To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
This chapter explores the role of Hong Kong in cementing, in British eyes, the distinction between extradition and the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The process of distinguishing these legal mechanisms unfolded through disputes about the Hong Kong government’s treaty right, or lack thereof, to request the surrender of fugitives who had taken refuge in Chinese territory. Taking place during 1843–65, these complex disputes caused British officials to conclude that, unlike other British arrangements with France, the United States, and several other countries, the Sino-British treaty regime for fugitive surrenders was not directly reciprocal. Rather, it gave only China a right of ‘extradition’ and only British Hong Kong a right of ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ over crimes committed within its territory. As such, there was ‘a kind of balanced one-sidedness’ between Britain and China. Retrospectively constructed from evolving ideas of British sovereignty and international reciprocity, this view of the Sino-British treaties influenced British imperial reforms in extradition. It also shaped the legal status of dual British–Chinese subjects in important ways.
After the rural tax and fee reform in China in the 2000s, the increased administrative nature of rural governance weakened state–peasant connections, rendering local cadres’ traditional societal-oriented consent strategies ineffective. To gain peasants’ consent to state policies and reconnect with them, grassroots officials adopted a more complex, covert and naturalized strategy for constructing consent, integrating it into peasants’ daily lives. This study uses the “rural construction” initiative in Chuxi county, China, as a case study to explore the construction of consent. The findings indicate that constructing peasant consent is a process of continuous interaction between the individual actor and social structures. In the regularization phase, grassroots officials use institutional practices to facilitate consent, including winning the hearts and minds of villagers, solving “thought” problems, shaping behavioural norms and cultivating lower-level agents. In the mobilization phase, when consent is needed, grassroots officials flexibly adapt the pre-established institutional elements to elicit specific consent. They do this by fostering an atmosphere of consent, employing divide-and-rule tactics, and contextualizing rules. The study concludes that the party-state is building a broader form of peasant consent in the Xi era, which extends beyond consent to policies.
This chapter shows how British sovereignty in Hong Kong was built on inchoate ideas of extradition: half-formed ideas of whether and how the colony would surrender Chinese criminals to China under the contested treaties that ended the Opium War. In 1841–44, these ideas were entangled with unstable ideas of jurisdiction, as British officials struggled to fit the conquered Chinese population of Hong Kong within recognised categories of British subjecthood. Events on the ground then short-circuited efforts to resolve this problem. In The Queen v. Lo A-tow (1843), Governor Henry Pottinger conflated his power to refuse Chinese requests for fugitives for lack of evidence (which China did not dispute) with the power of British courts to try Chinese subjects and sentence them to punishment (which China did dispute). Pottinger’s interpretation of Lo A-tow established a tenuous precedent for territorial sovereignty in a turn of events that would have far-reaching consequences.
This chapter explores diverging practices of extradition and deportation during the 1840s to 1860s. The early colonial government of Hong Kong faced a crisis of legitimacy as China contested its jurisdiction to discipline the thousands of Chinese migrants who flocked to the growing colony. In response, the colonial government promised to ‘protect’ Chinese subjects from lawlessness and arbitrary punishment. These promises buttressed the government’s tenuous claim to the right to keep the peace and to remove people to China discretionally, especially amid the unsettling Arrow War (1856–60). Throughout this period, governors gave themselves flexible powers of ‘rendition’, ‘banishment’, and ‘deportation’, while vesting other powers of policing and population control in a mercurial office of ‘Registrar General and Protector of Chinese Inhabitants’. Colonists, imperial officials, and British diplomats in China challenged these powers. Their contestations served to refine the colonial practice of extradition.
This chapter concludes the book by reflecting on the implications of the intertwined origins of colonial Hong Kong and British extradition law. In the final analysis, ideas of extradition actuated local, territorial, and limited common law government in mid nineteenth-century Hong Kong. This set Hong Kong apart from China in idea and practice, through processes that disclosed British unilateralism and parochialism. Remarkably, similar processes are now taking place but in reverse, as heated debates about extradition and jurisdiction have arisen in Hong Kong’s postcolonial reassimilation into mainland China.
This chapter tracks the modernisation of the extradition law of Hong Kong against the backdrop of empire-wide legal reform. In 1865–73, two explosive scandals caused imperial officials and judges to impose belated restrictions on the colonial removal of fugitives to China. The first, the case of How Yu-teen (1865), involved embarrassing allegations of British complicity in China’s violent execution of a political refugee; the second, Attorney General of Hong Kong v. Kwok-a-Sing (1873), was a habeas corpus dispute born of colonial infighting and the only extradition dispute to reach the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the nineteenth century. These scandals propelled Hong Kong away from the flexible and jurisdictional practice of rendition, as imperial officials ignored colonial fears of establishing a Chinese ‘Alsatia’ – a disreputable refuge for Chinese criminals. The new reality – the imperially homogenous, late-Victorian law of extradition – carried drastically heightened and irreversible expectations of individual rights and executive comportment.
