Abstract: The identification of Aeneas Tacticus has always been a matter of dispute. Most often he is supposed to have been a mercenary officer, probably from Stymphalus, to whom Xenophon makes reference in Hellenica, 7.3.1. Accordingly, one may find the views that in Aeneas’ treatise a mercenary perspective is adopted, a claim also supported by the observation that the author records the phenomenon of the ubiquitous popularity of paid soldiers in the Greek warfare system of the fourth century BC. In this paper it is argued that Aeneas’ outlook in fact had little in common with mercenary ethics; instead, it is the writer's deep commitment to civic values (explicitly stated in the Preface) that is stressed. Especially worth pointing out remains Aeneas’ belief that during siege civic patriotism still matters. It is a value on which success in overwhelming the invaders depends: all the steps and preventive actions of the city's dwellers leading to a successful defense of a native polis must be rooted – according to him – in the conviction that polis in its material (territory, estates, shrines, temples, walls) and spiritual dimension (religion, gods, respect for the parents) constitutes the best framework for life. By the same token, a relatively high importance is given by Aeneas to hoplite troops, usually consisting of yeomen and farmers who were the owners of land. In the author's conviction they could provide the best possible protection to a polis.

Abstract: The Daochos Monument at Delphi has received some scholarly attention from an arthistorical and archaeological perspective; this article, however, examines it rather as a reflection of contemporary Thessalian history and discourse, an aspect which has been almost entirely neglected. Through its visual imagery and its inscriptions, the monument adopts and adapts longstanding Thessalian themes of governance and identity, and achieves a delicate balance with Macedonian concerns to forge a symbolic rapprochement between powers and cultures in the Greek north. Its dedicator, Daochos, emerges as far more than just the puppet of Philip II of Macedon. This hostile and largely Demosthenic characterisation, which remains influential even in modern historiography, is far from adequate in allowing for an understanding of the relationship between Thessalian and Macedonian motivations at this time, or of the importance of Delphi as the pan-Hellenic setting of their interaction. Looking closely at the Daochos Monument allows for a rare glimpse into the Thessalian perspective in all its complexity.

Keywords: Daochos, Philip II of Macedon, the Daochos Monument, Delphi, Thessaly.

Introduction

Reconstructing Thessaly's early involvement in Delphi and its Amphiktyony draws the scholar towards the shimmering mirage of Archaic Thessalian history. Like all mirages, it is alluring, and represents something which the viewer wishes keenly to find: in this case an ambitious, powerful, energetic Thessaly extending its influence outside its own borders and claiming a stake in wider Greek affairs.

Abstract: The view that the successes of Macedon in the fourth century marked the failure, or the end, of the Greek polis is increasingly being abandoned, and some scholars are abandoning also the view that Athens was great and glorious in the fifth century but degenerate in the fourth. However, the successes of Macedon meant for Athens the loss of that ultimate freedom which it had aspired to and had often enjoyed between the early fifth century and the late fourth, freedom not merely from receiving orders from others but to give orders to others, and in this paper I explore the reasons for that change. Some scholars believe that fourth-century Athens was led astray by “the ghost of empire;” others believe that the Athenians were unwilling to pay for a response which could have defeated Philip; I argue that except in the years after Leuctra the ghost of empire did not have malign effects, and even with more expenditure Athens could not have defeated Philip. There was nothing fundamentally wrong with Athens in the fourth century, but Sparta's success in the Hellespont in 387 and the resulting King's Peace, the rule in Macedon of Philip II, who was too clever diplomatically and became too strong militarily for the Athenians, and Alexander's succession in 336 and his success and survival in his campaigns, placed Athens in situations which it could not overcome.

Abstract: Following the recent attempts to rehabilitate the reputation of Ctesias and the information given in his works, this paper proposes to understand certain of the seemingly fanciful details that were associated with the physician and his writings. It tries to shed some light on several uncertainties connected with Ctesias (i.e., his sojourn in Persia) and the Persica (i.e., date, original style and sources of imagery). It argues that the pedestrian lists included in the work might have been later interpolations and that the minor works circulating under Ctesias’ name might have been either sections of the Persica that were taken out to be presented as stand-alone volumes or else falsely attributed to him. The paper addresses the Indica and puts forward several possibilities concerning its relation with the Persica. The influence of Ctesias on the author Deinon is examined, and in the appendix the impact of the Persica on Xenophon's Anabasis is analyzed.

Keywords: Ctesias, Persica, Indica, Artaxerxes II, Xenophon, Anabasis, Greek Historiography, Photius, Plutarch, Deinon.

From Cnidos comes one of the more controversial and influential authors of Classical literature, namely Ctesias, a physician and a historian (probably floruit 401-392 BCE). Ctesias seems not only to have been one of the first prose writers to dwell on his own personal experiences (in this case, at the court of the Great King Artaxerxes II), in what might be considered tantamount to a proto-autobiography, but also to have developed a unique genre of historical writing, following Herodotus yet going beyond his model, in creating works situated between fact and fiction.

