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11517 results in Ancient philosophy

Page 143 of 576

  • Chapter 5 - Stoic Dialectic and Its Objects

  • Edited by Thomas Bénatouïl, Université de Lille, Katerina Ierodiakonou, Université de Genève
  • Book:
    Dialectic after Plato and Aristotle
    Published online:
    26 October 2018
    Print publication:
    15 November 2018, pp 134-167

  • Summary

    The Stoics defined dialectic as ‘the science of what is true, what is false and what is neither true nor false’. This means that dialectic is a science with a specific object, the lekta or sayables. There seem to be conflicting sources concerning their status. According to Sextus, lekta are meanings correlated to thought and language. An alternative theory attributed to Diogenes of Seleucia, introduces them as predicates. In addition, the theory of complete sentences presents them as items combined by the expressions of vocal sound that signify them. Finally, sayables seem first to appear in physics as the incorporeal effects of corporeal causes and do not belong to dialectical contexts alone. These different aspects of the sayables are shown to be different moments of one process, from what happens to a body to its expression understood through cognition and language communication. Thus the notion of a sayable shaped Stoic dialectic not only as a science of signifying sounds and sayables, but also as a technique of argumentation by question and answer that reflects the asymmetry of cause and effect in physics by the asymmetry of name and verb in logic.

  • Chapter 4 - Dialectic as a Subpart of Stoic Philosophy

  • Edited by Thomas Bénatouïl, Université de Lille, Katerina Ierodiakonou, Université de Genève
  • Book:
    Dialectic after Plato and Aristotle
    Published online:
    26 October 2018
    Print publication:
    15 November 2018, pp 114-133

  • Summary

    This chapter studies the place of dialectic within Stoicism, where it is understood as a part of logic and a subpart of philosophy. By drawing on comments by Alexander of Aphrodisias, the chapter contrasts the Stoic conception of dialectic to those of Plato and, particularly, Aristotle. It is argued that what makes dialectic a part of logic, and hence a subpart of philosophy, in opposition to the Aristotelian view, is not its utility but its subject-matter, a particular domain of reality, and its purpose, a concern with truth. In support of this, the Stoic position on mathematics, which was not a part of philosophy, and on rhetoric, which was a part of philosophy side by side with dialectic, is considered.

  • Chapter 3 - Epicurus on Dialectic

  • Edited by Thomas Bénatouïl, Université de Lille, Katerina Ierodiakonou, Université de Genève
  • Book:
    Dialectic after Plato and Aristotle
    Published online:
    26 October 2018
    Print publication:
    15 November 2018, pp 82-113

  • Summary

    This chapter offers an overview of Epicurus’ attitude to dialectic, with particular focus on his critical treatments of fallacy, taxonomy, fatalism and definition. It offers previously unnoticed evidence that Epicurus was engaged in a confrontation with the contemporary Peripatetic Clearchus, the two of them debating the riddle about the eunuch and the bat (Plato, Republic 5) through the lens of Aristotle’s De interpretatione 7. The chapter's findings, if accepted, would have wider implications for the nature and extent of Aristotelian influence on early Hellenistic philosophy.

  • Chapter 6 - Dialectic in the Hellenistic Academy

  • Edited by Thomas Bénatouïl, Université de Lille, Katerina Ierodiakonou, Université de Genève
  • Book:
    Dialectic after Plato and Aristotle
    Published online:
    26 October 2018
    Print publication:
    15 November 2018, pp 168-217

  • Summary

    The chapter investigates the nature, function and extent of dialectic and dialectical arguments within the Hellenistic Academy, with special focus on Arcesilaus and Carneades. Section 6.1 reconstructs Arcesilaus’ and Carneades’ attitudes towards what they, and their contemporaries, called ‘διαλεκτική’. Section 6.2 examines some key ancient testimonies on their philosophical method, and ask whether, and in what sense exactly, it should be characterized as ‘dialectical’. Section 6.3 analyzes the structure of Arcesilaus’ and Carneades’ ‘core argument’ for suspension of judgement, and surveys a number of examples of Academic arguments, asking in what sense, if any, all these arguments were ‘dialectical’. Finally, Section 6.4 asks whether any exegetical and logical space is left to interpret the philosophy of Arcesilaus and Carneades as an exercise in ‘pure dialectic’, as argued by Pierre Couissin in his influential article on ‘The Stoicism of the New Academy’.

