Chapter 7 sets Recognising the Best Physician at the heart of its discussion, moving the focus from popular philosophical works to tracts of social commentary that are rich in ethical references or subtexts. I suggest that, despite its content being closely related to the material discussed in The Best Doctor is Also a Philosopher, the latter contains a more generalised advocacy of how the proper doctor ought to behave, whereas Recognising the Best Physician restricts its focus to treating Galen’s individual virtues, and renders self-projection more central to the narrative. This enables Galen to provide a more pragmatic account of the connection he envisaged between medicine, ethics and society, and place the morally didactic function of medicine in particular at the forefront of his intellectual horizons. I highlight how Recognising the Best Physician offers a plethora of passages discussing moral issues, for example the emphasis on the value of truth over deception, the issue of flattery and the ethical corruption of contemporary society. I show that to better illuminate the immorality of his medical colleagues, Galen, inspired by philosophical intertexts, notably the Republic and the Gorgias, creatively likens them to wicked and dissimulating orators. By also attributing features of self-interested politicians familiar from Platonic metaphors to contemporary charlatan physicians, Galen recategorises his rivals’ abilities and undermines their moral standing to suggest that the ideal kind of medicine to combat public disorder is the moral medicine embodied by himself. To that end, Galen sketches himself as a Platonic helmsman, entrusted with a humanistic vocation and safeguarding social and political stability.

The Byzantine author of the pseudo-Lucianic dialogue Timarion, a work dated to the twelfth century, offers an arresting prosopography of Galen centred around the characteristics of his personality that seem to have endured over time. As one might expect, his formidable prowess in medicine predominates, but other aspects that single him out from the medical conclave described in the dialogue surface too, notably his thoroughness and ambition that keep him so focused and show a transcendent devotion to his endeavours.1 Popular philosophy has been one of the least known of Galen’s passionate endeavours, and one which this book has attempted to illuminate from a number of angles.

Chapter 5 turns the spotlight on the rather overlooked treatise Exhortation to the Study of Medicine. It argues that in this work Galen constructs or conjures up images of young readers, intending it to act as an educational manual in moral intensification for prospective medical students. It hence demonstrates how Galen’s concern for his reader’s acculturation might explain the appropriation of advice and the selection of relevant material from a long-established protreptic tradition. In discussing Galen’s moralising methods and the pedagogical elements of the essay, this Chapter also draws links between Galenic and Plutarchan moralism, dealt with in detail for the first time, and thereby arguing that Galen’s moral writings need to be construed in the light of Imperial-period practical ethics. That proposition receives further support from the special features of Galen’s protreptic discourse discussed in this Chapter, especially practicability and effectiveness resulting from the author’s philosophical leanings (e.g. his Platonic-Aristotelian background) and medical expertise (the mechanics of the body and his emulation of Hippocrates in the second part of the essay).

Chapter 4 examines Galen’s credentials as an ethical philosopher in the light of his recently discovered essay Avoiding Distress. It argues that his moral agenda which is expanded upon here makes him an active participant in the practical ethics of the High Roman Empire, with a more profound attentiveness to popular philosophy than is usually admitted. Galen’s dialogue with what has been termed ‘Stoic psychotherapy’ and the Platonic-Aristotelian educational model helps build up his ethical influence through an engagement with the past. On the other hand, his individual characteristics, such as the autobiographical perspective of his narrative and the intimacy established between author and addressee, render Avoiding Distress exceptional among essays (whether Greek or Latin) treating anxiety, especially when compared to the tracts on mental tranquillity written by Seneca and Plutarch. Another distinctive element of the treatise is that Galen’s self-projection as a therapist of the emotions corresponds to his role as a practising physician as regards the construction of authority and the importance of personal experience.

Chapter 8 shows how close Galen is to the style and language of a practical moralist by focusing on the previously neglected moral aspects of Prognosis. The rich ethical material that Galen includes on the way his society functions and the role of physicians is construed as moral reportage, which also enables him to provide the image he constructs of himself as a medic with profoundly moral features. The essay’s preface stresses the quest for truth and the exercise of correct judgement as moral principles advocated by Galen for physicians and all other professionals as thinking beings. This, I suggest, has a strong theoretical background expounded upon in Galen’s ethical work, pointing to his ideological coherence on ethics and its uniform application across texts of a (seemingly) different purpose. The preface is also informed by Galen’s perception of the morality of doctors addressed in the Therapeutic Method, which I see as a sibling account of Galen’s conceptualisation of medicine as a virtuous art. Furthermore, the delineation of moral character is made central to Galen’s notion of the proper physician, which explains the fact that he formulates his text in such a way as to distinguish himself and his peers from charlatans and sophists, a group of moral outsiders traditionally depicted as quarrelsome and vainglorious. This Chapter also discusses the sophisticated discourse on malice and contentiousness that Galen sets up within the context of some of his medical case histories. The analysis of the writing technique and structure of the case histories as much as of the characters involved offers unique insights into Galen’s account of emotions, especially their causes, consequences, theorisation and phenomenology. This Chapter concludes by stressing how in these instances Galen’s medical activity impinged on the formation and sometimes the development of his moral ideas. In Prognosis ethics emerges as a robust area of thought, study and professional performance in Galen.

