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Accompanied by a new translation of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics X, this volume presents a hybrid between a traditional commentary and a scholarly monograph. Aristotle's text is divided into one hundred lemmata which not only explore comprehensively the content and strength of each of these units of thought, but also emphasise their continuity, showing how the smaller units feed into the larger structure. The Commentary illuminates what Aristotle thinks in each lemma (and why), and also shows how he thinks. In order to bring Aristotle alive as a thinker, it often explores several possible ways of reading the text to enable the reader to make up their own mind about the best interpretation of a given passage. The relevant background in Plato's dialogues is discussed, and a substantial Introduction sets out the philosophical framework necessary for understanding Book X, the final and most arresting section of the Ethics.
As we have seen Physics I identifies matter and form as ‘the causes and principles’ from which naturally generated substances first come into being (e.g. 190b10–23; cf. Metaph. VII 8). On this model, matter plays the role of the subject from which the change proceeds while form is the positive state acquired as a result of the change. When Aristotle returns to the principles of natural generation in GC II 9, he goes to great lengths to show that these two principles alone are not sufficient to account for the change. Instead, we must posit a third principle over and above those two.
In Chapter 2 we raised the question of whether Aristotle thinks that in all cases of coming-to-be (including substantial generation) the subject from which the change proceeds must persist through that change or whether he thinks this holds only for those cases where S comes to be F in the qualified sense. I tried to show that, if Aristotle did think that in cases of substantial generation the pre-existing matter survives to become a constituent of the finished product, it is not obvious that he provides that defence in Physics I as the standard reading assumes. However, because the idea of persistent matter has such a firm hold on the literature, much more will be needed to loosen its grip. Part of the aim of the current chapter is to provide that additional support by examining the account of generation in GC I 1–4.
The seeds of an answer to the question raised at the end of Chapter 7 – how do formal and material natures interact in the creation of a new substantial individual? – have already been sown inChapter 4 in connection with GC II 9. On the reading I defended there, while Aristotle agrees with those more sophisticated materialists who regard natural generation as the effect of the simple bodies and their inherent powers, he ultimately rejects their account on the grounds that the powers they give them are too instrumental (lian organikas) to serve as primary causes of the change (336a1–12). But Aristotle’s positive account in GC II 9 remains undeveloped in two important respects. First, he says very little about the nature of the efficient cause that was ‘vaguely dreamed of’ by all his predecessors but ‘definitely stated’ by none of them (335b7–8).
Chapter 17 sets out the historical factors behind the differing conceptions in India and Greece of the interrelation of universe with inner self and the absence from Greece of karma.