The numbers [in brackets] that follow certain names are those used in Heckel 2006a.

General Commanders

Parmenion son of Philotas

Attalus [1] (Justin 9.5.8; Diod. 16.91.2)

Amyntas, son of Arrhabaeus? (Justin 9.5.8)

Somatophylakes (Members of the Seven-Man Bodyguard)

Lysimachus son of Agathocles (Arr. 6.28.4)

Aristonous son of Peisaeus (Arr. 6.28.4)

Peithon son of Crateuas (Arr. 6.28.4)

Arybbas [2] [died 332/1] (Arr. 3.5.5)

Leonnatus son of Anteas (Arr. 6.28.4)

Balacrus son of Nicanor [replaced in 333/2]

Menes son of Dionysius [replaced in 331]

Perdiccas son of Orontes (Arr. 6.28.4)

Hephaestion son of Amyntor [died 324] (Arr. 6.28.4)

Ptolemy son of Lagus (Arr. 6.28.4)

Peucestas son of Alexander [an honorary appointment 324] (Arr. 6.28.4)

Cavalry Commanders

1) Hipparchs of the Companions

Philotas son of Parmenion

“Black” Cleitus [2], son of Dropides (Arr. 3.27.4)

Hephaestion son of Amyntor (Arr. 3.27.4)

Demetrius son of Althaemenes (Arr. 4.27.5)

Coenus son of Polemocrates

Perdiccas son of Orontes

Craterus son of Alexander

“White” Cleitus [3] (Arr. 5.22.6; 6.6.4)

Eumenes son of Hieronymus (Plut. Eum. 1.5)

2) Ilarchs

“Black” Cleitus (ile basilike)

Amyntas son of Arrhabaeus (prodromoi)

Protomachus (prodromoi)

Ariston [3] (Paeonians) (Arr. 1.14.1; 2.9.2)

Ariston [1] (Arr. 3.11.8)

Demetrius son of Althaemenes (Arr. 3.11.8)

Glaucias (Arr. 3.11.8)

Hegelochus son of Hippostratus (Arr. 3.11.8)

Heracleides son of Antiochus (Arr. 3.11.8)

Meleager (Arr. 3.11.8; Curt. 4.13.27)

Pantordanus son of Cleander (Arr. 2.9.3; 3.11.8)

Peroedas son of Menestheus (Arr. 2.9.3; 3.11.8)

Socrates son of Sathon (Arr. 1.14.1)

Sopolis son of Hermodorus (Arr. 3.11.8)

Lysanias?

IN THE SHORT INTERVAL BETWEEN HIS ACCESSION AND THE START of the Asiatic campaign, Alexander suppressed rebellion in the south and unrest on his northern borders – all with terrifying ease. A rapid move into Thessaly silenced the first grumblings of discontent, and in the following year (335 BC) he arrived at the gates of Thebes, dispelling by his very presence rumors of his death in the north. A single act of terror – the destruction of the city and the enslavement of its population – served to impress upon the Greeks the futility of opposition. The Spartans refused to join the League, just as they had after Chaeronea, but theirs was for now a passive resistance. When they did finally attempt to reassert themselves, they found few allies and no military success.

SETTING THE STAGE

In 334 Alexander's army crossed the Hellespont from Sestos to Abydus on 160 warships and an assortment of cargo craft. That Alexander did not build a boat-bridge was probably a matter of economics – his finances were an ongoing concern at the beginning of the expedition – and the recollection that Xerxes' “chaining” of the Hellespont was regarded as hubristic. Instead he used every symbol in the Panhellenic arsenal. At Dium in Macedonia he staged games in honor of the Muses and the Olympian gods. Still on the European side, he propitiated Zeus the god of safe landings and made apotropaic sacrifice to Protesilaus, the first man in the great expedition against Troy to die on Asian soil, hoping to avert a similar fate.

