Development marked significant shifts in Conservative approaches. Despite this, there is little analysis of the role of international development in rebranding, repositioning and redefining the Party. Even less attention has been paid to the particular role that Africa plays in these processes, in sharp contrast to extensive research on Africa’s role in relation to the self-identification and projected images of Labour Governments and leaders. This chapter begins to fill this gap. It analyses party documents, speeches by members of Cameron’s inner circle, and commentaries by Conservative media and the wider UK press to explore how Africa has featured in a narrative of change in relation to Conservative Party identity. In doing so it considers the role of Africa in defining a new Conservative identity as projected at three levels: within the Party, to potential voters and on an international stage.

This chapter reviews UK–Africa engagement since the late 1990s and assesses its drivers, successes and limitations. It looks at the implications of these factors for future policy, especially post-Brexit, and assesses how Africa will fit into emerging UK foreign policy in this new domestic and international policy environment. The chapter draws on policy discussions, fieldwork, and policy and academic publications on UK–Africa relations. It also benefits from ongoing research and engagement on UK Africa policy conducted at Chatham House. The author, Dr Alex Vines, has been Head of Chatham House’s Africa Programme since 2002.

This chapter explores the securitisation of UK development aid from the pre-2010 Labour Government to the post-2010 Conservative-led Government. It does so by examining official policy discourse in Department for International Development (DFID) aid programming in five sub-Saharan African countries: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. It finds that, in line with the development discourse, aid securitisation as conceptualised here progressed in the five case-study countries gradually between 2002 and 2015. The most notable change from Labour to the Coalition Government in this regard was the higher preference to channel ‘securitised’ aid to countries of more strategic importance to the UK. A closer look at three examples of ‘securitised’ aid projects implemented by Conservative-led DFID unfortunately demonstrates that such projects are not likely to contribute to one of the key aims of securitised aid provision: the sustainable reduction of conflict and instability in the recipient countries.

The chapter presents an empirically original account of the evolution of UK Labour Party international development policy, and Africa’s place within that, in the Party’s years of opposition from 2010–17. The chapter explores the significant processes of policy development which took place during these years and draws on archival research and interviews with key politicians. It argues that the Party has used the Sustainable Development Goals and a renewed focus on inequality to move policy beyond the Blair–Brown era. The chapter identifies constraints on this policy rethinking, including internal party politics and processes, rapid turnovers of shadow secretaries of state and an increasingly hostile external environment. Continuing tensions in policy remain to be resolved if Labour is to meet the challenge of developing an effective left-of-centre policy programme for Africa.

This chapter considers the impact of the Trade Justice Movement (TJM) on broader debates on African development. TJM became one of the three pillars of the Make Poverty History (MPH) coalition which played such a key role in 2005 in shaping understanding within the UK of the main barriers to African development. Often perceived as the poor relation of the MPH coalition, TJM’s focus on the rules of global trade added a crucial structural dimension to the diagnosis of African poverty and underdevelopment. In assessing the influence of TJM since its formation in 2000, the chapter considers three important dimensions. First, the concept ‘trade justice’ itself, how this has been framed and in particular how it relates to ‘fair trade’. Secondly, the organisational challenges faced by TJM given the wide range of non-governmental organisations involved and the changes in the composition of the UK Government since 2010. Thirdly, the focus of TJM’s advocacy is assessed and in particular the extent to which African development has featured in its campaigning since the dissolution of MPH. The chapter’s central argument is that TJM’s impact has been largely discursive rather than achieving significant changes in UK policy.

This chapter explores United Kingdom (UK) engagement with United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations on the African continent since 2010. It takes a chronological approach, and argues that while it is difficult to identify a single overarching policy towards UN operations on the African continent, there are identifiable trends which have influenced how policymakers have treated the topic. First, there are varying degrees of scepticism as to the motivations, politics and practicalities of UN missions. Secondly, the UK’s interactions with Africa-based peacekeeping operations have generally been undertaken on a political level, be it in the chamber of the UN Security Council, through the UN Secretariat or through financial and bilateral contributions. At a time when the UK is re-engaging with UN peacekeeping on the African continent, the chapter reflects on where UK policy has come from and where it may go in the future.

Africa’s trading status with the UK has been seriously complicated by Brexit. Since 2000, African states have negotiated with the European Commission for Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). The EPAs are imminently coming onstream in African sub-regions such as the Economic Community of West African States and the Southern African Development Community. ‘Hard’ Brexit, however, means that the UK will not remain a part of EPAs. This has obvious repercussions for African producers dependent upon access to British consumers. Hard Brexit of course also raises the question of tariff access for British exporters vis-à-vis African markets. This chapter examines elite and civil society discourse about the possible contours of post-Brexit arrangements. In so doing it highlights UK aid as a likely leveraging device. Moreover, it critiques the ‘pro-poor’ discourse of Brexiteer elites. It does this in relation to the likely negative impact of envisaged free trade arrangements for African agro-processing and manufacturing sectors and the neo-colonial logic of making aid conditional on trade negotiations. Finally, the chapter concludes by assessing the potential usages of African Regional Economic Communities – or indeed the African Union – to mitigate neo-colonial trade and aid agendas.

This chapter analyses the interactions between the Enough Food If campaign and the Conservative Governments. The chapter contextualises this interaction as a novel political interaction, between a Party historically disinterested in international development and a coalition of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) which has mainly associated with the liberal left. Both sides effectively addressed their traditional distance by using the coalition to generate a certain kind of success story. For the NGOs this was a way of addressing a difficult political coalition post-Make Poverty History. For the Conservatives, their association with the campaign generated an image of justice-seeking and value-driven Conservatism in an age of tax evasion, austerity and poverty. The salient outcomes of this comity were that the campaign itself did not capture the public imagination nor generate a clear and demanding political agenda. Its successes were overwhelmingly Party and coalition-based, not policy or mobilisation-based.