“Canadians are desperate for a Keats,” proclaimed the narrator of The Favourite Game, and Cohen himself seems to have been the poet designated to fill that role. The poets Louis Dudek and Irving Layton were his first mentors, and he was celebrated specifically for his contributions to Canadian literature. One could argue that Cohen was a member of a renaissance of Canadian literature that began in the second half of the twentieth century, and would include near-contemporaries Margaret Atwood and Michael Ondaatje, both of whom began their careers as poets. Moreover, Cohen’s songs should be read in relation to the other Canadian songwriters whose careers were contemporary and sometimes intersected, especially Joni Mitchell and Neil Young. These songs are also a contribution to that literature, and this chapter reads Cohen’s songs in that context, and to understand his importance to Canadian literature.

This chapter discusses the contested place of the Declaration of Independence in black political thought. As a document that provided a rationale for American independence, the Declaration of Independence in its own way also provided one for black political equality in the United States. This tension between intention and interpretation has made the Declaration stubbornly immune from attack by black intellectuals, politicians, and movement leaders. With rare exception, the Declaration has been attacked mostly for its exclusivity, not its content or core ethos. Even Critical Race Theory’s (CRT) modest dissent from the Declaration has been limited in its ability to transform the persistence of black support for it, making arguments for CRT’s abandonment of America’s founding principles ring hollow. Instead, the history of black political thought from Frederick Douglass to W. E. B. Du Bois to Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, stands squarely on the side of the Declaration’s essential truths, while admonishing America’s enduring failure to live up to them.

“Manners” alternates between the portrayal of self-reliant “gentlemen” like Montaigne, Socrates, and El Cid, who are “original and commanding” and “fashion,” an imitative “hall of the Past” where “virtue [has] gone to seed.” But near the end of the essay he turns away from forms of aristocratic morality by introducing two new heroes: a woman, “the Persian Lilla,” who reconciles “all heterogeneous persons into one society”; and then “Osman,” a poor beggar at the gates of the Shah who is a “great heart … so sunny and hospitable in the centre of the country,” and whose wealth lies in his ability to “harbor” madness without sharing it. The introduction of Lilla and Osman late in “Manners” raises the question of how they align with its other heroes. Are they part of a turn or contrary tendency showing up late in the essay, or a deeper exploration of forms of virtue – especially love – already introduced?

Chapter 10 charts Emerson’s long engagement with Hinduism, from his college years, when he rejected what he thought of as “Indian Superstition,” to the presence of the Vishnu Purāna and Bhagavad Gīta in some of his greatest essays. In “Plato, or the Philosopher,” Emerson draws from these works the idea of a fundamental unity – “The whole world is but a manifestation of Vishnu” – and credits Plato with absorbing, enhancing, and representing the “unity of Asia and the detail of Europe.” Emerson’s Plato is a representative of Emerson himself, a man who made lists of opposing East-West properties and tendencies on the same pages where he recorded passages from the Vishnu Purāna. Emerson finds a skeptical strain within Hinduism, particularly in “Illusions.” But he also weaves in the contrary vision of deep, but momentary, insight: “by and by, for an instant, the air clears, and the cloud lifts a little.”

Chapter 1 considers how Emerson uses the essay form to present his ideas as experiments or trials, to preserve a sense of spontaneity or casualness (“I gossip for my hour concerning the eternal politics”) and to dramatize what he calls the “contrary tendencies” in his philosophy (“I accept the clangor and jangle of contrary tendencies”). While it is important to trace Emerson’s main positions, one misses the living nature of his philosophy unless one also takes account of the motions and patterns within his essays, and the ways he dramatizes instability, spontaneity, and inconsistency. Emerson’s description of a poem in “The Poet” applies equally to his own essays: each is a living thing, like “a plant or an animal,” each has “an architecture of its own.” The discussion focuses on the moods of “History” and “Experience,” guided by Theodor Adorno’s idea of the essay as a carpet, or an arena for thought.

