Family and local interests and responsibilities

Certain obligations were specifically associated with Athenian citizenship, such as personal service in the armed forces and, in the case of the propertied classes, financial levies, but there was also a vast range of responsibilities which were implicit in membership of the polis. These might be interpreted in different ways by the individual. The friends of Sokrates, for example, when he had been condemned to death on a charge of impiety and corrupting the youth, urged him to escape and to live in exile. Not a few Athenians chose exile when under political or judicial attack, and, in fact, exile was a penalty which could be imposed by law. But Sokrates at his trial declined that legal alternative and also rejected the pleas of Kriton to escape from prison. He argued that all his life he had enjoyed the protection and benefit of the laws and that he must not now seek to evade them and so destroy them and the whole polis. Not all Athenians would have fully shared the high-minded attitude of Sokrates, but in theory they would have endorsed the notion of obedience to the laws, for they shared with other Greeks a deep conviction that the laws, not the whim of a despot like the Persian king, were their master and that obedience to the laws was fundamental for the well-being of their polis.

The food needs of the Athenians from the imperial period in the fifth century down to the Macedonian occupation of 322 BC could not be met from the resources of the territory of Attica alone. But the extent of Athens' dependence on external sources of supply remains problematic. There is a lack of precise and detailed information relating to land under cultivation, population level, food consumption rate, yield and sowing rate. Absence of data has not deterred scholars in the past from attempting to calculate the relative importance of home-grown and imported grain, and for better or worse their conjectures underpin current conceptions not only of the food supply policy of Athens but also of Athenian foreign policy in general over several centuries. Thus the conclusion that Attica could support only 60,000–75,000 people, 20–30% of the resident population as conventionally assessed (by my estimate about one-half of the figure actually supportable), underpins the doctrine that Athens' dependence on imports for ‘by far the greater part of her corn supply … led almost inevitably to naval imperialism’; it also underpins the more radical thesis that Athens relied on foreign grain as early as the turn of the seventh century BC, well before the era of ‘naval imperialism’. If, as I argue below, the productive capacity of Attica has been grossly underestimated, then a new interpretation of archaic Athenian history is demanded, one which is not shaped by conventional assumptions about Athens' early dependence on foreign grain.

POPULATION

There are no reliable demographic data from ancient Athens.

After almost two decades of civil war (49–31 BC), the Roman state came under the control of one man. Because of his own experiences as triumvir in Rome, Augustus as emperor could not fail to take a personal interest in the matter of the food supply of the city. If his regime was to be stable and enduring, then repetition of the famine and crowd violence of 43–36 had to be avoided.

Rome under Augustus was a huge metropolis of around one million people. Its vulnerability to food crisis did not miraculously come to an end with the emergence of the Principate. Augustus' personal intervention was required on a number of occasions to alleviate grain shortage. A standard imperial response to food crisis was, simply, largesse. Augustus frequently handed out money or grain (or both), not only in times of shortage. He thus established a tradition of liberality which his successors could hardly ignore. The more responsible emperors also made structural improvements in the system of supply and distribution. Augustus himself introduced several important innovations of this type, most notably the addition of Egypt as a major supplier of the capital, and the inauguration of the office of prefect of the grain supply (praefectus annonae). The long-term consequence for Rome of these and other such developments was reduced vulnerability to food crisis.

FOOD CRISES

1. Food shortage is not directly attested but may none the less have occurred in 28 BC. Cassius Dio reports under this year: ‘To the populace he distributed a quadruple allowance of grain and to some of the senators he made presents of money.’

Ancient historical studies have traditionally followed the literary sources in their preoccupation with wars and international relations, political events and institutions, and the careers and personalities of powerful and charismatic individuals. However, the first concern of the vast majority of the inhabitants of the Mediterranean in ancient times was not whether Alexander the Great would reach the Ocean that surrounded the inhabited world, or whether Julius Caesar was justified in crossing the Rubicon, but food: how to feed themselves and their dependants.

Famine is a major preoccupation of geographers, anthropologists, economists and historians of periods other than antiquity. While interest has been kindled by contemporary events, it is also recognised that the study of famine leads to a deeper understanding of the dynamics of particular societies.

Historians of antiquity have by and large neglected the topic. There is room for a study that will assess the ability of the peoples of the ancient Mediterranean to produce and distribute essential foods in a setting marked by climatic variability, traditional farming methods, a rudimentary transport system and a significant level of urbanisation.

Food crisis is a consequence of the breakdown of the system of production, distribution and consumption of essential foodstuffs. An analysis of the origins and impact of famine would involve one in an investigation of the whole material basis of Graeco-Roman civilisation. Discussion of these matters must be postponed for the present. This book is limited in focus; it concerns the responses of both urban and rural dwellers to food crises, actual or anticipated.