ALEXANDER'S ARMY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE EXPEDITION (334)

Even the lost primary historians disagreed on the exact number of troops in Alexander's army: According to Anaximenes of Lampsacus (FGrH 72 F29), there were 43,000 infantry and 5,500 cavalry; Ptolemy son of Lagus (FGrH 138 F4) gives 30,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry; and Aristobulus of Cassandreia (FGrH 139 F4) 30,000 foot and 4,000 horse. The only writer who breaks down the figures into contingents is Diodorus (17.17.3-4), whose numbers may come directly from Cleitarchus: the 32,000 infantry are broken down into 12,000 Macedonians, 7,000 allies, 5,000 mercenaries, 7,000 Odrysians, Triballians, and Illyrians, and 1,000 Agrianes and archers; of cavalry there were 1,800 Macedonians, an equal number of Thessalians, 600 allies, and 900 Thracians and Paeonians (that is, 5,100, though Diodorus wrongly gives a total of 4,500). Plut. Alex. 15.1 gives 43,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry; Front. Strat. 4.2.4 simply gives a round figure of 40,000 for Alexander's army. The lower figures for the army as a whole may not include those forces which had been in Asia since the spring of 336; Polyaenus 5.44.4 speaks of 10,000 men with Parmenion and Attalus.

PERSIAN NUMBERS AT THE GRANICUS RIVER (334)

Diodorus estimates the Persian forces at 10,000 cavalry and 100,000 infantry. Justin (11.6.11), probably the least reliable extant source, says that the Persian army numbered 600,000, but the Latin sescenta milia can mean simply “many thousands,” somewhat like the English hyperbole “millions.”

THE MARCH FROM THE HYPHASIS (BEAS) TO THE HYDASPES (Jhelum) marked the beginning of the long road home. This is not to say that there were no more battles to be fought or hardships to be endured, but it was clear to all that Alexander had established the Indus river system as the eastern limit of his empire. Thus he reasserted the claims of the Achaemenid kings, if only for a short while. Little did he know that the collapse of the Nanda dynasty was imminent and the Mauryan kingdom of Chandragupta (Sandrocottus) was destined to subjugate the Punjab and the Indus lands to the south. At the time, it seemed prudent to secure Porus' realm against the threat of hostile neighbors, namely the Sudracae and Mallians, but in the long run Alexander's actions may have weakened the Punjab in the face of new enemies to the east.

All newly acquired territories east of the Hydaspes were given to Porus. Alexander received Abisares into alliance and assigned to him control of Hazara, where Arsaces remained as satrap; furthermore, he had broken the resistance of others who opposed Porus – the so-called Cowardly Porus and the Cathaeans – and now directed his energies against the tribes to the south. Porus retained the rank of king and enjoyed expanded territories and fewer restrictions on his power than Taxiles, who remained under the watchful eye of Philip son of Machatas.

THE DEFEAT AND DEATH OF DARIUS ENDED THE CONQUEST phase of Alexander's campaign. The four Achaemenid capitals were in his possession, along with their treasuries; the Greek allies had been dismissed, with bonus pay; satraps, strategoi, phrourarchoi, and gazophylakes had been appointed; and he could claim the eastern satrapies as his by right of conquest. The struggle for legitimacy continued, however, and it was necessary to overcome any rival claims. The period from 330 to 328 was one in which Alexander fought to establish his legitimacy and authority.

THE USURPATION OF THE ROYAL TITLE BY BESSUS

If Alexander had hoped that the death of Darius would bring the war against Persia to an end, he was soon disappointed. Those who had betrayed their king fled into Bactria via Margiana (the Merv Oasis) and attempted to rally the splendid horsemen of Central Asia and their local barons. Bessus, a relative of Darius (though we do not know how close the relationship was), wore the tiara upright, in the style of kings, and took the name Artaxerxes (V). Politically, it was a major setback for Alexander, who was himself posing as the “legitimate” successor of Darius, having assumed the trappings of Persian royalty. For this reason, too, in an act of piety, he had ordered that the dead king be given a state funeral; Bessus, as regicide and usurper, could expect no mercy. This he clearly understood, but he was doubtless disappointed by the lack of support he received in his own satrapy.

