The victory in the battle of Adasa in March 161 b.c. again gave the Hasmonaeans dominion over all of Judaea. Judas Maccabaeus took control of Jerusalem and the Seleucid garrison was confined to its stronghold in the citadel. In the course of the following year Judas Maccabaeus took steps to strengthen his position at home and abroad. The high point of his efforts was the pact between the Jews and Rome, which contained among others the formal provision concerning mutual assistance in case of war and an explicit warning to Demetrius (I Macc. 8.24–32). The agreement did not ensure military intervention in practice, but it was a signal to the Antioch authorities of growing Roman interest in events in the country, and warned of the danger in the long run to the kingdom presented by the Revolt in Judaea. At the time Demetrius was preoccupied with the suppression of the uprising in Babylonia and the eastern parts of the empire under Timarchus, satrap of Babylonia, and his brother Heraclides, satrap of Media. Timarchus, who declared himself king, was able to establish ties with Rome, while the kingship of Demetrius I in Syria had not yet gained Roman recognition. However, at the beginning of 160 b.c. Demetrius seized control of Babylonia, and it appears that the local population and the military settlers east of the Euphrates gradually accepted his rule. The suppression of the opposition in the east enabled the king to divert part of the army to dealing with the war in Judaea, in the spring of 160 b.c. (see PP- 43–5 above).

The Books of the Maccabees, the chief sources for the battles of Judas Maccabaeus, do not specify any Jewish tactical unit that took part in them nor any armament. I Maccabees usually confines himself to the general term ἄνδρες (‘men’, ‘people’: 4.6, 29, 5.20, 7.40, 9.5) and II Maccabees is no less obscure (e.g. 8.1, 22, 10.1, 16,25, 11.6, 13.15), in contrast to the wealth of detail they provide for the enemy army. Such a presentation creates the impression that the arms at the disposal of the Jews were meagre and primitive. The author of I Maccabees even complains more than once of the shortage of basic fighting equipment at the start of the Revolt (3.12, 4.6, 31). The complaints do not recur after the purification of the Temple, and the author incidentally notes the improvement that had taken place in the effectiveness and quantity of the armament at the disposal of the Jewish forces (6.6). But that was only a slip of the pen in the course of an explanation of the death of Antiochus Epiphanes in Persia as being the result of his disappointment at the failure of his Judaean plans. Even here the author is not explicit, and is satisfied with a general and vague statement, and he continues to refrain from mentioning the types of weapons or units in the Jewish army even in descriptions of later battles.

Numerous scholars anxious to explain the background and contributory factors that led to the religious persecution and the Hasmonaean Revolt are of the opinion that Antiochus Epiphanes established a military settlement in Jerusalem composed of soldiers of the Seleucid garrison stationed in the Akra, the local citadel. The military settlers were given allotments (klēroi) confiscated from residents of the city. Tcherikover even made this view the keystone of his well-known theory stipulating that the coercive laws were in fact a response to a general revolt of the Jewish population. In his opinion the uprising came in the wake of the confiscations of land which usually preceded the establishment of a military settlement. Some scholars even attempted to explain that the citadel people later on held their own logistically, despite the protracted rule of the Hasmonaean brothers in the city, because their supplies were based on the agricultural produce of the settlement.

This opinion about the change in the agrarian and municipal position of Jerusalem is based not only on considerations of historical probability, but also on two sources which seem to imply that a military settlement of Seleucid soldiers was founded in the city (I Macc. 1.38) and that land was confiscated and allocated to the troops (Daniel 11.39). Before examining the theory as such, it would be advisable to have a close look at these sources.

In the course of the lament on the bitter fate of Jerusalem after its capture by Apollonius, the Mysian commander, and the assignment of soldiers in the citadel, the city is said to have become an ἀλλοτρίων κατοικία (‘katoikiaof foreigners’, 1.38).

The difference in the number of combatants on each side is not necessarily a decisive factor in the course of military events. The quality of the personnel, the standard of weaponry, the capacity for tactical manoeuvring and the particular conditions of the battle site may cancel out or at least limit the importance of numerical superiority. Nevertheless, modern historians are wont to make the number of combatants the first piece of information given about rival armies and the course of a battle. In doing so they not only assume that quantity quite often becomes quality, but are following a prevailing historiographic tradition. Many a historian, of antiquity stressed the numbers because often their significance was more comprehensible to him than was that of other components of military might. In accordance with that time-honoured procedure, we shall open our re-examination of the sources and of scholarly views with a study of the question of the relative size of the forces.

