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23990 results in Ancient history

Page 819 of 1200

  • 14 - Warfare and the state

  • from Part II - The Hellenistic World and the Roman Republic
    • By John Serrati, Professor of History and Classics, McGill University, Quebec
  • Edited by Philip Sabin, King's College London, Hans van Wees, University College London, Michael Whitby, University of Warwick
  • Book:
    The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare
    Published online:
    28 March 2008
    Print publication:
    06 December 2007, pp 461-497

  • Summary

    The defining element of the Hellenistic world is most certainly warfare. With his newfound sources of wealth Philip was able to bolster his already large native force with troops of every kind. Siege trains were relatively new in Greek warfare, and had previously only been employed with any effect by Dionysius I of Sicily; afterwards, Syracuse continued to be a centre of the study of siege technology, and this process culminated with the machines of Archimedes in the third century. One of the main characteristics of warfare among the Diadochoi was the fact they were not yet tied to states and were largely fighting over the empire that had been left by Alexander. The economic and administrative forms of Roman imperialism that were now taking place in the provinces could prove more lucrative and less dangerous for the ruling classes than military campaigning.

  • 2 - Warfare in ancient literature: the paradox of war

  • from Introduction: The Historiography of Ancient Warfare
  • Edited by Philip Sabin, King's College London, Hans van Wees, University College London, Michael Whitby, University of Warwick
  • Book:
    The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare
    Published online:
    28 March 2008
    Print publication:
    06 December 2007, pp 22-53

  • Summary

    Wars and fighting are very prominent in the literature of classical antiquity. This chapter looks at literary sources about war and fighting and the problems of using them. It concentrates on three types of fighter: archers, women, slaves. The chapter deals with the interaction between military and non-military institutions: the relationship between the state and organized violence, and attitudes to that relationship as they are displayed in the literary sources, are topics of central importance to the ancient historiography of warfare. It explores why there is so much about war in ancient literature if war was not regarded as the natural, normal state of affairs. Homer's Iliad, with its nearly incessant fighting, might seem to provide a complete reply to any notion that war was viewed by Greeks as unnatural. The chapter ends with six suggestions for the resolution of the paradox of war.

  • 11 - Military forces

  • from Part II - The Hellenistic World and the Roman Republic
  • Edited by Philip Sabin, King's College London, Hans van Wees, University College London, Michael Whitby, University of Warwick
  • Book:
    The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare
    Published online:
    28 March 2008
    Print publication:
    06 December 2007, pp 325-367

  • Summary

    Philip, Alexander and later Hannibal can be regarded as military commanders of genius, capable of guaranteeing the command and control of a heterogeneous military force. As the territory of the Macedonian state grew, Philip was able to expand its demographic and financial base. The expansion of the Macedonian and Roman manpower bases, which in turn enabled military and territorial expansion, was due to a willingness to extend citizenship and to incorporate allied contingents fully into their military structures. Although Macedonia had some of the best sources of shipbuilding timber in the eastern Mediterranean, neither Philip II nor Alexander embarked upon major programmes of warship construction. The standard warships of the Hellenistic period needed crews of c. 150-300, or more in the case of the larger polyremes. During the Second Punic War the Carthaginian naval effort was not as extensive as that of Rome, but it was still far from negligible.

  • 5 - Warfare and the state

  • from Part I - The Late Republic and the Principate
    • By Dominic, Professor of Ancient History, King’s College London, Richard, Professor of Ancient History, Royal Holloway, University of London
  • Edited by Philip Sabin, King's College London, Hans van Wees, University College London, Michael Whitby, University of Warwick
  • Book:
    The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare
    Published online:
    28 March 2008
    Print publication:
    06 December 2007, pp 158-197

  • Summary

    The extant literature of the Roman world of the late Republic and Principate has occasional brief references to soldiers' pay, preparations for particular campaigns and the burden of military expenses. The four centuries of the late Republic and Principate are supposed to have seen two major changes in Roman military provisioning: introduction of a civil administration supplying the dispersed units of the army of the Principate; and the abandonment of this system in the third century AD in favour of direct requisitioning of supplies by the army. The lack of ancient statistics makes it difficult to assess the overall impact of the Roman army and warfare on the economy of the Roman world. Six decades of regular civil wars ushered in a period of two centuries in which civil political conflicts did not escalate into war. The chapter also discusses this Roman revolution and the removal of the soldiery from the politics of the imperial centre.