Monthly sales of cut-price grain were introduced into Rome by the state authorities in 123 BC following the passage of the grain law of Gaius Gracchus. They were abolished in 81, remained in abeyance until 73, and sporadically ceased to function in times of civil strife. Otherwise the system operated more or less continuously. However, Rome in the late Republic was by no means free from food crisis. The explanation lies both in the disturbed political climate of the time and in the inadequacy of the distribution system.

FOOD CRISES

1. In 104, when Saturninus was quaestor, grain rose in price. The senate deprived him of his responsibility for supplies and transferred it to M. Scaurus, the leading senator (princeps senatus). Stung by this insult, Saturninus became a demagogue, according to Cicero.

2. In 100 the senate authorised the purchase of supplementary stocks of grain. A denarius of this year shows on the obverse the head of Saturn and a serrated sickle, and on the reverse the two quaestors Caepio and Piso seated on a bench, at each end of which there is an ear of corn. The reverse bears the inscription: ‘Ad Fru[mentum] Em[undum] Ex S[enatus] C[onsulto]’ (‘For the purchase of grain following a senatorial resolution’).

This special grain purchase undertaken with senatorial authority may perhaps be seen as the conservative counter to Saturninus' more radical proposal, also of 100 (but some favour 103), to reduce the price of distributed grain from 61.3 asses to 5.6 as per modius.

(A) On the vexed question of the population of Athens, see the fundamental studies of Beloch (1886 and (1923) 386–418) and Gomme. For the fifth century, see Thuc. 2.13.6–8 (and HCT) (for 431) and other evidence examined by Gomme 1–35 and Gomme (1959) 61–8, Jones 161–80, Patterson (1981) 40–81, Strauss (1979) 72–118, Whitehead (1977) 148–9, Jameson (1978) 141, Duncan-Jones (1980) 101–9, Hansen (1981) 19–32, Garnsey (1985) 62–75. For convenient tabulations of estimates of the total population and of the citizen, metic and slave components at different times from c. 480 to 313, see Gomme 26, 29, Ehrenberg (1969) 31 and Ruschenbusch (1979A) 146.

(B) The rate of population growth has been much debated. Aristotle (Pol. 1265a38–65b17) seems to indicate some increase in citizen populations in Greek cities, for he represents Plato's failure (in the Laws) to control the birth rate as based on the assumption of a sufficiently stationary population, ‘because that is thought to be the case now in the poleis’. Aristotle, however, appears to believe that in fact there was some population growth both in the mid-fourth century and earlier – sufficient to require the attention of lawgivers. Throughout the period from the mid-fifth century to 322, a natural growth of not less than ½% in the Athenian citizen population may be suggested. Before 451, when Perikles' restrictive law (see ch. 2.1) made the citizen body a ‘closed population’, the rate may have been somewhat higher.

After the battle of Chaeronea in 338, the external food supply of the Athenians was as much in the hands of others as it had been at the beginning of the century. It is difficult to believe that grain flowed as freely from the north, given the demonstrably increased vulnerability of the Athenians to food crisis in this period. It is noteworthy that imports from the west and south-east come into prominence in the sources only after Chaeronea.

The Athenians did little to endear themselves to the rulers of Macedonia. Philip's seizure of the grain ships in 340 was repeated at some point in the following decade. The speaker of On the Treaty with Alexander, delivered in 331, complains:

The grain fleets were most vulnerable when war was being waged between Macedon and Greek states, especially in 338/7 and 323/2 (the Lamian war), but also in 335/4 (the Theban war) and 331/0 (the revolt of Agis of Sparta, a limited enterprise). The Persian fleet was a force in the Aegean from 334/3 to the early summer of 332. Other states, for example, Byzantium, periodically obstructed the passage of the grain ships. Finally, piracy flourished during the period of Macedonian ascendancy.

GRAIN IMPORTS

Grain was still routinely sought in the Black Sea in the late 330s and 320s by traders serving Athens.

Food crisis was endemic in the Mediterranean in classical antiquity. Its origins lay in nature and in man, often operating together. Harvest failure was an underlying cause of food shortage. However, food crisis was the consequence of a sharp reduction not in the absolute level of food supply, but in food availability. The causes of famine are to be sought not only in the physical environment and conditions of production, but also in distribution mechanisms, their limitations, and their disruption through human intervention.