IN 331/30, IN THE FLUSH OF VICTORY AT GAUGAMELA AND IN pursuit of the ultimate prize, Alexander had marched directly from Babylon to Susa. Now, more than six years later, he did not return directly but moved instead to Opis and, ultimately, Ecbatana, which he had passed through quickly in his pursuit of Darius III. But the year 324/3 was to be a long and painful journey from Susa to Babylon. Like the Achaemenid rulers who had preceded him, Alexander now went on procession, fleeing the stifling heat of Susa for the cooler climes of Ecbatana, and sharing the burden and expense of maintaining the royal court amongst the capitals of the empire. To this end, he had deprived himself of the pleasures of Persepolis, but the needs of Alexander's court may have represented a reduction from Achaemenid times.

The king himself returned to the Persian Gulf and sailed with Nearchus to the mouth of the Tigris, and up that river to the town of Opis. Here he was joined by the remainder of the army, which had been led by Hephaestion. Here, too, he announced the demobilization of the veterans – particularly those who were physically unfit – but offered incentives to those capable men who chose to remain. Dismissal was a bitter pill for the men, no matter how much they longed for home. Dismissal, that is to say, under circumstances that caused them to question the entire purpose of their labors.

WHEN ALEXANDER SET OUT FOR INDIA IN THE SPRING OF 327, it was to secure the eastern fringes of the empire – Gandhara and the Indus lands had been under Achaemenid rule since the time of Darius I, although Persian authority had weakened somewhat – not to seek the ends of the earth or greater glory beyond. As elsewhere, there were dynasts who were content to recognize the overlordship of Alexander, and even to accept Macedonian garrison troops, if it meant stealing a march on their rivals. It is therefore wrong to speak of the Macedonian conquest of India, though some enemies were clearly conquered. Instead it was a matter of restoring the authority of the empire over the eastern satrapies and establishing buffer zones. But India was a land of mystery and enchantment to the Greeks and the Romans, and it was easy to forget that Alexander had not, in fact, advanced beyond the boundaries of the Persian Empire.

The weakening of Persian authority in the Indian satrapies no doubt accounts for the fact that it was here that the Macedonians encountered the most determined resistance. In Bactria and Sogdiana, the opposition had come from the nobles who had close ties with Darius and from the local dynasts who felt secure in the mountain fortresses. But their opposition was motivated primarily by their distrust of Alexander and they were easily won over by the expedient of political marriage.

THE AIM OF THIS BOOK IS TO PROVIDE AN INTELLIGENT INTRODUCtion to the conquests of Alexander the Great (334–323 BC). This is not a biography, and I have said little or nothing about Alexander's youth, his sexual orientation, the breaking of Bucephalas, and the like. Nor do I go into detail concerning the nature of Alexander's death. Some aspects of Alexander's personality are discussed, since they pertain to our understanding of his “divinity” and his “orientalism”; but even here the emphasis will be on the political impact of Alexander's attitudes and personal actions. In short, this book was never intended to be an exhaustive treatment. Although the emphasis is on military and political (including administrative) aspects, the battle descriptions focus on key developments rather than providing blow-by-blow accounts. More attention is given to aims and impact, to political consequences of military action, and especially to the use of propaganda for both motivation and justification. Conspiracies and mutinies are viewed within the context of the campaign, as reactions to Alexander's policies and the apparent changes in his personality, as symptoms of battle fatigue or disenchantment with career progress. But, again, little space is devoted to the intricacies of the plots or to cloak-and-dagger scenes.

While it is important to consider Alexander and his military achievement in the context of his times, one must also remember that the basic goals of conquest and keys to military superiority (once allowances have been made for technology) have not changed dramatically over the millennia.

IN 325 BC, ALEXANDER SAILED OUT FROM THE INDUS DELTA INTO the Ocean, the vast body of water which, according to ancient thought, encircled the world. Here he sacrificed bulls to Poseidon and, after pouring libations, hurled the golden cup and bowls into the sea as a thank-offering. The scene was hauntingly reminiscent of the ceremony conducted on the Hellespont in 334. In less than ten years, the Macedonian army had conquered the vast territories of the Achaemenid kings, including the fringe areas of the Punjab and the Indus, the most formidable empire of the ancient world. It had followed the path of unbroken victories from the familiar confines of the Aegean to the edge of the earth, overcoming everything in its way: armies, terrain, climate, all invariably hostile. Now the conquerors prepared to return to the west – some by sea, others along the coastal deserts – to consolidate their victory and contemplate the magnitude of their accomplishments. Little did they know that within two years their beloved king would be dead and their labors seemingly wasted. Most of those who returned to Europe were impoverished, their health broken by years of physical hardship. Others, if they did not die on campaign, were destined never to see Macedonia again, embroiled instead in the bitter struggles of Alexander's successors. The average soldier, whose efforts brought wealth and fame to his king and a small group of Companions, was left only with the scars of combat and slowly fading memories of that glorious adventure in the east.

