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If you want a happy ending, that depends, of course, on where you stop your story.
– Orson Welles
Seen from a global perspective, October 23, 1844, was not an especially eventful day. The world was remarkably, if atypically peaceful. England was beginning what would be the long reign of Queen Victoria, and the United States just ending the profoundly uneventful presidency of John Tyler. No wars were fought: the only shadow of conflict was that looming between Mexico and what was for not much longer to be the independent Republic of Texas. Karl Marx had just met Friedrich Engels and completed one of his minor works. Charles Dickens had recently published the final installment of the serial novel Martin Chuzzlewit. Although not newsworthy at the time, the actress Sarah Bernhardt was born in Paris on this day. The lead story in the London daily Times concerned the upcoming visit of the Queen to the city, including helpful hints of where to stand for the best view of the royal procession. Nearly one whole page was devoted to a long, indignant letter from one member of the public who questioned the wisdom of forcing women in workhouses to break stones for a living. It was something of a slow news day.
But for a hundred thousand followers of the preacher William Miller, October 23 presented a very serious problem – it should not have arrived at all.
Although separated by two and a half centuries, the early years of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) and Tokugawa shogunate (1600–1868) present certain obvious similarities. Both regimes emerged from periods of chaos and warfare, and each one went to great lengths to transform society and thus establish a more durable political order. Bitter experience had taught the ambitious founders of each of these new governments that religion could be both a threat and an ally. Each enshrined new policies toward religion, supporting some, banning or ignoring others. Of course, the two were working within fairly different religious landscapes: the Ming emperor built up Confucianism but also faced the destabilizing influence of apocalyptic belief, while the early Tokugawa rulers had first to tame and then to harness Buddhist piety. To appreciate fully the comparison between these two, we need to see how each one reacted to the arrival of a new religion: Christianity.
The first Christian missionaries, Iberian Catholics of the Jesuit order, reached Japan in the mid-1500s, and China a few decades later. In each place, they found allies among the political elite and faced opposition from a variety of conservative figures, particularly Buddhist monks. Similarly, Christian missionaries in both Japan and China experienced an initial period of success, which was abruptly terminated by a sudden reversal of political fortune. By the early seventeen hundreds, Western missionaries had been expelled from both countries, and their religion banned by law.
Religion in China is both singular and plural. For the great majority of Chinese people today, religion consists of a combination of three distinct traditions: Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism. Each of these traditions can be seen as its own intellectual and organizational entity, and this chapter will begin by presenting each one separately. In practice, few believers would think to choose one over the others. The idea of exclusive religious membership, that one should be a Buddhist or Daoist, but not both, simply does not apply. Even those believers who are particularly devoted to one teaching will often incorporate elements of the other two, sometimes without even recognizing them as such. The point is not that Chinese people are irreligious. Quite the contrary: the “three teachings,” as they are called, are inseparable parts of a single system of beliefs, morals, and rituals that pervades Chinese life.
It was not always so. The three teachings evolved in relation to, and sometimes in conflict with, each other. The current state of equilibrium is relatively recent, at least by Chinese standards, meaning that it is less than a thousand years old. Before that time, the balance among the three teachings was much more fluid, and occasionally more violent, than what we see today.
Confucianism
Properly speaking, Confucianism is less a religion than a political philosophy, one that developed long before the birth of Confucius himself.
Fists of Justice and Harmony: Christian mission and the last stand of Chinese traditionalism
Over the nineteenth century, the Qing gradually lost the upper hand in dealing with the Western powers. The change resulted not from religion, but from commerce. As the Iberian powers went into decline during the late 1700s, Britain emerged as China's greatest European trading partner. Initially, this trade was conducted entirely on Chinese terms: it was bottlenecked through the single port of Canton and consisted almost entirely of an exchange of Chinese tea for British silver. The tea trade was so massive and so valuable that even a low import duty of 12.5 percent provided a tenth of all British government revenue. But it was not sustainable. After a long series of behind-the-scenes negotiations over court protocol, British envoys finally met the aging Qianlong emperor in 1793. To the request for more equal terms of trade came the emperor's famously dismissive response: “We possess all things. I set no value on strange or ingenious objects, and have no use for your country's manufactures.”