The immediate reason for which artefacts are not substances is arrived at only by means of the consideration of matter as parts and the focus on the relation of parts and whole, which is undertaken in this chapter. Indeed, artefacts fail to satisfy the substantiality criterion, according to which no substance is composed of parts present in it in actuality (Met. Z 13). I show that Aristotle regards living beings as constituted of parts in potentiality, while he conceives of artefacts as constituted of parts present in actuality. Because their parts are in actuality, artefacts are not as unified as substances, but because artefacts still possess an inherent form, they cannot be downgraded to mere heaps. Thus, artefacts are hylomorphic compounds, but not substances at all.

The Physics constitutes a fruitful starting point for our study of Aristotle’s metaphysics of artefacts. This chapter shows that we can glean from Aristotle’s Physics an account of artefacts that is not only compatible with, but also directly related to the account offered in the Metaphysics. This account chiefly consists of: (1) the art analogy and (2) the fundamental distinction between artefacts and natural beings. Another Aristotelian conceptual tool I discuss in this chapter and is provided by the Physics is the distinction between ‘artificially caused’ and ‘artefact’. This survey will accomplish two tasks: it will present typical artefacts (i.e. generally accepted members of artificial kinds that are brought about by art) and it will open space for the conceptual possibility that art might be able to bring about things that are not artefacts proper. By identifying the building blocks presented in the Physics and presupposed in the Metaphysics, this chapter also lays the foundations for the remainder of the book.

Chapter 4 argues that those material objects that, in the Categories, would fall under the category of substance qualify as hylomorphic compounds (i.e. they have matter and form). It presents three arguments in defence of the thesis that artefacts have forms. The first argument is that artefacts undergo genuine unqualified coming-to-be (or substantial change), as opposed to the mere acquisition of a property by a substrate. Related to this argument is the crucial Aristotelian distinction between per se unity and accidental unity. The second argument is based on Aristotle’s application of the ekeininon-rule to artefacts, which reveals that the identity of an artificial object cannot be reduced to its matter. (The third argument is that Aristotle’s application of the synonymy principle to artefacts shows that the form in the mind of the artisan is identical to the form present in the actual artefact, insofar as it is thought, and that the artisan’s use of tools represents the stage at which the artefact’s form is in potentiality.

This book concerns the ontological status of products of art (technê) in Aristotle, in particular material objects. It makes three main advances with respect to the existing literature: the first will be of interest to contemporary metaphysicians, the second to historians of philosophy, and the third to both contemporary metaphysicians and historians of philosophy. First, the metaphysics of artefacts is increasingly gaining the attention of contemporary metaphysicians, in particular among supporters of hylomorphism, who all refer to or draw on Aristotle. However, there is no consensus about the place of artefacts within Aristotle’s ontology; indeed, there is no consensus as to whether Aristotle articulates a single coherent account of artefacts in the first place. Hence, the first contribution made by this book is to offer a complete picture of Aristotle’s account of artefacts that is sensitive to current issues and that can therefore serve as a guide for the contemporary (neo-)Aristotelian debate. Second, when it comes to technê, historians of philosophy have primarily focused on the art analogy and Aristotle’s use of examples taken from the artificial realm.

Chapter 4 argues that those material objects that, in the Categories, would fall under the category of substance qualify as hylomorphic compounds (i.e. they have matter and form). It presents three arguments in defence of the thesis that artefacts have forms. The first argument is that artefacts undergo genuine unqualified coming-to-be (or substantial change), as opposed to the mere acquisition of a property by a substrate. Related to this argument is the crucial Aristotelian distinction between per se unity and accidental unity. The second argument is based on Aristotle’s application of the ekeininon-rule to artefacts, which reveals that the identity of an artificial object cannot be reduced to its matter. The third argument is that Aristotle’s application of the synonymy principle to artefacts shows that the form in the mind of the artisan is identical to the form present in the actual artefact, insofar as it is thought, and that the artisan’s use of tools represents the stage at which the artefact’s form is in potentiality.