  • 2 - Military forces

  • from Part I - The Late Republic and the Principate
    • By Boris Rankov, Professor of Roman History, Royal Holloway, University of London
  • Edited by Philip Sabin, King's College London, Hans van Wees, University College London, Michael Whitby, University of Warwick
  • Book:
    The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare
    Published online:
    28 March 2008
    Print publication:
    06 December 2007, pp 30-75

  • Summary

    The period of the late Republic and early Principate is one in which Rome's military forces underwent a transformation in almost all aspects. C. Marius, a senator, used the popular revulsion against the aristocratic mismanagement of Rome's armies, obtained the command in Africa for himself. The army he employed to win his African victories had been subject to better individual training than before. In the course of Augustus' reign, a standing Roman army was set up on a permanent basis, under the command of the reigning emperor and the direct control of his appointed legates. The legions of the Principate were equipped with 120 cavalry. In the middle Republic, each legion had had 300, drawn from the very wealthiest members of society, including senators. Octavian, Caesar's great-nephew, stationed troops in Rome on a standing basis for the first time, although both he and his successors were careful as far as possible not to offend lingering Republican sensibilities.

  • 7 - International relations

  • from Part II - The later Roman Empire
  • Edited by Philip Sabin, King's College London, Hans van Wees, University College London, Michael Whitby, University of Warwick
  • Book:
    The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare
    Published online:
    28 March 2008
    Print publication:
    06 December 2007, pp 233-269

  • Summary

    The subjugation of barbarian envoys in front of Theodosius I, as depicted in the Constantnople's obelisk in 390, soon turned out to be hollow. The same barbarians later became embroiled in a series of conflicts that would seriously undermine the stability of the empire and eventually produce a very different balance of power between the empire and its neighbours. This chapter traces this changing balance of power in late antiquity and its ramifications for imperial international relations. After 378, the balance of power shifted in favour of Rome's enemies, as the Roman Empire was consistently on the retreat with any territorial expansion. The substantial geopolitical transformations experienced by the Empire between Diocletian and the Arab conquest affected its perspectives both in terms of the ideological underpinnings that guided policy and the goals it sought to achieve through diplomacy. The late Empire relied on a fluid decision-making process that meant the implementation of foreign policy was rarely consistent.

  • 4 - International relations

  • from Part I - Archaic and Classical Greece
    • By Jonathan Hall, Phyllis Fay Horton Professor in the Humanities, Professor of Classics and Professor of History, University of Chicago
  • Edited by Philip Sabin, King's College London, Hans van Wees, University College London, Michael Whitby, University of Warwick
  • Book:
    The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare
    Published online:
    28 March 2008
    Print publication:
    06 December 2007, pp 83-107

  • Summary

    It is perhaps preferable to conceptualize international relations in terms of a dynamic interplay between the identity, characteristics, interests and objectives of actors; the actual process of interaction itself; and external structural determinants. Since international relations in the archaic period were conceived as a zero-sum game in which the gains of one party could only be secured at the expense of the other, arbitration of disputes was from fairly early on referred to third parties. By the fifth century the system of bilateral and unequal alliances that the Spartans had contracted was organized on a more formal basis to constitute what modern scholars call the 'Peloponnesian League', though the term that the ancients used was 'the Lacedaemonians and their allies'. The agonistic spirit in international relations was an anachronism. With the new asymmetric relations of power created by the rise of hegemonic alliances, the imperative to secure honour among peers and the satisfaction gained by achieving this became increasingly redundant.

  • 11 - Warfare and the state

  • from Part II - The later Roman Empire
    • By A. D. Lee, Senior Lecturer in Classics, University of Nottingham
  • Edited by Philip Sabin, King's College London, Hans van Wees, University College London, Michael Whitby, University of Warwick
  • Book:
    The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare
    Published online:
    28 March 2008
    Print publication:
    06 December 2007, pp 379-423

  • Summary

    The relationship between war and the state was always a close one throughout Roman history, but never more so than during late antiquity. During the early Empire the relationship between military and political power was particularly evident in two interrelated areas. Maintenance of the emperor's political position was dependent to a significant degree on the projection of an image of military success. During the course of late antiquity challenges to imperial power did periodically emerge from within the Empire's own armed forces. Some of these were the result of ambitious individuals exploiting the interests of troops for their own ends. Donatives and material incentives, and mutinies over slowness of or reductions in pay reflect the importance of economic dimensions and ramifications of military affairs. In the late fifth century, while the western half of the Empire ceased to exist as a political entity, the eastern half continued to exist in one form or another for a further millennium.

