In this chapter, I argue, drawing primarily on passages from the Philebus, the Republic and the Laws, that Plato understands comedy to be, in essence, an imitation of laughable people, where the notion of the laughable, or to geloion, is a normative one that picks out what genuinely merits laughter, and not necessarily what people actually laugh at. According to Plato, the only thing that merits laughter is moral vice, in particular the vice of self-ignorance. I formulate four constraints on ideal comedy on Plato’s behalf: the veridical constraint, which holds that only what is genuinely laughable, that is, moral vice, should be imitated as laughable; the educative constraint, which holds that comedic imitation must aim at educating the audience by encouraging them to reject vice in their own lives; the emotional constraint, which holds that the comedic imitation should cause appropriate and appropriately moderate emotional reactions; and the political constraint, which holds that only moral and political enemies should be portrayed as laughable.

This chapter focuses on the domain of the vegetative soul that represents some of the simplest activities that distinguish the organic from the inorganic. It examines the central vegetative system consisting of the liver, the veins and their supporting organs, as well as the vegetative capacities present in all the tissues that are subservient to this system. The chapter not only discusses the relationship between the central parts and capacities in all of the body, but also examines the ways in which these capacities manifest themselves, arguing they represent Galen’s attempts to grapple with the notion of basic vitality. On some occasions, Galen also calls them ‘demiurgic’, implying a creative capacity. A discussion of how he engages with the pre-existing philosophical tradition and the notion of a biological demiurge helps to delineate the scope of these capacities.

The final chapter entitled Conclusions contains a summary of the findings of the study, explaining the key motivations and claims behind the Galenic understanding of bodily unity.

This chapter looks at the ways in which Galen posits the theoretical unity among the discrete physiological system, especially with a reference to tripartition. Unlike Platonic, the tripartition that is motivated by psychological conflict, Galen’s tripartition of physiological domains shows the three domains to be highly cooperative and co-dependent on each other. The respective material fluxes they control are together necessary for continued functioning. The chapter looks at Galen’s adoption of the popular philosophical idea that identity persists because of the form, and at his analysis of different causes, strongly influenced by the ideas of his contemporary Middle Platonists. While more popular analyses of causes explain that the body is unified in its design, it is the notion of cohesive cause, the chapter argues, that accounts for unified physiological functioning.

Galen employs several different taxonomies of body parts, dividing the body up in various ways. This chapter looks at some of the more prominent ones, especially those that either define parthood or shed light on Galen’s theorization of parthood in other ways. The central question guiding this discussion arises from claims about (in)expendability of various parts: why is it the case that, according to him, the loss of a bone leads to a complete loss of activity the bone supports (voluntary motion in a limb), but the loss of the stomach does not lead to the loss of the activity of nutrition. One of the key preoccupations emerging from various ways in which Galen differentiates bodily parts is the proper activity of parts, which shape his understanding of the role of parts and their significance relative to each other. The final sections of the chapter sketch out the difference between normative and functional understandings of a parthood.

This chapter opens with the discussion of vital unity, a problem at the intersection of medicine and philosophy. Broadly speaking, medicine is concerned with the preservation of a living whole, but for many ancient thinkers, like Galen, the practice of medicine was informed by a highly theoretical understanding of the relationship between the parts and the whole. The first section of the Introduction sets out the key preoccupation of the study: Galen’s understanding of the role that different body parts and systems have in maintaining the functioning of the living whole. Subsequent sections contextualise Galen’s work within the phusiologia tradition, as well the debate between empiricism and rationalism, and briefly outline key classifications to be discussed in later chapters, before turning to the content of individual chapters, situating the present study within the existing scholarship and, finally, briefly explaining how this work approaches the much-debated problem of the substance of the soul.

While the preceding two chapters focused on the physiological domains whose motions take place ‘by nature’, that is, involuntarily, this chapter looks at the activities of the physiological system responsible for the motion ‘by will’. Galen depends on Hellenistic anatomists, especially Herophilus, for much of what he knows about the nervous system, but this chapter looks at both inherited knowledge and polemic interaction. In a rare case of disagreement, Galen criticizes Herophilus regarding the claims about the inherent sensitivity of the nerve tissue. The fact that Galen does not accept Herophilus’ experiments and maintains that nerves only receive capacity from the brain shapes his understanding of this physiological domain. The activities of the nervous system encompass not only voluntary motion but also sense perception and pain, and this chapter argues that each of them has distinctive implications for the unity of the living body as a whole.

This chapter deals with the cardiac system that underpins animal vitality that is more complex than the vegetative one discussed in the previous chapter. The central activity of this system is breathing, and the chapter outlines different types of breathing posited by Galen, the anatomy underpinning them, and his explanation of why the deprivation of breath leads to the loss of life. The chapter also focuses on the three types of pneuma theorized by Galen, discussing their proper activities and properties enabling these activities. The focus on pneuma also brings attention to yet another Galenic division of parts into solids, fluids and pneumata. This division of tissues according to their texture and speed of movement offers an important glimpse into how Galen conceives of interaction between parts. Moreover, the rapid alterations in the pneumatic tissues underpin the physiological understanding of animal vitality.