This chapter examines the Hong Kong government’s practice of giving people up to foreign authorities during 1850–65 on charges of crimes committed at sea. Framed as ‘rendition’, an early version of extradition, this mechanism was used to remove several hundred accused pirates, mutineers, and other criminals of Chinese origin – criminals that officials believed China was better suited to punish. Other seafarers were also given up to France and the United States as the colony sought to take pressure off its overstretched and barely functional courts and prison system. Ideas of British sovereignty and the international law of piracy fuelled this pragmatic policy. Notably, officials believed that maritime crimes should only be tried in Hong Kong if they implicated ‘British interests’, specifically British victims, offenders, or territory. This rationale for jurisdictional restraint reached a controversial zenith in 1861. In the case of the French coolie ship, Ville D’Agen, a Peruvian sailor, Juan Pastor was nearly given up to China despite the absence of any treaty or statutory basis for his rendition.
International law has been predominantly shaped by the West. Despite decolonization, insufficient attention has been paid to non-Western civilizations’ practices, including Asian civilizations. This article examines this insufficiency in relation to treaty interpretation and customary international law identification. To do so, it uses the notion of conscientious objection to military service as a case study. Despite particularly adverse state practice, chiefly in Asia, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) treaty body and UN organs began affirming in the 1990s that the Covenant includes a right to conscientious objection to military service. The first part analyzes whether such a right can be implied from the ICCPR, inter alia, by assessing the practice of Asian states. The second part endeavours to explain the gap between the international human rights machinery’s pronouncements and non-Western practice by discussing the Western-centrism and individual-centrism of interpretations adopted by human rights bodies and organs.
Revolutionary exports are essential to studying China’s relations with Southeast Asia during the Cold War, particularly regarding communist parties in neighbouring countries that received substantial logistical support from China, enabling them to sustain armed struggles. However, previous research has been limited due to the topic’s sensitivity and the scarcity of Chinese-language sources. This article seeks to uncover the logistical system centred on Mengla, Yunnan, designed to support Southeast Asian communist parties, mainly in Laos. By examining the development of Chinese logistics units and the extensive clandestine aid networks (including road construction) that linked China with Laos, this article argues that China’s integrated civil-military logistics support was pivotal in sustaining armed resistance in Southeast Asia and countering the influence of the United States in the region. Additionally, the article examines the dimensions of the Cold War in Asia from the perspective of the ordinary individuals who were direct participants.
The 1920s to 1950s was a period of significant transformation and conflict in South and East Asia, marked by the forces of (anti-)imperialism, nationalism, and militarism, eventually escalating into the Second Sino-Japanese War and the Second World War. For a long time, internationalist initiatives hoped that de-escalation and peace could be achieved through diplomacy and exchange. Part of this approach included Asian Christians moving in the milieu of Protestant internationalism, a movement long dominated by American organizations and actors, which after the First World War saw a shift towards Asia—both in terms of representation from and interest in the region.
Between the 1920s and the 1950s, numerous international conferences, organized by missionary associations and organizations such as the World Student Christian Federation or the international Young Men’s Christian Association, debated the political future of Asia in a changing and increasingly belligerent world. The period also witnessed numerous exchanges of Christian delegations between individual countries. By analysing the interrelated histories of three Asian Protestant internationalists—T. Z. Koo of China, Kagawa Toyohiko of Japan, and Augustine Ralla Ram of India—the article offers an examination of the mechanics of Christian diplomacy before, during, and after war. It shows that Protestant internationalist diplomacy, fellowship, and solidarity were often overshadowed by national and political ideologies. However, the article further argues that, despite its shortcomings, which challenged transnational solidarity and fellowship, Christian diplomacy was characterized by a resilience and reach that allowed its Asian protagonists a remarkable international operating space by providing useful networks, opportunities, and resources.
This article presents additional data to better understand the history of intercultural communication between the Yenisei people and the Han Chinese. Although the mysterious history and isolated culture of the ancient Kirghiz (Chinese Xiajiasi 黠戛斯) tribes at the Yenisei River Basin are little known to the world, ancient Chinese books and the artefacts with Chinese characters, unearthed in the Yenisei region, present a vivid picture of the Yenisei people’s foreign exchange history. This article approaches the Yenisei–Chinese cultural interaction from the perspective of the Yenisei Turk-Runic language and the date of the E77 inscription. The research material for this study is the E77 Yenisei inscription that is engraved on a Tang Dynasty bronze mirror called the Sanlejing 三樂鏡 (Lobed Mirror of Three Delights). The authors’ interpretations of the local Runic language on the E77 Yenisei inscription reveal Yenisei people’s knowledge about the Chinese iconic figure of Confucius, which blends into the Tibetan Bon religion as Kong tse or Kong tshe. Therefore, this article confirms the culture contact between the Yenisei and Han Chinese people during the Tang Dynasty.
The present article focuses on two main topics. Firstly, it provides a general overview of Edward W. West’s travels in India, based on an investigation of unpublished documents preserved in London archives. It emerges that there may have been at least four such periods of residence, during which West developed his scientific interests. One of the main objectives of this investigation was to identify traces relating to the manuscripts of the Zoroastrian polemical treatise Škand Gumānīg Wizār. Secondly, it sheds light on the broader context of the first critical edition of the aforementioned treatise, co-authored by West and Dastur Hoshangji JamaspAsana, and published in 1887. The second part raises questions about the complete manuscripts of this treatise, which appear to have been lost. Particular attention is given to AK2.