The Introduction provides an overview of trademark laws that implicate the right to freedom of expression. It also introduces the concept of inherently valuable expression in trademark law. Examples include descriptive trademarks; popular phrases and designs claimed as marks for T-shirts and other types of expressive merchandise; political and social messages; words, names, and symbols important to religious or indigenous communities; popular colors and shapes; and culturally significant creative works claimed as trademarks. The introduction also discusses the proposed free speech framework for trademark law. Government decision-makers should (1) identify the purpose of this specific trademark law and determine whether it is sufficiently important; (2) evaluate whether that particular trademark law directly and materially furthers its purpose; and (3) determine whether this trademark law endangers free speech, and ensure that it suppresses or chills protected expression no more than necessary in pursuit of that important purpose. The introduction concludes with an overview of trademark registration and enforcement laws that may potentially conflict with the free expression right.

In the first part of Chapter 5, Goodman considers some basic affinities of Emerson and Montaigne that are evident even before Emerson published “Montaigne, or the Skeptic”: their use of the essay form to register spontaneity and contingency, their critique of books and travel, their discussions of the play of moods, their attention to themselves. The second part of Chapter 5 considers the shape of Emerson’s Montaigne essay, which has its own moods and its own architecture, and which concludes by taking what the critic Barbara Packer calls “a miraculous act of levitation” outside the play of moods to the moral sentiment that “outweighs them all.” In evaluating this leap, Goodman deploys Emerson’s own skepticism against his more metaphysical and dogmatic tendencies. “Why so talkative in public,” he writes, “when each of my neighbors can pin me to my seat by arguments I cannot refute?”

More than any other of Emerson’s essays, “Experience” shows us a succession of states, moods, and “regions” of human life. It is not a “carpet” essay in Adorno’s sense, in which a set of themes is woven into a core idea, but a journey essay, which moves from region to region, and portrays life as a set of moods through which we pass. Like a piece of music, “Experience” is in motion. It provides an exemplary case of the essay as Montaigne describes the form: “something which cannot be said at once all in one piece.” Chapter 7 considers whether “Experience" is to be seen as what Cavell calls a “journey of ascent” – as in the journey up and out of the cave in Plato’s Republic; as a version of Plato’s myth of Er; or, with its praise of “the midworld,” as a return to the ordinary as Wittgenstein thinks of it.

Chapter 9 considers Emerson’s first revolutionary book of 1836, Nature. Even in this first book, Goodman argues, Emerson presents a nascent epistemology of moods. The discussion then turns to the moody swings of “Nature,” from the Essays, Second Series, in which Emerson finds the natural world either bountifully present or just missed, and as taking two opposing forms: a stable finished form he calls natura naturata, and a dynamic form he calls natura naturans. At the end of the essay, Emerson abandons this main set of oppositions in a leap to a metaphysical conclusion. The Coda considers Emerson’s attraction to Michael Faraday’s idea that “we do not arrive at last at atoms, but at spherules of force.”

Emerson describes a range of experiences that constitute friendship: titanic battles between beautiful enemies; conversational brilliance and expansion; a joyful solitude, as if someone has departed rather than arrived; a generalized benevolence toward people in the street to whom one does not speak; the warm sympathies and household joy one shares with a familiar friend; the disappointment of a friend outgrown. His account shows an intense focus on moral perfection – on our unattained but attainable self, alone and with others – but an equally intense awareness of what he calls in “Experience” “the plaint of tragedy” that sounds throughout our lives “in regard to persons, to friendship and love.” The chapter’s coda charts the opposition in “Love” between love as the experience of being “swept away” and a skeptical vision of marriage as a prison, from which sex, person, and partiality have vanished.

Chapter 1 uses three examples of expression with substantial inherent value that should arguably not be registered as a trademark, or should only have a narrow scope of trademark protection regardless of whether it has acquired distinctiveness in an industry. The first example focuses on words that provide information about products. DC Comics and Marvel Characters have obtained trademark registrations for “Super Heroes” for comic books and other products that feature superhero characters, and “Super Hero” for masquerade costumes. The second example focuses on trademark rights claimed in popular terms or designs displayed on expressive merchandise. Lifeguard Licensing Corp. registered “Lifeguard” and a white Greek cross symbol (similar in shape to the red cross symbol) as a mark for T-shirts and other goods. The third example focuses on intrinsically decorative product features, such as three-dimensional shapes that represent things in nature. Globefill Inc. owns trademark registrations for a human-skull-shaped bottle for alcoholic beverages sold under the brand name “Crystal Head Vodka”, and a copyright registration and design patent for this sculpture.