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In the fifth century BCE, Melissus of Samos developed wildly counterintuitive claims against plurality, change, and the reliability of the senses. This book provides a reconstruction of the preserved textual evidence for his philosophy, along with an interpretation of the form and content of each of his arguments. A close examination of his thought reveals an extraordinary clarity and unity in his method and gives us a unique perspective on how philosophy developed in the fifth century, and how Melissus came to be the most prominent representative of what we now call Eleaticism, the monistic philosophy inaugurated by Parmenides. The rich intellectual climate of Ionian enquiry in which Melissus worked is explored and brought to bear on central questions of the interpretation of his fragments. This volume will appeal to students and scholars of early Greek philosophy, and also those working on historical and medical texts.
Cicero’s practice of dialectic has been analyzed in his philosophical or rhetorical treatises, but not in his letters. While the letters sometimes offer very technical developments, they do not constitute a theoretical corpus and the dialectic we find there, which has an Academic, a Peripatetic or a Stoic origin, is often a soft echo of something he has discussed in his rhetorical or philosophical books, either to praise it or to criticize it, particularly in his polemic against the Stoics. In this chapter, I study the heterogeneous, diffuse and sometimes tenuous presence of dialectic, upon which Cicero himself made a balanced judgement, considering it sometimes as a tool (albeit an important one) with which the orator could make his style richer, sometimes as an instrument necessary to the intellectual rigor of philosophical reasoning. In order to define more precisely my field of investigation, I begin with a study of Cicero's vocabulary and practice of dialectic in most of his works and in his letters. Then I analyze the influence of jin utramque partem on the correspondence as well as its dialogical, and sometimes agonistic, nature.
This introduction summarizes the main questions concerning dialectic and its study after Plato and Aristotle, starting from the general problem of the unity of dialectic from Antiquity to contemporary philosophy. After distinguishing the practice(s) of dialectic and its rival definitions from Plato to Stoicism, the question whether Plato's and Aristotle's conceptions of dialectic influenced Hellenistic and Imperial philosophers is raised, together with the problem of the epistemological status and metaphysical underpinning of dialectic.
This chapter looks again at the Carneadean pithanon. It is proposed that in the Carneadean scheme an impression's initial persuasiveness, prior to any testing or scrutiny, is taken to be due to the fact that its propositional content is consistent with views antecedently held by the subject, and that an impression's phenomenal clarity is an enabling not a constitutive property of persuasiveness as conceived by Carneades. Alternative interpretations are rejected: that the initial persuasiveness of a persuasive impression is a brute fact, not capable of explanation; that it is exclusively or primarily due to the phenomenal clarity of an impression; or that it is linked to probability, pre-theoretical or otherwise. The argument is developed with reference to evidence from Sextus and then tested against evidence from Cicero; the Stoic conception of the pithanon is considered for comparison.