This chapter focuses on Proclus’ use of a theological notion of harmony, which is designed to reveal the essence, intelligible relations, and causality of the soul by taking its harmonic structure as a starting point. The fact that the soul is made of specific means and proportions paves the way to the claim that the soul’s essence consists of a logos. This represents neither just an exegetical remark related to Plato’s divisio animae nor the mere use of an image: Proclus regards Plato’s account of the soul’s harmonic structure as a specific key to access theology. By analysing the harmonic component within Proclus’ iconic theology, a clear analysis of both the “theological” implications of Proclus’ study of the harmonic structure of the Platonic world-soul and of the metaphysical-theological function of the ambivalent notion of logos emerges.

After a brief overview of Christian Platonism in modern philosophy, the chapter has three sections. The first defends a Platonic account of value, in the second the primacy of consciousness is defended over and against physicalist accounts of mind that denigrate or eliminate consciousness, and in a third section objections are raised to Christian materialism, thus the chapter concludes with a defense of a more Platonic Christian account of the soul and body.

This chapter explores the ambiguous relationship between late modern western thought and the Platonic tradition. Particular attention is given to the resurgent philosophical interest in Neoplatonic-Christian mysticism and its overlap with emergent discourses of ecocriticism.

Platonism in Byzantine Christianity is a complex topic since diverse traditions of Platonism had an impact on Byzantine theologians. This chapter considers three central thinkers: Dionysius the Areopagite, St Maximus the Confessor, and St Gregory Palamas. It discusses the ‘diffused Platonism’ of these Christian thinkers whose thought included Platonic doctrines such as the radical transcendence of God, the doctrine of providence, the doctrine of Forms as creative logoi in the mind of the Creator, the Plotinian doctrine of double activity, and the late antique doctrine of procession and conversion. Notions like these were established as parts of a general outlook of Byzantine Christian thought. The chapter concludes with a discussion of John Philoponus and John of Damascus.

The chapter focuses on the import of the notion of harmony in Middle Platonist theology and cosmology. More specifically, I show that Middle Platonists developed different theological models in order to build up philosophically consistent cosmologies, and one of the main tools applied to achieve these models is the use of the two notions of cosmic harmony and divine harmonisation. On the one hand, a strictly artisanal notion is crucial for those authors who regard God as a divine craftsman and uphold a temporal cosmogony: in their view, God is directly engaged in the production of harmony between opposite cosmological powers. On the other hand, a mathematical and static notion of cosmic harmony paves the way to a sempiternalistic cosmology, denying any direct artisanal intervention in the world on God’s part.

After introducing Porphyry’s commentary, this chapter asks how Porphyry saw himself at the time of writing. Was it as a ‘Neoplatonist’ and pupil of Plotinus as usually presumed? Does he write as a mathematician and scientist or as a philosopher? Assuming he sees harmonics as a natural interest of the philosopher, what sort of philosopher does he represent himself as? He could claim to be embarking upon a ‘Pythagorean’ task rather than a ‘Platonist’ one, though the two were hard to distinguish in this era. Either would involve the Timaeus. His persona may have a bearing on the work’s date. The long discussion on logos and sensation is examined for indications of Porphyry’s sources and allegiance. This epistemology is distinctive, and the most distinctive features are independent of Plotinus. The section’s eclecticism and polymathy make it hard to associate with a single school, like Thrasyllus, Porphyry’s only named authority here. Porphyry’s persona is in fact complex, as much Pythagorean as Platonist, with an early dating feasible, allowing for debts to Longinus and to the mathematician Demetrius rather than to Plotinus. A Pythagorean’s interest in harmonics is natural.

This chapter is an overview of the varieties of Christian Platonism in early modern philosophy including canonical figures like Descartes, Malebranche, Leibniz, Berkeley, and Kant as well as the Cambridge Platonists, Cudworth, More, Smith, and Conway. It emphasizes the diversity of views inspired by the Christian Platonist tradition in response to Epicurean naturalism.

One of the most remarkable contributions of the Middle Ages to Western thought is the invention of theology as a rational science of faith. This chapter traces the origin of the concept of theologia. By examining the works of Dionysius the Areopagite, John Scotus Eriugena, and Boethius, it is possible to arrive at a picture of how theology came to be used to designate a Christian discipline, and the field for the rational interpretation of faith.

By exploring three issues which connect music with Platonic cosmology, I argue that, according to Plutarch, this connection was at the same time very important and severely limited. (1) In several passages of De animae procreatione, Plutarch compares the demiurge to a musician. These comparisons suggest a certain degree of similarity, but also a significant degree of difference between the two and, accordingly, between cosmic harmony and music. (2) Similarly, Plutarch’s reception of the notion of ‘music of the spheres’, as it emerges from a discussion in Quaestiones convivales, confirms the connection between music and the cosmos only to a limited extent. What the answers of the discussion have in common is that they all warn against excessive appreciation of music. (3) Finally, in Amatorius and De Pythiae oraculis, Plutarch distances musical experience from divine inspiration (enthousiasmos). In general, this persistent combination of importance and limitedness can be explained by Plutarch’s interpretation of Plato’s Timaeus.