  • 9 - War

  • from Part II - The later Roman Empire
  • Edited by Philip Sabin, King's College London, Hans van Wees, University College London, Michael Whitby, University of Warwick
  • Book:
    The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare
    Published online:
    28 March 2008
    Print publication:
    06 December 2007, pp 310-341

  • Summary

    War shaped the existence of the Roman empire, determined its decline and conditioned the nature of post-Roman structures. The majority of wars were undertaken in response to external threats, serious ones in contrast to the excuses which were sometimes exploited during the Republic to justify expansionist campaigns. Most warfare had the predictable rhythms imposed by seasons and logistics. In the east Roman commanders could forecast when Arab tribes would be inactive because of religious celebrations. It was usually to the Romans' advantage to confirm the cessation of hostilities with a formal agreement. In the east written treaties became increasingly more specific during the fifth century. Warfare was preceded by careful preparations, not just of men and material but also of information, as appears from a tenth-century account which purports to describe Constantine's practice. The traditional Latin religion had significance in structuring the lives of Roman soldiers, which was particularly relevant in a unit largely recruited from eastern provincials.

  • 12 - War

  • from Part II - The Hellenistic World and the Roman Republic
  • Edited by Philip Sabin, King's College London, Hans van Wees, University College London, Michael Whitby, University of Warwick
  • Book:
    The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare
    Published online:
    28 March 2008
    Print publication:
    06 December 2007, pp 368-398

  • Summary

    War was a major source of income for Hellenistic monarchs. A remarkable number of innovative military figures arose in Greece in the fourth century: Iphicrates and Chabrias of Athens, Epaminondas, Pelopidas and Pammenes of Thebes, Agesilaus of Sparta and Bolis of Crete, to name only a few. It was, however, Philip II of Macedon who drew many of the new elements of fourth-century warfare together, creating a formidable military machine. The Macedonian king fashioned a true combined arms force, streamlined the logistics of his army, and fashioned an up-to-date siege train. Perhaps most significantly, Philip wrought a new form of political organization, the Greek monarchy, able to direct this new military machine with a single will. Hellenistic strategic decisions were generally based on military circumstances and the desire to defeat the enemy and secure victory. Beginning with the Peloponnesian War and continuing into the fourth century, one sees Greek logistics improving significantly.

  • 1 - The modern historiography of ancient warfare

  • from Introduction: The Historiography of Ancient Warfare
    • By Victor Hanson, Senior Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford
  • Edited by Philip Sabin, King's College London, Hans van Wees, University College London, Michael Whitby, University of Warwick
  • Book:
    The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare
    Published online:
    28 March 2008
    Print publication:
    06 December 2007, pp 1-21

  • Summary

    Military scholarship about ancient warfare continued in both applied and theoretical approaches through the Middle Ages (the works on Roman military and civic foundations by Egidio Colonna and Christine Pisan), into the Renaissance (Machiavelli and Maurice of Nassau) and early Enlightenment (Henri de Rohan and Chevalier de Folard). Europeans increasingly were more apt to elucidate ancient fighting from their own combat experience than to look back to the Greeks and Romans for contemporary guidance in killing one another. Consequently, at the dawn of ancient military historiography a paradox arose: those in the university most qualified to analyse ancient literary evidence, inscriptions and archaeological data concerning classical warfare were by their very nature as academics often most removed from pragmatic knowledge of the battlefield. Despite occasional controversies concerning the methods and topics of investigating the ancient world at war, classical scholarship continues to ground the field firmly in the philological and bibliographical traditions of the last two centuries.

  • 9 - War and society

  • from Part I - Archaic and Classical Greece
    • By Hans van Wees, Professor of Ancient History, University College London
  • Edited by Philip Sabin, King's College London, Hans van Wees, University College London, Michael Whitby, University of Warwick
  • Book:
    The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare
    Published online:
    28 March 2008
    Print publication:
    06 December 2007, pp 273-300

  • Summary

    A defining feature of Greek society was the distinction between those who could afford to live off the labour of others, 'the rich' or leisured classes, and those who had to earn a livelihood, 'the poor' or working classes. A second defining feature of Greek society was pervasive competitiveness. Competition for wealth within a community aggravated the pressure on resources created by the leisure-class aspirations of its citizens. Aristotle noted that 'people commit the greatest acts of injustice for the sake of superiority, not for the sake of necessity': the root of conflict was pleonexia. Aristotle briefly argued in his Politics that the growth of hoplite forces had led to wider political participation, and added that it was in particular the small size of the 'middle group' which had previously allowed oligarchic regimes to flourish. Wars were common, and links between social and political structures on the one hand, and military institutions on the other, were close.

Page 819 of 1200