Mycenae’s LH IIIA2-IIIB palatial stonework was spectacular, and attention is given here to the innovative construction processes and specialized stonecutting tools that elicited awe. A fresh look at Mycenae’s final three tholoi illustrates the strategy of conveying power through stonework. The chapter also assesses the semiotics of the site’s architectural sculpture.

This chapter surveys the wide range of definitions of belief in recent scholarship and explores the potential of the cognitive science of religion for generating new approaches. It rejects the assumption that it is possible to talk about the presence or absence of ‘belief’ in Greek religion in a monolithic way, such that the Greeks either believed wholly in their gods or they did not, and challenges the related assumption that beliefs combine to form stable, internally consistent systems. It draws on a range of concepts from cognitive science to explore how contradictions between beliefs and between beliefs and experience might be managed and argues for a dynamic, contextual and plural understanding of Greek religious belief.

The implications of tool distributions and exceptional building projects in the Argolid and Boeotia are discussed. Substantial gaps remain in the story of transregional craft and political ties, but the present study offers new clues about the political makeup of at least part of the Mycenaean world.

This chapter considers how Plutarch, a Platonic philosopher and priest of Apollo, used the language of pistis (‘faith’) and pisteuein (‘to believe’). It rejects the view that Plutarch was the first to introduce a ‘fideistic’, proto-Christian concept of religious faith as opposed to reason, or that his faith was only a way to inscribe himself into ‘tradition’. Crucial for our understanding of Plutarch’s pistis is his initiation into the Dionysiac mysteries, which prevented him from ‘believing’ the Epicureans’ denial of immortality, as he deemed that the Platonists’ view of the immortality of the soul ‘is harder to disbelieve than to believe’. The chapter emphasises the convergence between Plutarch’s experience of the mysteries and his Platonic philosophy. Plutarch’s notion of faith is not fideistic and anti-philosophical but belongs to the domain of philosophy: unfounded faith must be criticised when it misrepresents the gods and strengthened when it aligns with sound philosophical doctrines. Not only can philosophical doctrines confirm expressions of pistis, but particular philosophical views are also the object of faith and are, conversely, reinforced by initiation into the mysteries. Throughout the chapter, it is intimated that Plutarch’s concept of pistis is not fundamentally different from that of Paul.

From the late nineteenth century onwards, Greek and Roman religion was increasingly characterised as ritualistic and collective, with little role for belief, while belief itself was increasingly associated with Christianity. By the 1990s, the dominant view in classical studies aligned closely with functionalist traditions in the wider study of religion, linking Greek and Roman religion with social cohesion and identity, and rejecting belief as an irrelevance. Since then, fresh arguments have emerged, some drawing on the cognitive science of religion, which reject the association of belief with Christianity and argue that a culturally neutral, purely propositional sense of believing is both possible and necessary. However, work in anthropology and early modern history, particularly on the emergence of ‘propositional religion’ during the Reformation, suggests that the concept of belief continues to carry complex cultural baggage. Despite recent developments, the debate over how best to represent the religious experience of the Greeks and Romans remains open.

Chapter 2 considers how requirements for Christian officials intersected with ongoing debates and disputes over the definition of orthodoxy in East and West. Eastern emperors and post-imperial kings felt the need to establish forms of consensus which might unite potentially opposing churches and church factions amidst new Christological disputes (in the East) and renewed Trinitarian controversies (in the West). This chapter considers how that pursuit of accommodation affected the practical implementation of ideals of a religiously uniform state. What Eastern emperors seem to have sought (and officials provided) was not personal commitment to a particular Christological orthodoxy, but rather, public support of and administrative co-operation with the current imperial line on its definition. Post-imperial kings adopted similar strategies. While the Hasding dynasty eagerly (and self-consciously) deployed the precedents of Theodosian legislation on religious uniformity within the state, these provisions were quietly shelved elsewhere in the West. This tacit acceptance of Christian diversity within the state maps onto the wider attempts of Burgundian and Ostrogothic regimes and their elite subjects to skirt the implications of doctrinal difference as part of wider strategies of accommodation.

This chapter explores stoneworking practices characteristic of the LH IIIB Argolid that are evident also in elite Boeotian stonework. Particular attention is given to the Treasury of Minyas at Orchomenos and the Melathron complex at Gla, as these structures exhibit robust craft ties to Mycenae and Tiryns.

Over the past two decades, historians of ideas have posed searching questions about the relevance of some of the standard categories used in the investigation of past systems of thought and practice. The categories ‘science’, ‘philosophy’, and ‘religion’, in particular, have been subjected to intense scrutiny, and it is now often claimed that in antiquity and the Middle Ages there were no enterprises that can easily be mapped onto these modern categories. This chapter traces the origins of the modern conception of religion – understood as a generic entity characterised by sets of beliefs and practices – with some reference to the parallel emergence of modern notions of philosophy and science. It also offers some preliminary suggestions about how this might be relevant to the study of religion in antiquity.

This chapter examines the discourse of religious belief in Latin epic of the first century CE. The first section advances a methodological case for the value of high-register poetry as evidence for Roman thinking about religious belief. Building on the model of Charles King, the argument highlights the implications of the literary evidence for key theoretical debates about belief. The second section consists of a series of case studies demonstrating Roman imperial epic’s interest in the role of empiricism in shaping beliefs about the divine. Human testing of the gods features especially prominently in Ovid’s Metamorphoses and Statius’ Thebaid: how to recognise a deity, whether a mortal can perform the same acts as a god, what qualities distinguish the human from the divine. Using Ovid’s Lycaon and Niobe and Statius’ Capaneus as paradigms of a broader phenomenon, the chapter shows how Latin epic develops both a vocabulary and behavioural code of theological scrutiny, which subjects divinity to rigorous examination by mortals as a method of grounding belief. The motivations for this poetic line of inquiry can be traced not only to philosophical discourse but also to contemporary practices of emperor cult and deification.