In the Christian literature of the first centuries, notions such as those of harmonia, symphōnia and epōidē – just to mention a few – as well as many musical instruments and musical myths borrowed from pagan culture, appear, in an adequately reinterpreted form, in the description and explanation of fundamental aspects of Christian doctrine. The chapter examines some musical concepts and images in Clement of Alexandria’s and Origen’s works, with a specific focus on the Greek musical culture that lies in the background of this rich musical imagery. By analysing Clement’s and Origen’s strategy of reinterpretation and appropriation of fundamental figures and notions drawn from the Greek musical world – such as the figure of Orpheus and the notion of symphōnia – the chapter shows that the use of music stands out as a momentous feature in the apologetic and exegetical activities of these Christian writers, touching upon some crucial issues, such as the Christian attitude to pagan culture and the relationship between Christianity and philosophy.

This chapter considers the trajectory of Northern Renaissance Platonism from the fifteenth to the mid-seventeenth century. It highlights the persistence of certain topics from the time of Nicholas of Cusa to that of Jacob Böhme, while at the same time arguing that Christian Platonism remained an eclectic phenomenon, and to some extent also the production of its critics. The chapter focuses in particular on the idea of the coincidence of the opposites, especially in relation to the Divine, and on God’s presence in nature.

Chapter 5 of De mundo is markedly different from the preceding chapters examining technical details of astronomy, geography and meteorology. Chapter 5 takes an overall survey, presenting a view of the whole cosmos as a unified, well-ordered, magnificent and eternal whole – a true kosmos. Chapter 5 can be divided into three parts: the first introduces the Heraclitean principle of the harmony of opposites (396a33–b22), the second shows how this principle applies to the cosmos (396b23–397a5), and the third argues that the cosmos, built on this principle, is majestic and indestructible (397a5–b8). The detailed analysis of each part is accompanied with an attempt to position this text against the views of other Hellenistic philosophical schools, of the Epicureans and the Stoics as well as the Platonists. Having set forth the Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity of the cosmos, it was important for the author of De mundo to show that this does not undermine the beauty and teleological order of the world nor does it remove the need for God, thus setting the stage for Chapter 6.

I have long pleaded that humanities scholars should intensify and improve their efforts to try and find distinct answers to their research questions. They need to sincerely crave real results, that is to say, to advance knowledge. If they are successful in their endeavours, it means that they manage to learn something about the phenomenal world that they did not know in advance. I think that humanists should regard such new pieces of knowledge as findings, since this is just what they are. Well, discoveries would be just as appropriate. There is nothing dramatic in a claim like this. A scientific finding (or discovery) is simply something specific that has been found out about the world – be it inside or outside the living creatures inhabiting that world.

Once they gain real results, humanities scholars should also present them in terms of results (that is to say with claims to truth) and resist a certain fashionable temptation to degrade them into personal interpretations or biased perspectives that are dependent on their subjective vantage point or something similar that tends to belittle – although in their view ennoble – what they have accomplished.

Why do I emphasise the need for such a seemingly self-evident attitude to science and research in the humanities? Simply because it is not as self-evident among humanities scholars as one would wish. Far too many of them are unaccustomed to thinking, writing and talking about their achievements in terms of distinct scientific findings or results. When asked to mention important knowledge gains in their field of research, disappointingly many have nothing (or next to nothing) to offer. The interview quoted below is a typical example. It is a translated and slightly edited extract from a recent investigation into the condition of the humanities at a regional university in Sweden:

The issue

Aesthetic actvities are present in all known societies, and it seems obvious that they play an important role as an essential ingredient in people's lives. On the one hand, aesthetic considerations seem to be present in almost all spheres and all parts of life. It is as universally human as they are uniquely human. On the other hand, almost no aesthetic considerations seem to be purely or exclusively aesthetic – they carry a very varied repertoire of other considerations and messages too. For example, to a large extent, group identities are enacted by aesthetic means, such as flags, outfits and so on. Rather often such means are even utilised to inflate essentially petty differences between groups – Sigmund Freud once denoted this the narcissism of small differences. But they are also used as individual means to make a mark, to establish personal distinction, to be famous.

By aesthetic activity I here mean the fine arts and fiction, as well as music and dance and the like, or any combination thereof, but also the aesthetic intentions in any other type of human activity – be they fully conscious and deliberate or not, extraordinary or not. Whatever the genre, the consumption or acquisition of what others have created is as much an aesthetic activity as the creation of such expressions themselves. They are closely linked, and all humans do both, albeit on different scales. Yet, whereas professional art and everyday aesthetics are interlinked, and the aesthetic component is inherent in both, they are not the same. As put by Jessica Lee: ‘Art, in the institutional sense, is generally created with the category of art in mind, while domesticity occurs as a matter of course in daily life.’ One could add that the primary function of objects meant to be artistic is to evoke aesthetic appreciation among the public, whether evoking pleasant or unpleasant feelings or no special feelings at all – as distinct from Immanuel Kant's notion that the aesthetic experience is equal to what is pleasurable or delightful. The term public is inserted to distinguish art from other objects also meant to primarily evoke aesthetic appreciation, for example, children's paintings at the moment when they are shown to their parents. While still not fulfilling all formal requirements for a definition, it works reasonably well.

• 1. What makes society possible or impossible?

• 2. The implications and lack of implications of knowledge

• 3. Creativity and societal change

• 4. The significance of aesthetic experience

• 5. The relationship between nature and culture, and natural and cultural selection