Recapitulation of the role of the prologue: 205.4–206.26

The prelude of the Timaeus records two main subjects, a summary of Socrates’ constitution and a concise narration of the battle of the Athenians against the Atlantines and of the victory that occurred over them. Each of these accounts makes a very large contribution to the entire investigation of the cosmos. The ideal form of the constitution, though object of knowledge in and for itself, has also harmonized at the primary level with the ordering of the heaven, while the account of the war and the victory has symbolized for us the opposition that is fundamental to the cosmos. The former revealed the essence of the encosmic kinds, the latter revealed their powers from which the activities advance into the universe. The former gave a sketch of the first creation in images, the latter of the second creation, or, if you wish, the former presented the formal cause, the latter the material cause. Indeed, all the philosophers of nature put forward the opposites as principles and establish the cosmos as resulting from the harmonization of the opposites. But harmony and order derive from the ideal form, which, starting from the constitution, [Socrates’] account has revealed as common to and extending to all multiplicity that proceeds in order. For that constitution is transmitted in different forms, whether in the soul, or in human beings, or at the cosmic level. Socrates’ recapitulation, which gave a sketch of the actual ideal form of the constitution wholly separated from matter, reveals to us at the primary level the constitution in the universe, and it is to the same form that it is eager to relate the parts absolutely as well.

In addition there is, if you wish, another way in which one should rank the constitution analogously to the heaven and the war analogously to genesis. The constitution in fact penetrates to the ultimate parts, since all things have been ranked in accordance with the appropriate series extending from the Demiurge right down to the bottom level of the encosmic beings. In a way the opposition was already established in the heavens beforehand, whether through the double revolution – rightward and leftward – of the [heavenly] bodies, or through the double circles – of the same and of the different – of the souls, or through the kinds of being – rest and motion – or through the properties of the gods – male and female – or through any other such division.

The account imitates the act of creation itself

Concerning an image and its paradigm, then, we must distinguish in this way, (29b3–4)

General explanation: 339.5–340.13

There are three things which have a natural interrelation with each other: realities (pragmata), thoughts (noêmata) and accounts (logoi). The first basic principles that he took in hand were related to realities and thoughts. The distinction he will make now is related to accounts. When he separated that which comes into being from Being, he applied himself to the investigation of realities, andwhen in the case of realities he distinguished our forms of cognition (gnôseis), he applied himself to the investigation of thoughts. But now, partitioning off the accounts in accordance with the different forms of cognition, he will show us the separate nature of those accounts. As a result these will [all] be in correspondence with each other: two kinds of realities, Being and becoming; two kinds of cognition, intuitive thought and opinion; two kinds of account, those that are stable and those that are likely. And where else do the forms of cognition come from than from the objects of knowledge? Where else does the differentiation of accounts come from than from the kinds of cognition?

Some thus say that distinguishing in advance what the method of giving an account is and what kind of reader one should have is a matter of literary composition and that Aristotle and many other more recent writers have emulated this. I myself would say that it is the act of creation itself which the account imitates. For just as it first produces the invisible principles of life in the cosmos and then causes the visible reality to exist and also contains its definition prior to the cosmos in its entirety [coming into existence], in the same way Timaeus too applies himself to the investigation of realities, makes the form of the account appropriate for the realities [being described], and prior to the entire investigation first treats and defines in advance the method of giving an account, so that the teaching in its entirety can be calibrated in accordance with this definition.

Introduction of the final cause, the Good

Let us, then, state on account of what cause he who constructed generation and this universe constructed them (29d7–e1)

Recapitulation of the preliminaries to the creation: 355.18–28

Everything said so far has been providing us with preliminaries to the science of nature in its entirety. Some of it has presented the doctrine of the cosmos by means of images and symbols, while some has put in place preludes5 to the entire dissertation. Of the presentation by means of images or symbols, one part showed the unity of things in the cosmos, another their separateness, and of the preludes, some were basic principles (hupotheseis), others were like propositions (lêmmata) demonstrated by means of these basic principles, since one could even count what is said about the nature of the discourse among the things so demonstrated, because [it is] from its having been proved that the cosmos is generated [that] it follows that the dissertation on the cosmos is [only] likely discourse.

General explanation: 355.28–357.12

But once these matters have received a fitting conclusion and Timaeus begins on the creation of the universe, he makes a beginning with the Good, believing that his best point of departure is the discovery of the final cause. For, just as the Good is the cause of everything that exists, so too does the generation of the cosmos proceed from this the most primary of principles. Because all things are from the Good: things for which demiurgic intellect is not responsible, for example matter, have the Good as their cause, and things for whose existence the Paradigm is not responsible also derive their existence from that source (ekeithen). ‘All things exist on account of it, and it is the cause of all beautiful things’, as is said in the Letters (312e2–3). For this reason Timaeus refers the other causes to this, the one cause. For, having discovered the form of the cosmos, and its paradigmatic cause and its efficient cause, by way of the basic principles (hupotheseis), he will now wish to give the most sovereign and venerable of causes, the final [cause], which one should be especially desirous of [discovering] in the case of the universal creation.