A simplistic view of the importance of the numerical factor in the course of a battle led, in most ancient literature, to a distortion of the data. This feature is not only characteristic of Oriental literature, but is familiar from Classical and Hellenistic historiography. The exaggerated figures cited by most Greek sources, beginning with Herodotus, for the Persian armies up to and including the era of Alexander the Great, are notorious. Needless to say, writers who had no real information at all on the actual numbers let their imaginations soar.

Like the other Hellenistic armies, the Seleucid army on the battlefield was composed of phalangites, heavy cavalry, semi-heavy and light infantry, and at times also light cavalry and elephants. The backbone of the army, however, was the phalanx force of military settlers that was deployed in the centre of the battlefield and served as a sort of barbed and impenetrable porcupine which overran anything in its way as it advanced. It is rightly accepted that the eastern peoples had no proper answer to the massive power of the phalanx units, and that that deficiency enabled the Seleucids to control the complex variety of nations in the empire.

Polybius, the great historian of the period, consistently refers to the phalanx soldiers as ‘Macedonians’, and he does so even in his detailed description of the procession at Daphne in Judas Maccabaeus’ time (30.25.5). Many scholars, however, hold that in the course of time the Seleucid phalanx deteriorated from thè point of view of ethnic composition and operational ability. According to them, at the outset most of the military settlers making up the phalanx units were of Greco-Macedonian origin. But eventually they assimilated into the eastern environment through intermarriage with the local population, and when their offspring lost their military gifts, soldiers of indigenous Syrian origin joined the phalanx units (and perhaps also the settlements) and became a majority in them. The term ‘Macedonians’ applied to these units in the various sources thus denotes not national origin, but combat method, as it did in Ptolemaic Egypt.

The victory of Judas Maccabaeus at Kafar Salama made it clear that the area north of Jerusalem was under his exclusive supervision. Nicanor, who from the base in the citadel controlled the Temple and the city, was in danger of being besieged. Aware of his difficult situation, he threatened the priests with the destruction of the Temple. According to the sources, the threat was designed to force them to turn over Judas Maccabaeus (I Macc. 7.33–8; II Macc. 14.31–6). However, since the latter did not recognize the authority of the Temple priests, and presumably most of them belonged to the high priest Alcimus’ faction which in any case supported Nicanor, it appears that the threat was aimed mainly at deterring the rebels from making an assault on the city and regaining control of it, while the Temple was Nicanor's ‘security’. Nevertheless, the threats against the Temple may also have been intended to persuade the Jewish rank and file, most of whom supported the Hasmonaeans, to hand over Judas Maccabaeus in order to avert the desecration of the Temple, the resumption of persecutions, and the reversion to the situation obtaining during the reign of Antiochus Epiphanes. Be that as it may, the sharp criticism of Nicanor voiced by the priests (I Macc. 7.36–8; II Macc. 14.34–6), if the wording in the sources is reliable, seems to testify to a change of heart in some of Alcimus’ supporters. It would not be unprecedented for moderates to have second thoughts in the face of sudden harsh measures and threats by foreign elements.

The route taken by Bacchides on his second expedition to Judaea which ended in the battle near Elasa is described in I Maccabees in relative detail and with more than the usual number of topographical indications. Nevertheless, the identity of the locations and the meanings of the phrases mentioned – and consequently the overall reconstruction of the expeditionary route – are in dispute. The precise determination of the route is important for an understanding not only of the particular strategy that Bacchides adopted in the expedition itself, but also of the date when extensive Jewish settlement began outside the Judaean Hills area during the period of the Second Temple.

The expedition is described as follows (I Macc. 9.2):

The name Gilgal is well known in the toponymy of the Holy Land, and at least four sites bearing the same name figure in the sources and can be located. The word maisalōth is obviously a transcription of the Hebrew mesīlōt, and can be either a place-name or a noun denoting ‘routes’ and the like, which would mean that Bacchides camped at a crossroads.

