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This chapter discusses the types of war fought by the Roman army in the late Republic and Principate. It examines the context in which these conflicts occurred, their frequency, duration, decisiveness and results. Much of the chapter deals with strategy, or the practical factors such as intelligence, communications and logistics which impose limits upon it. It is convenient to divide the foreign wars fought by the army in this period into four broad groups: wars of conquest, wars to suppress rebellion, punitive expeditions, and wars fought in response to invasions or raids. Beyond the desire of the emperor to prevent the movement of troops for one operation causing problems in other areas, it is hard to see how any form of grand strategy could have coped with so many local, ever-changing problems. The strategy in civil wars was always simple and wars ended with the death of one of the rival leaders. Compromises were inevitably temporary.
This chapter considers the military capacities and costs of different military forces. These capacities and costs, however, involved considerations rather more complex than, for example, the limited ability of arrows to pierce hoplite armour. The chapter covers the period from the lifting of the Dark Age (c. 750) to the end of the classical period (338). In 338 the Macedonian army of Philip II defeated a coalition of the most powerful Greek city-states, Athens, Thebes and Corinth, established Macedonian dominance over mainland Greece and put an end to hoplite dominance of land warfare. A brief description serves to sum up the treatment of military forces, since the Macedonian army in many ways represented the culmination of classical trends. The Macedonian army was powerful, not only because of the phalangite who replaced the hoplite as the mainstay of the infantry, but also because of the coordinated use of different types of military forces: cavalry of different types, peltasts, slingers and archers.
A graphic pitched battle narrative or detailed description of a siege (complete with gruesome embellishments) was a must for any decent history. The tactical flexibility offered by the auxiliary units was especially valuable in the smaller-scale wars of the imperial period, and for frontier and internal security. This applied most of all to the part-mounted equitatae units. Naval battles were more likely to be influenced by the vagaries of weather and wind than land battles, so there could be some delay before conditions allowed a battle to take place. Rome had traditionally been a successful besieger and was able to maintain an army over the winter if necessary. Roman military thinking believed that a pitched battle fought on a fair or level battlefield would bring a certain victory. The tactical manuals provide some insight into how the Romans themselves explained their military success.
This chapter discusses two themes related to Roman warfare in the late Republic and early Principate: the impact of society and social structures on the conduct of war, and the reciprocal effect of war on society. It focuses on the changing character of external wars in the late Republic, the pressures which this caused in Rome and Italy, both socially and politically, and how these were eventually to lead to internal or civil wars which tore the Roman Republic apart. No matter what the causes of wars were, there is no doubt that there was a massive influx of public and private wealth and slaves into Italy in the second century BC and beyond. The human cost of wars in Italy, and throughout the Mediterranean world, must have been great. The effect of Roman imperialism in the Mediterranean and beyond was determined not just by events on the ground, but in the political developments in the city of Rome itself.
This chapter pursues a generic approach to the battles of the Hellenistic and mid-Republican era to analyse them thematically in order to highlight differences and similarities and to cast light on battle as an overall phenomenon. The battles are analysed on two distinct levels: the grand tactical level examining the 'general's battle' of deployment, command and manoeuvre at the level of the army as a whole, and the tactical level. The chapter discusses the 'soldier's battle' at the sharp end itself, focusing on the interaction of differing troop types in actual combat. It closes by discussing the determinants of success in these engagements, and argues that only through an integrated understanding of battle dynamics at the two different levels can the clashes truly be understood. All naval battles were fought very close to land and might even involve land-based forces. The combat conditions of ancient sieges seem to have provided something of a dilemma for commanders in this period.
The relationship existing between the three major Hellenistic empires, the Antigonid in Macedonia and the rest of Greece, the Seleucid in western Asia, the Ptolemaic in Egypt and adjacent territories, was one of uneasy peace interrupted at quite frequent intervals by outbreaks of warfare in certain disputed border regions. In the case of relations between cities and kings, royal commands were phrased as polite requests, and were acceded to by the cities ostensibly out of a sense of proper gratitude to their benefactors. The relationship, both between two cities and between a city and individual foreign citizens, illustrates the degree to which friendly cooperation was considered to be the proper mode of interaction between Greek cities in the Hellenistic era. In embarking on the process of dominating the Hellenistic world, the Romans entered into relations with a culture older and far more sophisticated than their own, not least in regard to diplomacy and international relations.