Is the Cosmos one or Many?

So, have we correctly called it one heaven, or would it have been more correct to speak of many, indeed an infinite number? (31a2–3)

General explanation: 436.6–437.25

On the one hand, this problem, [coming as it does] after what has just been said, observes [an appropriate] compositional sequence. For, because [Plato] has defined the cosmos as ‘a single (heis) visible living thing containing within itself all living things which are naturally akin to it’ (30d3–31a1), he was bound to judge this very point – [I mean], whether the cosmos is a single entity (hen ti) or not – worthy of consideration and comment. And, in fact, among the philosophers of nature some make it unique (heis), others many, [yet] others not only many but infinite in number. And, secondly (de), this [same] question also has a continuity with what has gone before that stems from the facts themselves. For, since the cosmos has been shown to be an image of the Living-Thing-itself (30c2–31a1), a ‘living thing endowed with soul and intellect’ (30b8), there was a need to put the finishing touch to the account of it by showing that it is also unique. In that way it would be shown that it is also a god, since it would have participated the Henad above Intellect. It was not possible just to call it a copy, because there are also other copies, some of them produced by nature, others by art; or a living thing, because there is also a multitude of particular living things; or ‘endowed with soul’, for a human being too is an image, and a living thing, and endowed with soul; or ‘endowed with intellect’, for both a demon and an angel are living things endowed with soul and intellect. Rather, although, for the reason I stated, he earlier left it unexpressed, he has now introduced [the property] which above all and primally belongs to divine beings, [namely], oneness and uniqueness. For everything whatsoever in the universe that is monadic is divine, because it bears, if it is lawful to say it, an image of the One.

STRUCTURE OF BOOK 2 OF PROCLUS’ COMMENTARY

Book 2 of Proclus’ Commentary on the Timaeus comments on 27c1–31b4 of the original text, amounting to 106 lines of Greek in Burnet's OCT edition. After two introductory sections, the former recapitulating the role of the prologue in 17a1–27b8, the latter giving a brief exposition on the nature and role of prayer, Proclus divides the text into fifty-one brief lemmata and treats them sequentially in the remainder of the book. The longest lemma is four and a half lines, the shortest are a number of lemmata of about a single line of text. Each lemma is cited in full. Proclus’ text, which antedates that of the earliest manuscripts by at least half a millennium, is remarkably similar to Burnet's text, but there are a few significant differences, such as the omission of αɛí at 28a1. All variations between Proclus’ text and Burnet's are noted in the translation in footnotes to the translated lemma.

The commentary on the fifty-one lemmata takes up 240 pages of Diehl's Teubner text, so averages just under five pages per lemma. The length of the individual sections, however, is quite varied, depending on the subject dealt with. The longest sections are in each case provoked by an important theme, as can be seen in the following table, which lists the seven longest:

Some sections, in contrast, are as short as a single page. It cannot, in fact, be said that the commentary itself has any kind of structure beyond the sequence of cited lemmata and the comments made on them, which are in turn determined by both the method used by Proclus and the subjects raised by the text and its commentator. We shall return to Proclus’ method in the next section.

A different, though not wholly unrelated, question is how Proclus the commentator views the structure of the Platonic text. This is in fact what determines the length of the book. The question is not hugely important for him, and what he says on the matter is not always fully consistent, but he makes enough remarks to enable us to reconstruct his views.

Organizing the rest of the treatise

We should, therefore, first examine concerning it what it is laid down that we must examine concerning every [thing] at the outset.(28b4–5)

General explanation of the text: 275.3–20

After the prayer and the exhortation to the listeners and the presentation of the hypotheses, there is nothing else remaining than, following on the basic principles (hupotheseis) themselves, to organize the entire treatise. It leads off with that well-known heading (kephalaion) ‘whether the cosmos has come into being or whether it is ungenerated, having no startingpoint of generation’ (cf. 28b6–7). Indeed in the account preceding the basic principles he said ‘thatwewho are about to speak about the universe whether it has come into being or even if it is ungenerated’ (see 27c4– 5), must ‘invoke gods and goddesses’ (see 27d6), because he is about to start the investigation from this point. Moreover among the basic principles these were the first to be assumed: ‘what is that which always is and has no becoming, and what is that which is becoming but never is being?’ (27d6–28a1). This, then, we must first examine, just as it is laid down first among the principles (archai).

We must also, as Socrates has stated in the Phaedrus (237b7), ‘concerning every subject’ at the outset investigate the [question of] what it is. This is the specific kind (eidos) of the subject under investigation. The [terms] ‘generated’ and ‘ungenerated’ delimit the specific kind of the cosmos. So it is quite reasonable that this should first be required of the appropriate investigation, which indeed he will immediately carry out after this.

