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Confucianism is China's oldest and most revered philosophy. In imperial times, Confucius's standing was so great that the few writers who questioned his teachings became notorious for that reason alone. But in his own day, Confucius was taken as a wise but iconoclastic and potentially dangerous teacher of young men, and for many generations after his death, Confucians still struggled with exponents of other philosophies for primacy in the intellectual world of the so-called Warring States period (453–221 BCE). In keeping with the orientation of the Ancient Philosophies series, this book will focus on Confucianism as it was conceived and moulded by the earliest masters – in an age when Confucianism was regarded as but one of many viable philosophies, and did not yet enjoy the cultural supremacy that would come in later centuries. That later story will be reviewed briskly in the final chapter, along with a consideration of the standing of Confucianism today.
An exacting yet workable definition of Confucianism is crucial because the boundaries have been drawn both too broadly and too narrowly in the past. In this book, I shall use the term “Confucianism” to refer to the philosophy of Confucius (551–479 BCE), his disciples, and the numerous later thinkers who regarded themselves as followers of his tradition.
The translations and the ‘Further Reading’ were drafted by Alex Long, the introduction by David Sedley. The subsequent revision of the whole, and the footnotes to the translation, were shared between the two.
We are most grateful for the advice, criticism and encouragement of Hilary Gaskin of Cambridge University Press, and Desmond Clarke, general editor of the series.
Ring-composition makes it possible for the culminating insights and conclusions of a work to be experienced as moments of recognition. It is found in every kind of temporally extended artistic composition, on every scale, and in a bewildering variety of patterns: ABA, ABBA, ABCBA, ABCCBA, and so on indefinitely. Scholars have inferred that it is a marker of oral composition; but ring-composition of various kinds is pervasive in later Greek literature as well as well, including Pindar, Herodotus, Thucydides, and various orators and epigrammatists. It has tended to go undetected in philosophical texts-or perhaps to be ignored as philosophically insignificant. The chapter remedies this partially for the case of Plato, and the Republic in particular, after noting some other instances of ring-composition in Plato and Aristotle. It shows ring-composition in Plato and Aristotle, and explanatory regress more generally, as expressing a distinctively Platonic-Aristotelian conception of philosophical method.
Platonic education is forced to extend its purview to appetite and spirit. In the Republic, this part of education is discussed first, in Books 2 and 3. This chapter focuses on Platonic education's primary target and on the perplexing contrast Socrates draws between reorienting it and curing its blindness. Self-styled educators, who claim to be able to put knowledge into souls like sight into blind eyes stand revealed as people who think that the soul does not need an eye, a divine or god-like element, in order to acquire knowledge. Even if the soul were blind, so that it couldn't see the good itself were the two face to face, it could still, by learning everything else the philosopher learns, acquire knowledge. Countenancing the good, however, is a precondition of countenancing any forms.
The Republic famously ends with a consideration of the question of the rewards of justice by proving the soul's immortality. Plato begins by affirming Adeimantus' story that the gods reward just souls and punish the unjust during the course of their earthly lives, and then just as Cephalus feared, the gods do the same in the afterlife. Every commentator on the Myth of Er has rightly understood Plato's insertion of the initial lottery to be his way of initially absolving the gods of moral responsibility for each soul's choice of a life and the consequences that accompany that choice. Blame for one's placement in the choice-queue will then be placed on tuche, commonly translated as "luck" or "chance". The end of the Republic can be read as returning us to the stern Socrates of Book I who urges us to choose the path of justice simpliciter, and damn the consequences.
Not only is Socrates one of the fictional characters in the Republic, he is also its fictional voice. To the modern narratologist, Socrates is the Republic's "internal narrator". This chapter begins with a description of his private thoughts. It also discusses three other Platonic dialogues, internally narrated by Socrates: the Lysis, the Charmides, and the Lovers. Unexpected interventions are plentiful in the Republic; and they are sometimes connected with a private thought of Socrates' in a way that has no parallel in the other three dialogues for which he serves as internal narrator. Socrates invites Glaucon to join him as he rousts justice from a shadowy thicket; shouts as he comes upon its tracks; berates himself for not seeing it sooner. Socrates becomes less authoritative in the sense that he is no longer concealing his moves from his interlocutors.
echecrates: Were you with Socrates yourself, Phaedo, on the day he drank the poison in prison, or did you hear about it from someone else?
phaedo: I was there myself, Echecrates.
echecrates: So what did he say before his death? And how did he meet his end? I'd enjoy hearing about it, you see. For, as a matter of fact, scarcely any citizens of Phlius visit Athens these days, and no foreigner who could give us a clear report about it has come from there for a long time. Other than that he died from drinking poison, that is. They couldn't tell us anything else.
phaedo: So haven't you even found out how the trial went?
echecrates: Yes, someone did give us a report about that, and we really were surprised that evidently he died long after it had finished. So why was that, Phaedo?
phaedo: It was a matter of chance, Echecrates, in his case. For by chance on the day before his trial the stern of the ship the Athenians send to Delos had been wreathed.
echecrates: What ship is that?
phaedo: It's the ship in which, according to the Athenians, Theseus once set out to Crete with the famous ‘twice seven’, and both saved their lives and escaped with his own. Anyway, as the story goes, at that time they had vowed to Apollo that if they were saved, in return they would send an embassy to Delos every year.
The problem addressed in this chapter, sometimes called "the happy philosopher problem", is that one of the main arguments of the Republic was supposed to show that justice is preferable to injustice, for the agent. Based on the Republic, the chapter highlights doing what is just is not preferable to those who must return to the cave, who would be happier shirking their duties and remaining uninvolved with the dirty business of politics. In the case of the returners, Plato provides a counter example to his claim that justice is invariably preferable to injustice. When Plato discusses injustice as psychic disharmony, the account requires that each part of the soul must "do its own". The chapter concludes that how refusing to return to the cave would be psychically unbalancing, and also how the incomplete education of the returners could be used to explain their epistemic defects.
This chapter discusses Plato's image of the Divided Line which focuses on the nature of the ontological divisions associated with the four sections of the Line, especially the third. The initial division of the Line into two parts suggests an ontological focus. The top two sections of the line are distinguished in terms of a method or procedure of the soul. Divided Line passage suggests that the dianoetic and dialectical methods employs the general method as the Meno and traditionally called the method of hypothesis. The difference between dianoetic and dialectic lies in how each treats its hypotheses. The dianoetic method is in some way inferior to dialectic. The chapter examines the consequences of the hypothesis that follow directly from the nature of the Forms involved and not from contingent or artificial features of the hypothesis.
This chapter focuses on the Atlantis story and its links to the main argument of the Republic and the cosmology of the Timaeus. The Atlantis story is fiction invented by Plato, which is intended to carry an ethical message. The story insists on its own truth, something which is a familiar feature of fiction. The Republic argues for the value and benefit of virtue in a person's life even in the worst conditions of the actual world. In the Timaeus Plato creates a cosmology in which the goodness of the gods, insisted on in the Republic, is seen in the good ordering and construction of the whole cosmos, in which virtue and vice get the appropriate reward despite appearances. In the Timaeus the story is presented as a narrative which supports philosophical ideas. But what has actually appealed about the story is the fantastic and exotic aspect of Atlantis.