In the II Maccabees version of Judas Maccabaeus’ battle oration at Ammaus in the campaign against Ptolemy, son to Dorymenes, and Gorgias, the speaker refers to great victories in the nation's past against foes much greater in number than the Jewish force, such as occurred with Sennacherib's famous expedition and in the battle of the Babylonian Jews against the Galatians. The latter reference, which is not known from other sources, is worthy of special attention. Since we are not oversupplied with data on the Jews of Babylonia during the Hellenistic period, every crumb of information acquires added importance. Moreover, this information, if confirmed and set against its proper historical background, can supplement the various sources on the early military tradition in the Jewish Diaspora. As repeatedly noted above, there is no doubt that this particular speech was not made by Judas Maccabaeus and, like the other orations in the Books of the Maccabees, reflects only the views of the author. That does not mean, however, that the historical references in the speeches should be denigrated.

As we have seen, the Jewish army more than once outnumbered the enemy and its equipment was by no means primitive. On the other hand, the Seleucid army was fit, experienced and rather familiar with mountain warfare, so that the standard of manpower and the battle site would not necessarily have constituted an advantage for the Jews. We should consequently re-examine the conventional admiration for the dimensions of the Jewish military achievement. Is that admiration justified? In order to reply to that question we must clarify whether and when the Jews fought against forces that properly represent, at least formally, the royal Seleucid army in number and quality and what the balance sheet of achievement against them was. It appears that of the various clashes of Judas Maccabaeus with the regular Seleucid forces, it was at Ammaus, Beth Zacharia and Elasa alone that his force was required to face royal armies. In two of these battles he failed, and only at Ammaus did he gain a glorious victory.

The scope of the first two battles, against Apollonius and Seron, was quite modest in scale and importance. Apollonius was apparently then the governor (meridarkhēs) of Samaria and fought the rebels either because their main base was in the toparchy of Aphairema- Gophna, then part of his meridarchy (I Macc. 11.32) or because the troops that were stationed in Judaea and Jerusalem were incapable of taking effective action. The force that set out with him was composed of‘gentiles and those from Samaria’ (I Macc. 3.10).

In the autumn of 162 B.G. there was a court insurrection at Antioch. Demetrius I (son of Seleucus IV and nephew of Antiochus Epiphanes), who was then twenty-three, attained the throne. He had been a hostage at Rome since childhood, in compliance with the terms of the Treaty of Apamea. Learning of the succession crisis in the kingdom that had developed in the wake of Antiochus Epiphanes’ death, he had requested the Senate's permission to return to Syria and take over. When none was forthcoming he departed secretly with the active help of Polybius, the great Greek historian. In Syria he apparently gained the support and assistance of the Greco-Macedonian military settlers, the backbone of the Seleucid army and government. Because of their delicate situation within the native population, they were interested in putting the reins of leadership into stable, strong hands that would loyally represent the legitimate dynasty. Antiochus V Eupator was too young, and Lysias, who indeed aspired to the throne, was not a member of the royal family and could therefore not expect much support.

The accession of Demetrius met with the hostility of the Roman Senate, which did not forgive the new king for having fled from Rome. Suspicious, too, of his aggressive and dynamic personality, the Senate refused to recognize his authority and maintained cor tacts of various sorts with rebellious elements in the Seleucid empire. In contrast to the admiration that he was accorded in Syria, Demetrius was unable to win over the countries east of the Euphrates.

The dating of Lysias’ second expedition differs in the two principal sources. According to I Maccabees (6.20), it took place in the year 150 Seleucid era (S.E.). AS a date relating to Jewish matters, it must be set between April 162 and March 161 b.c. According to II Maccabees (13.1), the expedition took place in the year 149 S.E. AS that book uses only the Macedonian- Syrian variation of the Seleucid calendar, the count of which started in October 312, the reference is to the year between the autumn of 164 and the autumn of 163 b.c.

An examination of the possibilities based on II Maccabees’ chronology indicates that the beginning of the expedition must be dated later than midsummer 163 b.c., that is, close to the end of the year 149 in the Seleucid –Syrian calendar variation: Antiochus Epiphanes died at the end of 164 b.c., the Temple was purified, and then Judas Maccabaeus set out on protracted expeditions all over Eretz Israel. The only chronological clue regarding the end of those expeditions is the statement in II Macabees (12.31, 32) that the expedition to Transjordania ended on the eve of the Feast of Weeks-Shavuot (Sivan-June). According to I Maccabees, Judas Maccabaeus continued with his military operations in Mt Hebron and the coastal plain thereafter too (5.63–8). The siege of the Akra, which was the pretext for Lysias’ second campaign (I Macc. 6.20), began only after the completion of all these expeditions.