This study considers why public abattoirs of the Republican era failed to function effectively and were unpopular with contemporaneous Chinese people. In the early twentieth century, Chinese officials began to rely on biomedical parameters to define safe food, a critical step in the modernization of social control strategies. Tianjin was among the first Chinese cities to launch government-run slaughterhouses that combined safety inspection with monopolized animal slaughtering. However, how such slaughterhouses operated has received little academic attention. The municipal authorities introduced a series of laws covering slaughterhouses’ construction and operations to ensure meat safety. However, Tianjin’s public slaughterhouses failed to uphold their new duties toward public health and even became menaces to urban sanitation. City officials lacked the ethics of modern public servants, and the slaughterhouses provided them new opportunities for rent-seeking practices. The collection of slaughter tax superseded meat safety inspection as the municipality’s primary concern, which undermined the effectiveness of food hygiene regulation. Therefore, city residents regarded the public slaughterhouses as predatory tax collectors. Taking Tianjin as an example, this article demonstrates the gap between the modernization of governmental agencies modeled on Western countries and the persistence of traditional, exploitive governing practices in Republican China.

Environmental governance, often characterized as a tug-of-war between central ambitions and local reluctance, provides a valuable lens for examining the dynamics of China’s central–local relations and their impact on policy processes, enhancing our understanding of both the changes and continuities of the Xi Jinping era. By analysing the eco-transformation of waste management through the framework of political steering theory, this article presents a nuanced avoidance strategy used by local governments, which we term minimum compliance. This strategy allows local authorities to cope with and sidestep centrally mandated policies while avoiding the consequences of policy failure. This study enriches the discourse on China’s central–local relations by exploring why top-level design has not reduced policy implementation deviations. It also highlights how local governments in the Xi era evade policy responsibilities in their daily operations and hedge against political pressure.

In China’s pastoral regions, both formal and informal rules are embedded in society and are continually negotiated and reassembled according to social, cultural and political contexts. In particular, the de facto rules governing rangeland use and access are much more intricate and dynamic than de jure property rights as set forth by statutory law. Through the lens of legal pluralism, this article examines the multiplicity of customary practices in Saga, a pastoral village in Amdo Tibet, where pastoralists develop rangeland practices in multiple contexts to manoeuvre in their struggle for inclusion in wealth building and the right to access rangeland and natural resources. Through three cases of customary practices – grazing bans, pasture patrols and communal summer grazing – this research demonstrates how pastoralists interpret and tailor rangeland governance to meet their expectations. A plural context-based hybrid rangeland governance is visible in Saga, where in response to changing de jure rules, de facto rules are deeply rooted in social, cultural and emotional dimensions. Rather than becoming fixed, de facto rules and practices are always evolving in response to the local context where multiple types of de jure rules apply.

This article explores the history of the Tibetan and Mongolian Morse codes, devised by the Nationalist government between 1934 and 1937, by situating them within the infrastructural and political transformations that took place in China and Tibet during these four years. On the one hand, it demonstrates that the engineering of Tibetan and Mongolian Morse codes coincided with the global emergence of shortwave radio telegraphy which, for the first time, enabled communications between geographically distinct regions, such as Tibet and China. On the other hand, it also shows that the codes were devised at a critical political moment in Sino-Tibetan relations: with the death of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama in 1933 and the subsequent political ascendance of the Ninth Panchen Lama, the government believed that the Tibetan and Mongolian Morse codes would help the party rule over the Buddhist frontiers through an alliance with the Ninth Panchen Lama. This plan ultimately failed, as the Panchen Lama died in 1937, before he could take control of Tibet. In short, the government-funded coding project offers a lens into pondering the infrastructural politics of state-building in China.

How do local officials in China initiate and sustain policy experiments within a bureaucratic system that often obstructs innovation? This article examines local policy experimentation through the lens of bureaucratic power networks, identifying three key challenges: agenda-setting challenges related to superiors, coordination challenges involving peers and implementation challenges concerning subordinates. When formal power networks fail, entrepreneurial officials develop informal interpersonal networks, positioning themselves as “uninvited advisors” to superiors, “rhetorical allies” to peers and “supportive mentors” to subordinates. Using the case of “police–business cooperation” in Shanghai, the study reveals how the committee on comprehensive management of public security mobilized property management companies to maintain social stability. This article contributes to research on policy experimentation by situating experiments within bureaucratic power dynamics and highlighting the role of informal networks in overcoming institutional barriers. It also reveals the mechanisms by which the Party assigns social control tasks to commercial entities.

As India and Pakistan emerged as two new nation-states after 1947, questions around nationality and citizenship animated official and public discourses. While there were constitutional and legal pronouncements to clarify these matters, this article suggests that particular documents governing mobility became central to how such issues were framed and understood. In particular, this article focuses on the Indian passport and similar documents of mobility control, such as the domicile certificate, permits, and so on, to examine how they worked singly and in conjunction to frame the documentary life of belonging. The article also focuses on particular mobile groups, Muslim minorities and women married to non-Indians, to understand how these documents became central to their claims of citizenship and belonging.