ANCIENT HISTORIANS HAVE LONG HAD TO CONTEND WITH the fact that their knowledge of the past is based on limited, often secondary and unreliable evidence. Statistical analyses fail for want of sufficient data; historical interpretation falters on the broken ground of textual corruption, authorial bias, and the unintentional but misguided superimposition of Roman ideas and institutions on Greek subjects. Documentary evidence is often lacking, or spotty, and almost always in need of at least partial restoration. And such documents as survive are those recorded on nonperishable material, such as stone or metal, or on papyri which have survived as a result of unusual climatic conditions. But, whatever the form of these primary documents, they rarely if ever survived because of the intrinsic value of the information they contained. Rather, inscriptions on marble or limestone were reused as building material, as doorposts, lintels, foundation stones, or steps. Where their inscribed sides have been exposed to the elements or the tread of human feet, their messages have generally been obscured, if not entirely obliterated. In other places, stones have been cut into two or more pieces and their information scattered and partially lost. Histories survived on papyri in many cases because someone found a more important use for the writing material and recorded bills of sale, land registers, or other accounts on the reverse side. Other evidence survives on palimpsests, texts that have been erased so that the medium could be reused; but traces of the ink remain and these texts are sometimes legible under ultraviolet or infrared light.

GEOGRAPHICALLY, MACEDONIA BELONGS TO THE CONTInental Balkans rather than Mediterranean Greece. The plains of Lower Macedonia, formed by the Axius (Vardar) and Haliacmon rivers, extend to the Thermaic Gulf; to these we may add the valleys of the Strymon and the Nestus, which came under Macedonian control as the kingdom began to dominate the north Aegean coast. But the river valleys lead from north to south, and they brought a steady flow of migrants from the landlocked regions of the Danube basin down into the warmer and more appealing climes of the northern Mediterranean. In the west the mountains offered only limited shelter against the Illyrian tribesmen and the Epirotes farther south; in the southeastern sector, Mt Olympus and the Peneus River (more specifically the gorge of the Vale of Tempe) formed a natural barrier between Macedonia and the Hellenized world. The Macedonian people were scattered amongst the highlands, the various cantons of what we call Upper Macedonia, and the aforementioned plain. In the lower regions the kingdom began to develop, but the highlanders remained fiercely independent and faithful to their regional barons. Hence the formation of the state, effected by Philip II in the fourth century, was a remarkable achievement.

In 513, the European campaign of Darius I, which incorporated the Thracian region into the Persian Empire, organizing it into the satrapy of Skudra, reduced the kings of Macedon to vassalage.

THE PERSIAN EMPIRE IN THE FOURTH CENTURY

At the end of the fifth century, the rebellious brother of Artaxerxes II, known as Cyrus the Younger to differentiate him from the great founder of the dynasty, led a mixed force of barbarians and Greeks into the heart of the Persian Empire. The troops that confronted the armies of the Great King included more than 10,000 Greek mercenaries, drawn from many parts of European Greece, each contingent with its own commander. Although their leader and paymaster, Cyrus, was killed on the battlefield of Cunaxa, not far from Babylon, the Greeks (whose own generals had treacherously been slain by the satrap Tissaphernes) managed to escape the victorious army and fight their way back through the mountains of Armenia to the Greek settlements on the Black Sea. Their story is told vividly by Xenophon, the man who claimed to have assumed command of the force after the murder of the generals. His Anabasis or “March Up Country” was known to educated Greek and Macedonian youths, and there is no doubt that Alexander, as a boy, was held spellbound by the adventures of the Ten Thousand and the exotic world of Persia. But the Anabasis also played no small part in contributing to the view of the Achaemenid empire as decadent and “ripe for the picking.” This picture of Persia in decline, so long accepted by modern writers, has now been revised through the efforts of Achaemenid scholars.