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Fernandez and Mittelmann focus on Aristotle’s analogy between the soul as an efficient cause and a craft. They argue that the acts of a craft are a special kind of vital act of a rational soul and that the continuous unifying activity of the source of motion in those cases, which must be constantly and not episodically at work in and throughout each of its acts, is not an idiosyncratic feature of the rational case, but the rational version of a form of efficient causality that is at work in all those vital phenomena of which the soul is said to be the efficient cause.
This chapter concerns the medical background of Aristotle’s accounts of heat, pneuma, and the vegetative soul. Bartoš discusses four Hippocratic texts (namely On Flesh, On Regimen, On Sevens, and On Winds) in which heat/fire plays a prominent role. He illustrates the relation of the notion to soul and pneuma in these texts and suggests several remarkable details of special importance to Aristotle’s zoology.
Aristotle divides the physical world between a celestial realm, which is alive but neither hot nor cold, and a sublunary realm, which is moved by heat in two forms: the vital heat of the biological works and the inanimate fire, the operation of which is explained in the Meteorologica. In the context of the second division we find Aristotle distinguishing between the macrocosm (roughly the world according to Physics, de Caelo, Generation and Corruption and the Meteorologica) and the microcosm (the realm of the biological works, the individual sublunary animals). Wilson argues that this second division does not overturn the first one, but rather complements it, for it has some bearing on the question of solar and vital heat. He further argues that Aristotle mediates the macrocosm and the microcosm through the conceptual apparatus of the spontaneous generation in which heat plays a manifest role.