By the early 1800s, British firms (including such august names as Jardine Matheson) were making up their losses by illegally trading opium up and down the coast, and by 1840 the tension between the two countries reached the point of war.
Post-independence ethnic minorities inhabiting the Southeast Asian borderlands were willingly or unwillingly pulled into the macro politics of territoriality and state formation. The rugged and hilly borderlands delimiting the new nation-states became battlefronts of state-making and spaces of confrontation between divergent political ideologies. In the majority of the Southeast Asian borderlands, this implied violent disruption in the lives of local borderlanders that came to affect their relationship to their nation-state. A case in point is the ethnic Iban population living along the international border between the Indonesian province of West Kalimantan and the Malaysian state of Sarawak on the island of Borneo. Based on local narratives, the aim of this paper is to unravel the little known history of how the Iban segment of the border population in West Kalimantan became entangled in the highly militarized international disputes with neighbouring Malaysia in the early 1960s, and in subsequent military co-operative ‘anti-communist’ ‘counter-insurgency’ efforts by the two states in the late 1960–1970s. This paper brings together facets of national belonging and citizenship within a borderland context with the aim of understanding the historical incentives behind the often ambivalent, shifting and unruly relationship between marginal citizens like the Iban borderlanders and their nation-state.
This paper will build on my ethnographic engagement with the Jamaat-e-Islami to explore aspects of a shift in Islamist practice and imagination from the ‘state’ as the inspiration for projects and movements to the ‘market’. In doing so I hope to investigate not just what this might tell us about Islamism in Pakistan, but also about the ability of the state to manage religion more generally. My aim is three-fold: first, to record the particular modalities of changes within Islamism in Pakistan; second, to show that these shifts betray a closer alignment between the global political imagination and Islamism than has previously been acknowledged; and third, in discussing these issues, to explore the implications of the idea of market as an important contender to the dominance of the idea of the state in political mobilizations. While recent discussions about secularism, following Talal Asad,1 have tended to focus on the disciplinary force exerted by the state, this paper suggests that the market has emerged as a potentially more significant, though under-recognized, disciplinary force.
This paper takes a critical look at a recent attempt by the Pakistani state to manage religious thought and practice, under the broad banner of ‘Enlightened Moderation’. One of the key Islamic thinkers associated in popular imagination with this project is Javed Ahmed Ghamidi. In contextualizing the work and role of Ghamidi, it is tempting to work backwards from his opinions on Islamic truth to situate him as a reformer whose interventions are primarily oriented to the task of reconciling Islam to conditions of liberal modernity. Against such a tendency it is argued here that such an exercise of classification and categorization needs to be undertaken with greater care as against a critique of the imperialist typology of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Islams, a project of delineating authentic from inauthentic Islams has also more recently been activated.
The publications of the Hakluyt Society (founded in 1846) made available edited (and sometimes translated) early accounts of exploration. The first series, which ran from 1847 to 1899, consists of 100 books containing published or previously unpublished works by authors from Christopher Columbus to Sir Francis Drake, and covering voyages to the New World, to China and Japan, to Russia and to Africa and India. Three volumes, published in 1887, are devoted to the diary of William Hedges (1632–1701) who in 1681 became the first Agent of the East India Company at its new base in Bengal. The first volume contains a transcription of the diary itself; Volume 2 contains a collection of documents relevant to Hedges' time in India; and Volume 3 is a documentary history of Thomas Pitt, grandfather of Pitt the Elder and Governor of Fort St George, who appears frequently in Hedges' diary.
The publications of the Hakluyt Society (founded in 1846) made available edited early accounts of exploration. The first series, which ran from 1847 to 1899, consists of 100 books containing published or previously unpublished works by authors from Christopher Columbus to Sir Francis Drake, and covering voyages to the New World, to China and Japan, to Russia and to Africa and India. Shipwrecked on the Maldives in 1602–1607, Pyrard de Laval learnt the local language and studied the culture, flora and fauna of the islands. On his escape to Goa he continued his cultural investigations in Portuguese India, before returning to France by way of Saint Helena and Brazil in 1611. His book, which included practical advice for French traders travelling to Asia and a phrase book for visitors to the Maldives, was an immediate success. This three-volume translation of the 1619 edition appeared in 1887–1890.