A differenza di altre epoche storiche, quella antica è particolarmente selettiva dal punto di vista storiografico. La storia (o, meglio, le storie) dei Greci e l'imperium Romanum, con la sua cultura bilingue, operarono di norma un processo di selezione e talora manipolazione delle fonti, anche quando furono soccombenti in campo militare. Eccezioni marginali sono i casi in cui la storiografia e, in modo talora parallelo o addirittura antecedente, la retorica si esercitarono, anche con un certo successo, su episodi di storia controfattuale (o ucronía): il dilagare dei Persiani in Grecia nel 480, se gli Ateniesi non si fossero opposti, e l'ipotetica conquista di Alessandro in Occidente ne costituiscono gli episodi piú noti. Oltre a ció, niente di più che giochi letterario-storiografici vanno considerate opere come la De excidio Troiae historia di Darete Frigio, presunta traduzione latina di Cornelio Nepote, dedicata a Sallustio, dell'originale di un sacerdote troiano; testo che rappresenterebbe gli avvenimenti troiani dalla parte dei vinti.

La scrittura della storia operata dai vincitori del mondo classico, anche quando costoro subirono cocenti sconfitte, è favorita almeno in parte da una diversa prospettiva culturale dei popoli altri, che non conoscono forme storiografiche simili o comparabili a quelle greco-latine. Questi infatti privilegiano la cultura materiale e le forme di comunicazione orale (anche di tipo epico-folclorico) o monumentale (con un particolare tipo, spesso stereotipato, di scrittura esposta e di comunicazione di messaggi).

Abstract: Proper understanding of Iphicrates’ stratagem at Polyaenus 3.9.38, marred by a lacuna, can be derived from Leo Tact. 20.196, where anchoring a fleet off a harborless coastline is described. Emending Polyaenus’ text from the reading of a later MS also clarifies the anecdote's meaning. Leo knew the full text of Polyaenus, since Polyaenus 3.9.38 does not occur in the abbreviated Excepta Polyaeni, which some recently suggest replaced the Strategica in Byzantine use of Polyaenus.

Keywords: Iphicrates, Polyaenus, Leo, Strategica.

Artaxerxes II's attempt to recover Egypt in 374-373 B.C. with a combined force of Greek mercenaries and Persians fell victim to the bickering of its commanders, Iphicrates and Pharnabazus. A major joint military and naval expedition it was. From 377 or 376 B.C. there assembled at Ace (Acco, Acre, Ptolemais) in Phoenicia (allegedly) 200,000 Persians, 20,000 Greek mercenaries, 300 triremes and 200 triaconters. Diodorus (15.41-45) provides the fullest narrative (from Ephorus?), to be supplemented by tidbits of Trogus (Prol. 10), Nepos (Iphic. 2.4), Plutarch (Aratax. 24.1), and Polyaenus’ Strategica. Iphicrates, the most ruse of all generals in Polyaenus with 63 stratagems to his credit, distinguished himself in four exempla from this campaign in the stratagem collector's compendium (3.9.38, 56, 59, 63). Polyaenus 3.9.38, marred by a lacuna and misinterpreted in two recent translations, demands re-examination.

Abstract: There is a certain difficulty in attempts to describe the period in Syracuse between the death of Timoleon and the coming to power of Agathocles. It was a time of great turmoil and political instability – Syracuse would reappear after 317 BC as a tyranny. This article is a review of the events and causes that shaped the final outcome. The main points of interests are: an attempt to describe a type of government present in the given period, especially the function of the group of the so-called “Six Hundred Noblest,” and the career of Agathocles, an exemplary one considering the political realities of the time.

Keywords: Sicily, Syracuse, Agathocles, tyranny.

After the death of Timoleon in 333 BC democracy was restored in the polis of Syracuse. This period, however, was to last no longer than 13 years, with occasional bouts of oligarchy. Another tyrant, in this case Agathocles, would rise to power in 317 BC. This interim period is rife with questions and uncertainties. Modern scholars have usually concentrated on the later period, when Agathocles seized ultimate power, or just before then (Berve 1953). Still, even partial answers can shed light on our understanding of internal politics in Syracuse in general.

However, before I can deal with the events of that period, I need to review in brief the results of Timoleon's actions and decisions, as they clearly had an impact on subsequent events.

Abstract: This paper deals with a famous passage by Theopompus concerning the hetairoi of Philip II. Athenaeus, one of the three authors who transmitted this fragment to us, states that Philip had 800 hetairoi in 339, which seems to be too low a number for the last years of the reign. In search of a solution which would match Athenaeus’ quotation from Theopompus with other data about Macedonian cavalry under Philip and Alexander, I consider a textual corruption in Athenaeus.

Keywords: Theopompus, Athenaeus, Philip II of Macedon, Alexander the Great, hetairoi.