Explanation of a point of detail: 275.21–276.7

Among the Platonists many [interpreters] have understood the phrase concerning every thing as meaning ‘on every subject’ in accordance with what is said in the Phaedrus. But Porphyry (fr. 33) and Iamblichus (fr. 31) take it to refer to the actual universe (to pan), namely that it is necessary to speak first ‘concerning the universe’, asking of which kind of nature it is, whether it is found to be ungenerated or generated. We should recognize that the former interpretation is the more natural, for to convert ‘concerning every thing’ into ‘concerning the universe’ is a somewhat inarticulate move.

Which Living thing is the Paradigm?

This being so, we must go on to talk about what comes next. In the likeness of what living thing has he who constructs [the universe] constructed it? (30c2–3)

General explanation: 416.9–420.19

By this Plato shows clearly the continuity between the problems [he poses] and the linking of the later ones to the earlier. The [phrases] this being so and what comes next show the continuity of what is going to be said with what has [already] been said, and that it is on account of the truth of the latter that what will follow is in turn furnished with the starting-point of the inquiry. For, since it has been shown that it was through the providence of the god that the universe was produced as a living thing, it must have been made after the likeness of an intelligible living thing. After all, where else than to the intelligible [Living Thing] did the Demiurge look when he made the cosmos a living thing? And in fact one of the things demonstrated earlier (29a2–6) was that the cos mos, since it is ‘most beautiful’, is created (gignesthai) in relation to an everlasting paradigm. So if in creating an image of this [paradigm the Demiurge] brought a living thing into being, the paradigm itself must also have been a living thing – an intelligible one. For if [the paradigm] was not a living thing, how was this [living thing], which was created (gignesthai) as a copy of it, produced as a living thing? In fact, it is precisely because it resembles [the Paradigm] that it is created a living thing. It is not sensible or particular as a result of resembling it. These [characteristics] both came to it as a consequence of its bodily nature. But it is a living thing because it resembles the Intelligible. And if it resembles it, it was from it (ekeithen) that it got the form of a living thing. And as a matter of fact copies, inasmuch as they are formed after their paradigms, get not only their form from them but their names as well. And so if [the cosmos’s] having life is due to the Paradigm, it is also called ‘a living thing’ after it – and equally ‘endowed with soul’, because the cause of all animation also pre-exists in the Intelligibles, and, by the same argument, ‘endowed with intellect’.

Invocation of the Gods

But indeed, Socrates, this is what all those who share in even a modicum of good sense do. When venturing on any matter, even if it is insignificant, they always in some way call on God. (27c1–3)

Exegesis of the text: 214.17–217.3

You see what kind of subject (hupothesis) Plato has entrusted to Timaeus, what kind of listener he has furnished him in the person of Socrates, what kind of beginning of his discourse he has outlined. The subject matter extends to the whole work of creation. The listener is in a state of readiness to concur with him [Timaeus], being of one mind [together] and focused on the single investigation of the All. This is the reason he himself summons Timaeus to prayer (cf. 27b8). The beginning of the discourse, in taking its point of departure from the invocation of the gods, truly imitates the procession of beings, who first remained among the gods and only in this way have obtained the process of birth from them.

But since it is commanded that all those who share in even a modicum of good sense should always call on God when setting out on any venture, even if it is insignificant, let us observe then from what mental conception in each case these [men] make this invocation of the gods. In fact, if they are people of good sense, it is surely improbable that they do not take their aim at Being and at the truth concerning the gods themselves. I declare, therefore, that all people grasp hold of the knowledge concerning the gods in the true manner, when they (a) apply a pure mind to the investigation, (b) build up their store of what is noble and good in the excellences of the soul, and not in human concerns or external contingencies, and when they (c) observe the power of providence penetrating the whole of reality and bringing all things into harmony with the universe, in order that both the whole and its parts be in the best possible state and nothing be without share in the concern that extends from the gods to each individual thing.

Any argument that the philosophic pursuits of Plato's Socrates exemplify an understanding of love and friendship supportive of political life, as I make in this book, must confront the charges against Socrates made by his own political community, the city of Athens. Socrates was accused and found guilty of doing injustice “by corrupting the young, and by not believing in the gods of the city but in new daemonic things” (Apology 24b). Whereas in his Apology of Socrates Plato presents Socrates giving his defense in an Athenian court, his Symposium serves as his own consideration of those charges against Socrates, and I shall argue his own “apology for Socrates.” As Allan Bloom observes, “the accusation of philosophy's destructiveness was made on behalf of the political men and the poets. [The Symposium] is the only place where we see [Socrates] with the poets.” Indeed, one of those poets at the symposium was Aristophanes, whose portrayal of Socrates in the Clouds in 423 BCE fueled the charges against him in 399 (Apology 18c-d). In the Symposium, Socrates accepts a contest with the poets, including Aristophanes (175e, 205e, and 212c). At issue is their respective piety, along with their wisdom. We also see Socrates there with Alcibiades, one of Athens' leading politicians, one who was thought to have been corrupted by Socrates. His was one of the names, according to Xenophon, most frequently mentioned in connection with the accusation that Socrates did “the greatest evils to the city” (Memorabilia I.ii.12).