The publications of the Hakluyt Society (founded in 1846) made available edited early accounts of exploration. The first series, which ran from 1847 to 1899, consists of 100 books containing published or previously unpublished works by authors from Christopher Columbus to Sir Francis Drake, and covering voyages to the New World, to China and Japan, to Russia and to Africa and India. Shipwrecked on the Maldives in 1602–1607, Pyrard de Laval learnt the local language and studied the culture, flora and fauna of the islands. On his escape to Goa he continued his cultural investigations in Portuguese India, before returning to France by way of Saint Helena and Brazil in 1611. His book, which included practical advice for French traders travelling to Asia and a phrase book for visitors to the Maldives, was an immediate success. This three-volume translation of the 1619 edition appeared in 1887–1890.
Gaze through a window in the platform back wall (Shinjuku direction) and there is a plaque advertising a wondrous private clinic. Namely Brain Treatment System. Couple of visits should have you thinking more clearly.
KYODO EKI
Nothing like a good dental ad. Not least as you gaze from the Kyodo platform to a wall poster calling you to Sarurai Dentalpia. Could be a tooth-convention, even a deviant tooth-tendency.
SANGUBASHI EKI
Couple of stops from Shinjuku and there is an invitation to step into time as much as place. A platform sign reads – ‘Please get off at this station for Meiji Jingu’. The original shrine was built to commemorate Emperor Meiji and Empress Shō ken, destroyed in World War II bombing, and then re-created in 1958. Historic modernity several times over.
MINAMI SHINJUKU EKI
Essential facilities. Clearest word-and-picture indication, men and women, of where to go when you have got to go.
SETAGAYA-DAITA
One of several temporary plastic wall-coverings as the Odakyū-sen engineering work proceeds. Full of tile-like pattern. Small blocks colour-squares. With a small effort of imagination it puts you in mind of Mondrian or Miro. Japanese station cubism with a dash of Europe?
Day in, day out you get on the train at Mukōgaoka-yūen. But only this Friday did I notice the outside sign on the local ‘personal hygiene’ emporium. A store selling shampoos and handsoap, toothpaste and make-up, house-cleaning tackle and medicines. The sign, however, reads WEL PARK. Having consulted the local street directory, I find it belongs to a drug-store chain called Welcia Kanto Company. Even so, the urge is now on me to spiderman up the wall and add what to my own eye is a missing ‘L’. Thoughts of Lshaped rooms flood in, not to say long-ago school geometry lessons and those squares and oblongs measurement exercises.
Rooftop vistas. Setagaya Daita and Soshigaya-Okura. Both have yet more ‘mansions’, moderate high-rises at once shoeboxes and in tiers, and with balconies of reach-out-and-touch train proximity. How do people living inside them manage – passing train noise, the near presence of huge metal transportation within arm's length of where your head may be resting? Then there is the laundry. Pegged and hanging out for immediate passing inspections are shirts, sheets, undies, an array of towels. Rail-track dormitory. Odakyū lifecubicles.
Today I found myself sitting opposite a male passenger, not so much a salaryman as a sports jacket and cords type. I was just about settling in for my vertical read of The Japan Times when, like some junkie readying for his fix, he rolled up his left sleeve and with his right hand reached into bag for…a pair of tweezers. Without a byyour-leave he then started tweezering out hairs from his arm and on it went for some time. Not something to make you feel good about breakfast. And there was a whole other arm to go. But then an unusual bit of drama. An older woman, breaking with all rules of non-interference, gender status, and seated on my side of the carriage, suddenly shouted at him – ‘not here, not here’. Startled he got his tweezers back into the bag, rolled down his sleeve, and virtually jumped out at the next station. Quite a thing.
Comparative writing about the history of science and technology in different cultures tends to assume that differences in the ways in which these cultures write their histories are not important. But this is unlikely to be the case. The comparative lack of historical writing about printing in China by European standards should not in itself lead us to conclude that print only played a minor role there, any more than the tendency to downplay the importance of paper among historians of the European book means that its use in Europe was less significant than in other cultures. That in China the relative balance of the historical record is the opposite of the one that we tend to assume on the basis of the European experience is demonstrated here by contrasting the dearth of information about early printing with the commemoration even of relatively marginal cultural figures through the traditional Chinese historiography of paper making. But only tentative suggestions can be made as to why these differences in historical writing may have occurred.