This chapter assesses the factors which distinguished Roman armies from their various opponents: the tactical roles of the different troops deployed; their training, discipline and morale; and whether their attitudes to and preparation for combat were equal to the operational tasks they faced. Like their predecessors, later Roman emperors and officers embarking on military operations had at their disposal a number of military treatises or tactica. While Roman cavalry became more effective in fulfilling its existing tactical roles, the fundamentals of mounted combat remained unchanged. Sieges constitute over half the military engagements in late antiquity. Given the relative rarity of large-scale Roman offensives before the sixth century, Roman troops were ordinarily in the role of defenders, and more likely to be limitanei than comitatenses. This changed perspective is evident in contemporary treatises, which hitherto dealt almost exclusively with offensive siegecraft.
This chapter, covering the period from roughly 200 BC to AD 300, sketches out some of the structural determinants of the eastern Mediterranean's economic performance, and then traces that performance through the processes: production, distribution, and consumption. Isolating these very closely interwoven elements is helpful for the purposes of this particular type of overview; ultimately, however, the interaction of the three requires reconciliation and synthesis in other, more targeted studies. The chapter also visits the issue of relative growth across the empire. Agriculture was central to the Roman economy but agricultural production was uncertain in the eastern Mediterranean. Land-ownership in the Roman east offered avenues to security and status, and the preeminent means to garner wealth in the ancient world. Regional distribution of goods was very active in the eastern Mediterranean. An inland city such as Sagalassos appears to enjoy fewer imported wares than coastal cities such as Anemurion or Perge, but has the usual signs of conspicuous consumption.
This chapter presents Mediterranean ecology as a determinant for economic performance in the ancient Greek and Roman era. It focuses on the geography, climate, environment and agriculture in the region, and health of the people and disease occurrence in the region during the ancient Greco-Roman era. The lands surrounding the Mediterranean Sea are generally hilly or mountainous. Dendrochronological evidence from the Parthenon in Athens provides evidence for a pattern of climatic variability in the fifth century BC which resembles the modern pattern. In addition to being subject to regular climatic cycles, ancient Mediterranean region was a world of sudden, unpredictable catastrophes. Mt. Vesuvius played a prominent role in the Roman period, destroying Pompeii and Herculaneum in AD 79. A combination of agricultural crops had existed in the Near East since at least circa 3000 BC. There is evidence to support that ancient populations suffered from a substantial disease burden, consisting of both endemic and epidemic diseases.
Despite the existence of recent pessimistic interpretations of the economy of late antiquity, there is now a widespread conviction that whereas concepts such as decline are ideologically charged and consequently misleading, the use of the concept of prosperity is more respectful of the empirical evidence as interpreted by impartial scholars. Chronology shows that the crisis of the slave mode of production did not lead directly to the development of the late antique colonatus. The exhaustion of the villa system should be considered as an antecedent to the process of transition to late antiquity. The active, mature phase of the transition to late antiquity is set in the third century, and involves the whole of the Roman world. Christian reflections regarding work and profits accompany the economic transition to late antiquity, attaining further completion and elaboration in the process.
Roman society of the early empire presents a confusing and ambiguous image that we cannot easily situate in unidirectional accounts of European economic history. Clearly, public monuments in marble or other precious stone, military security, the urban food supply, roads, aqueducts and gladiatorial games testify to public consumption on a grand scale. On the other hand, the signs of poverty, misery, and destitution are no less obvious. Many inhabitants of the Roman empire only eked out a meager living, their skeletons grim testimonies to malnutrition and disease. Growth occurred because the wealth of the elite may have been a sign of effective exploitation of the poor. Roman National Income was indeed larger than that of any preindustrial European state. One of the requirements for an economy is to provide enough subsistence for its population to survive. The economic and social achievements of pre-industrial societies can be measured if standard of living of the masses exceeds bare subsistence levels.
Commerce and manufacturing certainly occupied a significant place in the early Roman economy. Large landowners and small farmers depended for their livelihoods on the production of surpluses for the market. In Roman agriculture, most common method for cultivating wheat was the two-field system. The Roman empire also witnessed construction of modest sized-estates which regularly included a pars urbana, an often lavishly adorned farmhouse, and a pars rustica, included farming facilities such as those for pressing grapes. Sometimes, many landowners used the institution of farm tenancy to organize the management and labor on their estates. To answer the question of what extent wealth generated from agriculture contributed to an expansion of production in the non-agricultural sectors of the Roman economy, the economic role of cities in the Roman empire and their relationship with the countryside, has to be evaluated. Archaeological evidence indicates that mining was conducted on a widespread basis in many regions of the Roman empire.