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The Anti-Extradition Bill Movement in 2019 sparked the most radical mass protests seen in Hong Kong since the transfer of sovereignty. Scholars have proposed various explanations for the radicalization of the protests, as well as for the mass support for this radicalization across various sectors of society. However, economic grievances have been relatively downplayed in attempts to understand the radical protests. Using data from a survey conducted during the suspension of the movement in 2020 (N = 1,574), this study examines the relationship between economic grievances and support for the protests. Through mediation analysis, the findings show that individuals who perceived themselves as belonging to a lower class tended to have a diminished sense of social mobility and equality. These negative perceptions contributed to concerns about the activities of Mainland Chinese individuals and the use of public resources. Thus, these particular economic grievances were found to be positively associated with support for the 2019 movement.
In their introduction to a survey of contemporary Chinese intellectual debate, Timothy Cheek, David Ownby and Joshua Fogel (2020, pp 15– 16) write that ‘China has achieved modernity in the form of wealth and power … We have entered the Chinese century.’ In the 2020s it is commonplace to describe China as a major power and its rise as an established phenomenon (Breslin, 2021; Brown, 2023). Not long ago, however, China's rise was a significantly contested topic, both inside and outside China (Glaser and Medeiros, 2007), and just how influential and powerful the country has become remains the subject of some debate today.
The aim of this chapter is to engage in an inter-disciplinary review of secondary literature which seeks to explain the contested phenomena of China's rise, its growing global power and influence, and its domestic socio-economic transformations, in order to establish a framework for subsequent analysis and to contextualize the present study. The chapter is structured around two main questions: first, the reasons for China's rise as a comparative international political– economic process (explaining how we got here); and second, how to characterize the politics, economy and society of a transformed China (understanding where we are now). Answers to the second question depend somewhat on the first, as they require interpretation of the process of China's rise.
At the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC or CCP)1 in Beijing in October 2017, Party General Secretary Xi Jinping declared on behalf of the gathered political elites that China was entering a ‘new era’ of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Among the many points made at the Congress was an affirmation that ‘peace and development remain irreversible trends’, a reference to a central notion in the Party's public assessment of the global context within which the People's Republic of China (PRC) had developed since the 1980s. However, China's external political environment was changing. A year later, this was made clear when then United States (US) Vice President Mike Pence elaborated on a different ‘new era’, one of great power competition, in a speech which set out a confrontational policy of strategic rivalry with China (Pence, 2018). It followed the publication in December 2017 of the first National Security Strategy of the US administration led by President Donald Trump, which described the return of ‘great power competition’, with China and Russia ‘contesting [the US’s] geopolitical advantages and trying to change the international order in their favor’ (National Security Strategy, 2017, p 27).
The extent of the deterioration in US– China relations and the changes in China's external environment have become more apparent over time.
This book has engaged debates about China as a risen, global power. Bringing together work in China Studies with scholarship from the ‘international disciplines’, it offers a critical analysis of the interplay of Chinese official and scholarly views and Anglophone discussions. By critiquing three dominant narratives of China – the return of geopolitics, contesting liberal order and collaborative governance – it highlights a much greater congruence between many Chinese and Anglophone Western perspectives than is found in most mainstream analyses, while exploring the implications and diversity of Chinese alternatives and ‘will to difference’. Moving beyond both ‘the quest for certainty rooted in the Western self-imagination’ (Pan, 2012, p 53) and existing binary ‘geo-narratives’ – market/state, east/west, authoritarian/liberal and fetishization of China's capitalist model as something entirely new requiring ‘radical countermeasures’ (Zhang and Lan, 2022, p 202) – requires us to take China seriously on its own terms as a distinctive entity but one whose visions emerge in dialectical relationships with many existing features of the international system and global order. There is deliberate tension or contradiction in this statement, a conclusion which emerges from the key insights of the ‘global China’ literature from which the book takes its title, and which underpins its analysis.
This concluding chapter summarizes the main findings and arguments of the book and comments briefly on some other contemporary policy themes which can shed further light on its conclusions.
… geopolitical reasoning works by the active suppression of the complex geographical reality of places in favor of controllable geopolitical abstractions.
Today, conflicting understandings of China jostle for attention, as dominant Anglophone narratives contrast with mainstream Chinese discourses. Across much of the West, perceptions of China have changed markedly, from assumptions about China's ‘convergence’ through engagement to a politics of irreconcilable difference and confrontation. This book examines how views of China as a risen, global power have shifted by critiquing three dominant narratives: the return of geopolitics, contesting liberal order and collaborative governance. While the first two narratives are strongest in the West, the third is primarily embedded in Chinese global visions. Based on this critique, and responding to the notion that ‘it is probably time to use the language of China risen’ (Breslin, 2021, p 2), the book sets out a nuanced account of China as a major global power, with its main focus on the period of Xi Jinping's leadership (2012– ).
The book bridges work in China Studies and International Relations, Global Political Economy and critical geopolitics to examine the three narratives using the lens of the politics of knowledge production and discourse, based on a foundational comprehensive review of relevant academic literatures which explain and conceptualize China's rise. Rejecting simplistic perspectives and the idea that China is a completely different ‘other’, it argues that China as a global power needs to be understood in all its contested complexity and to be taken seriously on its own terms as a distinctive entity, but one whose development and visions have emerged in dialectical, intertwined relationships with many existing features of global order.
