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This volume of essays contributes to the understanding of global law reform by questioning the assumption in law and development theory that laws fail to transfer because of shortcomings in project design and implementation. It brings together leading scholars who demonstrate that a synthesis of law and development, comparative law and regulatory perspectives (disciplines which to date have remained intellectually isolated from each other) can produce a more nuanced understanding about development failures. Arguing for a refocusing of the analysis onto the social demand for legal transfers, and drawing on empirically rich case studies, contributors explore what recipients in developing countries think about global legal reforms. This analytical focus generates insights into how key actors in developing countries understand global law reforms and how to better predict how legal reforms are likely to play out in recipient countries.
The gap between those living in the city and those in the countryside remains one of China's most intractable problems. As this powerful work of grassroots history argues, the origins of China's rural-urban divide can be traced back to the Mao Zedong era. While Mao pledged to remove the gap between the city worker and the peasant, his revolutionary policies misfired and ended up provoking still greater discrepancies between town and country, usually to the disadvantage of villagers. Through archival sources, personal diaries, untapped government dossiers and interviews with people from cities and villages in northern China, the book recounts their personal experiences, showing how they retaliated against the daily restrictions imposed on them while traversing between the city and the countryside. Vivid and harrowing accounts of forced and illicit migration, the staggering inequity of the Great Leap Famine and political exile during the Cultural Revolution reveal how Chinese people fought back against policies that pitted city dwellers against villagers.
A hundred years ago, pre-puberty marriage for girls was the norm among South Indian Tamil Brahmans, and Brahman girls received little or no education. By the 1940s, child marriage had largely ended and girls’ education was improving gradually. Today, girls’ educational standards more or less match that of boys’, and many Brahman women are also employed outside the home. In relation to marriage and education in particular, the position of women has greatly improved, which is regarded by Tamil Brahmans themselves as a sign of their modern, educated, professional, middle-class status, whereas extreme gender inequality formerly indicated their traditional, high-caste status. This paper examines how female marriage, education, and employment are interrelated and how they have changed among Tamil Brahmans, particularly in the Eighteen-Village Vattima subcaste, which continued child marriage until the 1970s. Among Tamil Brahmans, as both women and men recognize, a real reduction in gender inequality has occurred. Moreover, Brahman men have more readily ceded status to Brahman women than Brahmans together have to non-Brahmans, so that there is a striking contrast today between persisting ideas of caste superiority and diminishing gender inequality.
Possession among Jains remains an almost unexplored field of study. Based on fieldwork at a Jain pilgrimage site in India, this paper presents ethnographical material on a hitherto unknown oracular possession cult. The paper looks at the ways in which Jains themselves understand and sometimes critique possessions, as a way of understanding Jainism itself. The ethnographic material is presented on the background of other cases of Jain possession, both in scriptures and other accounts, in an attempt to show how possessions challenge our understanding of Jainism as a religion. Furthermore, possession is not one thing. There are various types of possession—depending for instance on who possesses—and they have different implications in the Jain scheme of things.
In general, during the nineteenth century the British were indifferent to the condition of the insane in colonial Burma. This was most apparent in the Rangoon lunatic asylum, which was a neglected institution reformed reluctantly and episodically following internal crises of discipline and the occasional public scandal. However, whilst psychiatry was generally neglected, British officials did intervene when and where insanity threatened the colonial order. This occurred in the criminal courts where the presence of suspected lunatics was disruptive to the administration of justice. Insanity was also a problem for the colonial regime within the European community, where erratic behaviour was viewed as a threat to racial prestige. This paper shows how, despite its neglected status in Burma, psychiatric knowledge contributed to British understandings of Burman masculinity and to the maintenance of colonial norms of European behaviour.
Over the last decade, public-private partnerships between states and a variety of non-state actors have proliferated as vehicles for functional co-operation at the global level. In parallel, there has been an emerging trend to accord such partnerships the privileges and immunities normally reserved for intergovernmental organizations (“IO-type privileges and immunities”). After identifying the legal and normative issues associated with this trend, this article argues that IO-type privileges and immunities should be restricted to entities that are clearly established under and governed by international law, and that any approach to IO-type privileges and immunities as a uniform package deal, regardless of the precise functional requirements of the global public-private partnership and its different categories of staff, or the specific conditions in the relevant national jurisdiction where a given privilege or immunity is sought, should be avoided.
In most explanations of history and the historical process, the primary protagonist, the human being, is painted as a unique creature, who sets himself apart from other animals due to his ability to perform complex thought processes. The ideational wellspring of human thought is credited, and often rightly so, for man's scientific inventions and complex social organisations. The arts, the sciences, and civilisation itself, is testimony to what the human thought process is capable of achieving. But, at the same time, various examples in human history also go on to mock and negate the very thought process that is credited for human development. Such discrepancies in human behaviour are sought to be explained away in terms of the innate selfishness and brutish instinct that man inherits. It is in this context that the duality of human nature needs to be acknowledged. But an acknowledgement of this duality raises the problem of whether we can assign primacy to one facet of human nature.
It has been pertinently observed1 that of the 193 living species of monkeys, all save one, is covered by a coat of hair. Terming this as an exception, the naked ape, or the self-named homo sapien, it is interestingly observed that ‘this unusual and highly successful species spends a great deal of time examining his higher motives and an equal amount of time studiously ignoring his fundamental ones’.