Modern scholars unanimously credit Philip II with making the Macedonian armed forces an efficient instrument of conquest. However, whereas they agree in general terms in this regard, they vary greatly in details. One such much discussed detail is the strength of the Macedonian cavalry in the reign of Philip.

The most important piece of evidence in this respect is a version of Theopompus’ insulting portrait of Philip's Friends/Companions preserved in Book VI of Athenaeus’ Learned Banqueters (Athen. 6.77 p. 260 D – 61 A = FGrH 115 F 225b). This fragment of Theopompus was notorious in Antiquity for its abusive language. A slightly differing version of it may be found in Polybius (Polyb. 8.11. 5-13 = FGrH 115 F 225a), and the opening sentences of the same passage are also cited by Pseudo-Demetrius of Phalerum, the author of On Style (Demetr. De eloc. 27 = FGrH 115 F 225c).

Abstract: This article attempts to make a critical assessment of the preserved fragments of Thettalon politeia as a source on the history of early Thessaly. The traces of the existence of this text come from the second half of the 2nd century CE at the earliest, but even then it was seen as one of the Politeiai recorded by Aristotle. As a result of this attribution, information from this text is treated as a reliable source of knowledge on the koinon organization of the Thessalians and their joint army. There are, however, important reasons to treat this source with the greatest caution: we have only six short quotations from the work available, and the part which refers to Aleuas’ supposed reforms is very much damaged and has been subjected to a number of emendations by its various publishers. The description of the system of mobilization of the Thessalian army from Thettalon politeia seems anachronistic, and probably arose under the influence of information about the reorganization of the army conducted in the 370s BCE by Jason of Pherae and the propaganda that accompanied these changes.

Keywords: Aristotle, Thettalon politeia, Thessaly, Aleuas the Red, Jason of Pherae, peltast.

Among the most important sources concerning the history of Thessaly in the Archaic and Classical period are the preserved fragments of Thettalon politeia. We can assume that it may have come about as one of the studies of political systems, Politeiai, written around 330 BCE by Aristotle himself or one of his pupils.

Abstract: This preliminary study of the so-called ‘Pistiros Inscription’ challenges the dominant interpretation of the document that has crystallized in the years since its preliminary publication, namely, that the inscription somehow guarantees the rights of traders operating within Pistiros. A reexamination of the rhetorical structure of the inscription and a reconstruction of the inscription's relationship with preexisting documents on this subject, which are not extant, raises the possibility that the function of the inscription was somewhat different than the communis opinio: the ‘Pistiros Inscription’ appears to have supplemented earlier regulation concerning Pistiros and to have attempted to limit the authority of an official, possibly a Thracian royal, who exercised dramatic power within Pistiros.

Keywords: Pistiros, the ‘Pistiros Inscription’, the Odrysian kings, Kotys.

Introduction

In 1988 a program of systematic archaeological research began at a Classical and early Hellenistic site located at Adzhiyska Vodenitsa, near Vetren, Bulgaria, in the upper Maritsa (anc. Evros) valley, close to the western edge of the Thracian plain. This project, initially led by Mieczysław Domaradzki, the great Polish archaeologist and historian of ancient Thrace, brought together an international team of scholars. Their excavations revealed a Classical and Hellenistic settlement that complicates traditional assumptions about the urban development of this area of the eastern Balkans and its associated economies. In 1990, soon after the excavations at Adzhiyiska Vodenitsa began, there was discovered a large, granite block with a lengthy, partially preserved inscription from the nearby site of Assar Dere, located some 2 km to the northeast of Adzhiyiska Vodenitsa.

Abstract: In the 250s and 240s continental Greece found itself in a particularly complicated situation. The growth of the Aetolian and Achaean Leagues, as well as Sparta's awoken ambitions, presented the Ptolemies with favorable conditions to actively pursue efforts to weaken the Macedonian influence there. Initially, the partner of the Ptolemies became the Achaean League. In this way, the Ptolemaic fleet gained important footholds, including both Corinthian ports, Kenchreai in the Saronic Gulf and Lechaion in the Corinthian Gulf. This strengthened the position of the Lagids at sea, and it was the islands on the Aegean Sea and the coasts of Asia Minor that were in the centre of the Ptolemies’ interest. However, the Aetolian League could continue to be seen as one of their possible partners in Greek politics. We should not exaggerate the Achaean-Aetolian conflict. After the death of Antigonus Gonatas in 239, the two conflicted federations were joined by an alliance. It cannot be excluded that Sparta also cooperated with the coalition, and the king of Egypt could have been a convenient link in this cooperation. There is no information whatsoever to suggest an Egyptian initiative to form the coalition. After the defeat of the Egyptian fleet at Andros in ca. 245, the position of the Lagids in the Aegean Sea was not as strong as it had once been. This was all the more reason for Ptolemies to closely observe the Aetolians’ intense activity on the Aegean Sea.