The Cold War is often depicted in binary terms: communists against anti-communists, the left against the right, or the free world versus the communist world. However, during the latter part of the Cold War, particularly following the 1979 war between China and Vietnam, earlier Cold War binaries no longer applied, and new alliances were established. These alliances often brought people with the same enemies together, despite having little in common ideologically. This article examines the historical circumstances and Cold War geographies of ethnic Khmu anti-Lao PDR and anti-Vietnamese insurgents, including their alliances with right-wing governments in Thailand and the communist People’s Republic of China (PRC). As neutralists, these Khmu occupied a political space rarely discussed in relation to the Cold War. Although the PRC provided training, weapons, and supplies to the neutralist Khmu between 1979 and 1983, later their political leader, General Kong Le, had a falling out with the Chinese, and the PRC stopped supporting his largely ethnic minority soldiers. However, up until 1989, the Thai government continued to allow the Khmu to maintain bases in Thailand for launching military operations inside Laos, until the Thai government adopted the “Battlefield to Marketplace” policy. Some Khmu continued resisting inside northwestern Laos during the early 1990s, but with declining numbers of soldiers and decreased outside support, armed resistance ended in 2003. It is critical that the geographies and alliances of the later Cold War be differentiated from those of the earlier years of the Cold War. This transnational insurgency deserves attention.
Engaging the writing of the fifteenth-century Confucian theorist and chancellor of the Imperial Academy, Qiu Jun, these essays enlarge our grasp of both Confucianism and the Chinese state, exploring what educated Chinese imagined as best practice in meeting the challenges of administering the realm. Rediscovering statecraft in the Ming period allows us to think about the tradition of applied Confucian duty without the moralism dominating conventional Chinese intellectual history, redirecting that history away from purely philosophical terms. As Qiu reminded Emperor Hongzhi, this 'is not empty talk. I humbly hope that your enlightened majesty will give these ideas your careful attention when you have the leisure to reflect. The people of the realm have no greater wish.' Drawing together a team of leading historians, this volume provides a vivid sense of the day-to-day policy calculations of Ming government, and brings Chinese political thought into the mainstream of comparative political theory.
The Indian writer Upamanyu Chatterjee, whose debut novel English, August, published in 1988, examined the coming of age of Agastya Sen, a disenchanted junior civil servant in a moffusil Indian town, returns to examine bureaucratic power in his recent novella titled The Revenge of the Non-Vegetarian. Published in 2018, the novella features Agastya's father, Madhusudan Sen, as a budding officer of the Indian Civil Services posted in the fictional north Indian state of Narmada Pradesh in newly independent India. Sen's proclivity for beef and his difficulty in sourcing meat in a predominantly Hindu town serve as a fertile ground for debates around the politics of food choices – who gets to choose, who bears the burden to service that choice, the cost of consuming meat in a geographically ‘vegetarian’ region and the larger ethics of a non-vegetarian diet. While Sen clandestinely ropes in a Muslim subordinate, Nadeem Dahlvi, to replenish his appetite for beef, in particular, this secret contract is sundered when Dahlvi and his family are murdered. This crime echoes the escalating violence of ‘gau rakshaks’, or self-styled cow protectors, mostly male and always Hindu, who assault and sometimes lynch those who belong to historically marginalised religious and caste communities, especially Muslims and Dalits, for consuming or simply possessing beef. The lynching of Mohammed Akhlaq by upper-caste Hindu Thakurs in Dadri, a village in Uttar Pradesh, in 2015 is one of the few cases of lynching that has garnered attention, with the perpetrators still left free. The novella exposes the slow judicial process in postcolonial India, the impossibility of an equitable punishment for crime, and the idea of revenge as a stand-in and an instantaneous substitute for justice.
How do we explore the relationalities of an animal that is believed to be a heavenly body, a symbol of purity, power, identity and life – an animal that is also at once social, sacrificial, economically valuable and consumed? This chapter is based on my research in the hill forests of Arunachal Pradesh in northeastern India where I explore human–animal relations – more specifically, the ways in which the mithun (Bos frontalis) is entangled in the everyday lives and practices of many tribes in the region. Mithuns are semi-domesticated animals found in India's northeast – sparsely distributed across Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram – Bhutan, the Chin State in Myanmar and the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh. Also known as the ‘ceremonial ox’1 of northeast India, the mithun is the most culturally, socially and economically valuable animal among many indigenous people in the region extending to southeast Asia. Festivals are celebrated and rituals are performed keeping the mithun at the centre of familial and spiritual relationships. The life and the existence of the mithun, thus, have become congruent with not only the structures of a village, tribe or community but also its forests, agriculture and people's food habits. Given the animal's significance in many tribal societies of the region, the focus in the chapter remains not on the practices of any specific tribe but on the connectedness of the narratives of different tribes across Arunachal Pradesh.
There are various ways to view tribal communities and their relations with animals, both domesticated and wild animals. The worldview of tribal communities is incomplete without the presence of animals. This chapter discusses the exceptional human–animal relations of a tribe, the Bodo, from northeast India. Among all the tribal societies, the Bodo are known as the largest tribe in the plains of the northeast region. However, this community has a few characteristics that make them different from others. For example, pigs, known as oma in Bodo language, are an important part of the Bodo community, reflecting a strong human–animal bond, which is the focus of the chapter. The relationship between humans and animals in Bodo society has its own value for defining the community as an inimitable tribal group in the world. In this chapter, I look at the Bodoland Territorial Region (BTR) and examine (a) the everyday lives of the Bodo with respect to pigs, (b) the importance of pigs in the sociocultural milieu, (c) pigs as an economy and livelihood and (d) the transformation in Bodo–pig relations.
The BTR is an autonomous area in Assam, India, and a proposed state in northeast India. It consists of five districts situated on the northern bank of the Brahmaputra river, at the foothills of Bhutan and Arunachal Pradesh. It is a subdivision of the government established in accordance with the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution. It was formerly known as the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) when it was a separate region.