Not every food crisis was catastrophic, on the scale of famine. Food crises ranged from mild, transient shortage to protracted, devastating famine. Shortage was common, but famine rare, the outcome of abnormal conditions. Every food crisis was a specific event; it can be classed in terms of its whereabouts on the shortage/famine spectrum, supposing adequate information exists about causes, context and impact. The most serious food crises were a consequence of a succession of harvest failures, wars of long duration or the conjunction of harvest shortfall and epidemic disease. Severe inflation in the prices of foods (as opposed to non-food items), drastic reactions by both ordinary consumers and governments, and above all a sharp rise in mortality among all classes other than the rich (who were vulnerable to disease but not starvation), are other indications that a given food crisis belongs towards the famine end of the spectrum.

The unique urban civilisations of antiquity were supported, when all is told, by the common labour of peasants. The survival of the peasantry hinged on the nature of their response to environmental constraints and to the demands of those wielding political and economic power.

(A) Variation in the recording of decrees may in part be traced to the character of the secretaryship concerned with the recording of decrees. Until 367/6 ‘the Secretary of the Boule’, who was the official directed to publish decrees, held office for one prytany. In and after 366/5 the secretary concerned (known sometimes by the same title) held office for a year (AP 54.3 and CAAP). The longer period of tenure should have led to greater efficiency and uniformity of practice (and in many respects decrees from the 350s and later display less variation in formulation, though other factors as well as the secretariat were working in this direction).

It would seem probable, however, that it was at the same time in the 360s that the method of selecting the secretary was changed from voting to sortition, and it is likely that he was no longer selected from among the bouleutai (Rhodes 135 n. 11; cf. de Laix 77). The uncertainty of these two aspects makes hazardous the deduction of reasons for the change to an annual secretary. On the basis of the observation of AP 54.3 that previously the most distinguished and trust worthy men were selected, it has been argued that the change was designed to downgrade the importance of the secretary by the introduction of sortition with its egalitarian assumptions. It should, however, be noted that the author of AP, if (as is likely) he is not Aristotle himself, shares with Aristotle a disposition to explanation in terms of anti-aristocratic attitudes in democracies.

FIVE RESPONSES

States seeking to avoid food crisis or reduce its effects had in principle the following options:

1. Extend domestic production: by increasing the proportion of home territory under cultivation, or by raising productivity on existing arable.

2. Extend the territory under control at the expense of other communities: imperialism.

3. Export a proportion of the population, so as to reduce the aggregate consumption requirements of the community: colonisation.

4. Import staple food items through trade and other methods of exchange.

5. Distribute available foodstuffs through the community to ensure the survival of the ordinary citizen consumer.

Of options 1 and 2, the more thorough exploitation of home territory and the exploitation of the territory of another state, the first is more or less an empty category. From time to time and in a variety of historical contexts (Attica and the Argolid in the fourth century BC are possible examples), land under cultivation was extended and higher productivity sought through intensification of farming practices. But this was done as a consequence of factors such as demographic pressure, not government direction. Civic governments did very little to regulate agriculture within their territories.

The second option, imperialism, was successfully exploited by relatively few states. Athens was one such, especially between 478/7 and 413/12, when her power at sea was unrivalled. During this period the Athenians were in a position to monitor and control the longdistance movement of grain, notably from the Black Sea, reduce enemies by blockade, feed a population far more numerous than their home territory could support, export citizens as settlers or garrisons on conquered land – and avoid food crises.

Rome's massive population of around one million in the age of Augustus, a number unequalled by any European city before the early nineteenth century, was primarily sustained by means of a regular inflow of food and manpower from all over the Roman world. Contributions from Rome's provincial subjects also financed the grandiose building projects, expensive public amenities and lavish entertainments of the capital city. They paid for the court and civil administration, supported the extravagant lifestyle of the Rome-based aristocracy and fed and equipped an army of around 300,000–400,000 men.

In this chapter I ask how these demands affected the livelihood of the populations of Italy and the provinces. My aims are, of necessity, limited. It is not possible to show precisely how living standards were affected all over the Roman world, nor to measure changes in the frequency and intensity of food crises. Without aiming at unrealistically precise estimates, we can assess the impact of taxes and rents, and identify certain long-term developments in provincial society, such as a steady increase of public ownership of land and other economic assets, and a concentration of wealth in the hands of the few. These and other matters, notably, the level of civic patriotism and initiative among leaders of local government, and the manner in which the Romans husbanded the agricultural surplus which was now under their control, have implications for the subsistence and survival of communities and households.

APPROPRIATION OF WEALTH

The Roman state under the Principate exacted tax somewhat more efficiently than preceding governments (Roman and non-Roman) had done, and over a wide area.