  • Chapter 9 - The Sceptic’s Modes of Argumentation

  • Edited by Thomas Bénatouïl, Université de Lille, Katerina Ierodiakonou, Université de Genève
  • Book:
    Dialectic after Plato and Aristotle
    Published online:
    26 October 2018
    Print publication:
    15 November 2018, pp 283-319

  • Summary

    Sextus Empiricus' Ten Modes of Scepticism seem to be devices to generate equal and opposing arguments to dogmatic arguments. An account is proposed of Sextus' Five Modes (the Modes of Agrippa) according to which they should be viewed in the same way. This contrasts with the usual interpretation of them, where they are thought of as codifying the sceptic’s rejection of certain types of argumentation on the basis of the sceptic’s taking a view about the epistemic inadequacy of those types of argumentation. On the proposed interpretation, when the sceptic deploys the Five Modes, he finds himself unmoved by a certain dogmatic argument because he finds himself in a state of suspension of judgement in the face of equal and opposing arguments, and not because he rejects on epistemic grounds the way in which the dogmatist argued. An analogy is suggested between the the Aristotelian topoi and the sceptical modes as being devices for generating arguments.

  • Chapter 2 - Dialectic in the Early Peripatos

  • Edited by Thomas Bénatouïl, Université de Lille, Katerina Ierodiakonou, Université de Genève
  • Book:
    Dialectic after Plato and Aristotle
    Published online:
    26 October 2018
    Print publication:
    15 November 2018, pp 47-81

  • Summary

    The sources for the early Peripatetic views on dialectic are scarce. They enable us conjecturally to credit Theophrastus with six main contributions to this area: (1) a new grouping of the predicables; (2) the inclusion of the problems pertaining to sameness among those pertaining to genera; (3) an examination of issues pertaining to division and classification; (4) a definition of ‘place’ (absent from Aristotle’s Topics); (5) an interest in inferences that look like instances of modus ponens; (6) a detailed examination of ‘precepts’ (i.e., instructions about how to proceed in a dialectical discussion). The evidence for Eudemus and Strato is even poorer: Eudemus appears to have emphasized the destructive character of dialectic and to have reflected on the status of dialectical propositions; Strato seems to have studied rather technical issues and to have added some ‘places’ concerning priority.

  • Chapter 10 - Galen and Middle Platonists on Dialectic and Knowledge

  • Edited by Thomas Bénatouïl, Université de Lille, Katerina Ierodiakonou, Université de Genève
  • Book:
    Dialectic after Plato and Aristotle
    Published online:
    26 October 2018
    Print publication:
    15 November 2018, pp 320-349

  • Summary

    Three senses of ‘dialectic’ can be discerned in Galen's works (section 10.1): (1) Dialectic as logic, i.e., analysis and techniques of arguments. (2) Dialectic as a part of logic that focuses on certain kinds of arguments characterized by the status of their premisses, which are different from scientific ones. (3) Dialectic as the analysis of names or words and their meanings in ordinary language. Galen’s account of logic and dialectic presents similarities and differences with Alcinous' and Alexander, but is distinctively connected to his views about the epistemic status of medicine. Section 10.2 focuses on Galen’s discussion of Aristotle’s eternalist cosmology, in book 4 of his lost treatise On Demonstration. It is similar to that of the Platonist Atticus but highly original: it can be seen as a discussion pro et contra the eternity of the cosmos, showing the fallacies of speculative knowledge. The third section focuses on Galen’s account of common notions and definitions. It is compared with that of Stoic and Platonist philosophers. Once again, Galen’s account appears to be distinctively connected to his views about the characteristics and scope of scientific knowledge.

  • Chapter 1 - Megara and Dialectic

  • Edited by Thomas Bénatouïl, Université de Lille, Katerina Ierodiakonou, Université de Genève
  • Book:
    Dialectic after Plato and Aristotle
    Published online:
    26 October 2018
    Print publication:
    15 November 2018, pp 17-46

  • Summary

    Though it also tackled issues corresponding to those handled by philosophy of language, linguistics, grammar and epistemology, Stoic dialectic was roughly the counterpart of what we call ‘logic’ today. Despite the enormous influence that Aristotle’s logic was to exert until close to our own time, it seems to have had no impact on the Stoics, who instead drew inspiration from an independent tradition whose roots can be traced back to the fifth-century practice of dialectic, reflection about which set in train the developments that eventually gave rise to Stoic dialectic. Evidence about the Stoics' precursors, frequently referred to as ‘dialecticians’, is scarce, however. The traditional view, recently challenged, holds that they belonged to a so-called Megaric school of philosophy. This chapter aims to see what can discovered about these shadowy figures and their contributions. Part of its burden is to urge caution about the question of their school affiliation.

Page 143 of 576