Quite often, when I try to understand history, I am reminded of the fable of the blind men and the elephant. As each blind man came forward and touched a portion of the animal, his understanding and explanation of it differed. So too with history. A new fact or a difference in perspective can paint the past in radically different hues. Which is the best hue? Which colour would paint the past in its most realistic replication? Is it possible at all? These are questions that doubtless assail most thinkers of history.
With these thoughts agitating my mind, I started examining the canvas of the human past. What I discovered was that the dominant brush strokes of most history writings were confined to political narratives in shades of grey, often to the exclusion or neglect of other colours! That this practice succeeded in creating an almost monochrome picture of the past, did not seem to matter. But it certainly did matter to me.
I often thought that a monochromic reflection of the past may have its own charm. But colour certainly added a vibrancy that carried with it the potential of vastly enriching our understanding of the past. Maybe, this need to allow different colours to complete the picture of the past had set in motion the trend of adding newer perspectives to political explanation. Thus, the emphasis on the study of the economy, the society, history from below, social formation, technology, etc., can be seen as an attempt to add different hues that would add to a more comprehensive understanding of the past.
The ASEAN Economic Ministers unveiled the ASEAN Regional Guidelines on Competition Policy on 24 August 2010. This is a non-binding document covering all key issues relating to competition law and policy. This article provides a comparative study of the regional harmonization of competition law and policy among the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, CAN, and ASEAN, with a focus on ASEAN. In contrast to the “hard law” approach of the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, and CAN, ASEAN has opted for a “soft law” approach because it is constrained by (1) the traditional “ASEAN Way”; (2) the diversity in economic conditions and competition regimes among its members; and (3) the lack of a supranational body to enforce common competition rules, or, at least, a mechanism for dispute resolution. The author concludes that this modest step which ASEAN has taken in the regional harmonization of competition law and policy is appropriate for the time being.
The emerging principle of the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) challenges China's traditional emphasis on non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states and non-use of force. This article considers the impact of the 2011 Libyan intervention on Beijing's evolving relationship with R2P, and assesses its implications for the future development of the doctrine itself. It argues that China's decision to allow the passage of Security Council resolution 1973, which authorized force in Libya, was shaped by an unusual set of political and factual circumstances, and does not represent a significant softening of Chinese attitudes towards R2P. More broadly, controversy over the scope of NATO's military action in Libya has raised questions about R2P's legitimacy, which have contributed to a lack of timely international action in Syria. In the short term, this post-Libya backlash against R2P is likely to constrain the Security Council's ability to respond decisively in civilian protection situations.
Like most other economies of the time, the Ahom economy too was primarily agrarian. However, one significant difference in the case of the Ahom economy was the striking universality of the agricultural process. As a matter of fact, it may be said that agriculture constituted the primary occupation of all the people during this time. Unlike other parts of India, agricultural activity here was not confined to a particular occupational group. On the contrary, it was common for all sections of the population, including the aristocracy to engage themselves in agricultural pursuits. This fact was succinctly put across in his Observations on the Administration of the Province of Assam by Baboo Anundaram Dakeal Phookun1 where he states, ’… The Assamese, one and all, from the poorest peasant to the nobility of the country, are devoted to agricultural pursuits. In ancient times, the sovereigns themselves had their private farms. In Bengal and other parts of India, tillage is exclusively the occupation of the cultivating class. There is, however, not a single family in Assam that is not engaged in the culture of lands, and every family provides itself by agriculture with almost all the necessaries of life.
Though one may argue that the use of the term mode of production has become somewhat clichéd, at the same time, it is a fact that this broad-based terminology does provide an effective yardstick to examine society and social formations. But before hurtling headlong into an exercise trying to examine the mode of production of a society and its corresponding social relations, one should seek to gain an overview of the nature of the inter-relation forged by man with his environment and the manner in which he utilises his surroundings for survival and progress. At first sight, it may appear that the fundamental factor which determines man's relation with the environment and the nature of resource utilisation is largely determined by geographical realities. Interestingly, the cultural idiosyncrasies of a given society coupled with its technical and scientific knowledge would largely explain the nature of resourse utilisation and its redistributive mechanism. In this vein one may examine the observation made by W.W. Rostow that ‘societies presented by the environment around them with similar investment possibilities, involving ranges of risks and degrees of change in existing productive methods, will exploit those possibilities in differing degree.’ In other words, the basic and fundamental connection between the physical environment and man's reaction to it, the ingenuity applied by the society in question needs to be examined in relation to the level of its knowledge and other cultural factors.
In trying to explain the process of change in nature, one often takes recourse to the theory of evolution. Understanding biological changes in species over the millennia, as also their adaptation to a changing environment, is extremely interesting. With regard to human civilisation, the study of man's biological evolution provides vital inputs to the understanding of history. But in deciphering the past, what is even more crucial is an understanding of the human efforts to use the environment to his own advantage, and the hows, whys and whens of the changes he has wrought on it.
The journey of man through the ages, from the primitive stage to modernity, from a creature who did not know the use of fire to man who split the atom to harness its energy, has been a tremendous journey indeed. Would it be possible to explain this transition? Can generalisations be made and patterns discerned so as to adequately explain the phenomenon of change in human history? In the process, would it be possible to identify the motive force that propels the progression of history? These are some of the questions that have been often debated by students of history.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the process of intellectual development, particularly in Europe, was dictated by the search for scientific truths and for ensuring objectivity of knowledge. In addition to this trend of making the study of history a scientific endeavour, another equally important development, as observed by Barnes, was the adoption of a more historical attitude towards the human past and the gradual rise of an idea of progress.