The sophistic counter-attack in the Middle Part

In the first two chapters I proposed and showed that the basic problem of the Sophist is how to distinguish the sophist from the philosopher; a sophist appears in various guises, so does a philosopher, but to secure the possibility of philosophy, it is necessary to determine what a sophist really is. The third and fourth chapters picked up one key concept of the sophist's art, namely, appearing; appearing to be wise is regarded as the core of the sophist's art. The fifth chapter then continued to examine this concept of appearance in relation to the concept of image. In searching for the sophist, we have thus narrowed down the inquiry and focused on the concept of appearance in accordance with Plato's argument in the first Outer Part of the Sophist. Concerning this characterisation of the sophist, however, difficulties emerge and force the inquirers to suspend definitional inquiry during the Middle Part (236d9–264b8). The difficulties are concerned with appearance, image, falsehood and what is not, and they are raised as if the sophist makes a counter-attack on philosophical inquiry.

In this chapter we shall first see what the counter-attack by the sophist means, and then examine what the difficulties raised in the Middle Part are and how they relate to each other, particularly in relation to the basic problem of defining the sophist.

The philosophic defence in the Middle Part

The previous chapter has shown how the four kinds of difficulty are advanced in the Middle Part by the sophist's counter-attack on the inquirers' attempt to define him. It aims at sweeping away the distinction between the sophist and the philosopher, and so endangers the possibility of philosophy itself. This chapter will in turn show that the argument in the Middle Part as a whole is the inquirers' philosophic defence against the sophistic counter-attack. Its overarching aim is to demonstrate the vital distinction between the philosopher and the sophist, so as to show and secure the possibility of philosophy.

As we have observed in the last chapter, the ‘fighting’ image of the sophist is prevalent in the Middle Part. The sophist counter-attacks the inquirers' statements about appearance without being, image and falsehood, and forces them (anankazein) to contradict themselves. The sophist fights (machesthai, diamachesthai) by putting forward obstacles or problems (problēmata) one after another to the inquirers (260d5–e3, 261a6–b4). The way he fights against the inquirers is to deny the possibility of appearance without being, image, and falsehood altogether, by appealing to the Parmenidean thesis, and consequently to make the distinction between the sophist and the philosopher impossible. Confronting these difficulties, Theaetetus doubts any possibility of capturing the sophist (241c2–3, 261a4–b4), but in response to his doubt, the Eleatic visitor urges him not to give up the investigation (241c4–9, 261b5–c4).

Analysing the appearance of the sophist

Now that appearing to be wise proves to be the essential feature of the sophist's art, our next task should be to analyse and explicate, philosophically and systematically, the appearance with which the sophist is concerned. The question is what makes his appearing possible. Since the appearance is at once what the sophist displays by his art and what the inquiry has revealed, to analyse the mechanism of the appearing of the sophist and to reveal the secret of his power, which lies between being an art and non-art, will indicate how the inquiry can deal with the appearance. The inquiry in the first Outer Part has two stages of analysis. First, the New Attempt (232b1–233d2), in the course of focusing on the sophist's appearing, reveals some central features of appearing; second, the division of image-making (233d3–236d8), which follows the New Attempt, illustrates how the two ways of dealing with appearances are to be distinguished. This chapter examines the first stage and the next chapter will discuss the second.

To interpret the conclusion of the New Attempt (Passage 9), we must elucidate the complex phenomenon of the sophist's appearing to be wise. To grasp its exact meaning, we shall consider three distinctions, which the inquiry has illuminated through the New Attempt.

First, so far we have been focusing on the speaking activity of the sophist, but in order to observe his art precisely, the complex nature of controverting (antilegein) should be examined instead of the simple activity of speaking (legein).

What we usually call Cyrenaic ‘epistemology’ is not an epistemology in the sense that other ancient and modern theories are. It is not a systematic theory exploring coherently and in depth the provenance, nature and structure of knowledge, objective or subjective. Nor, when it comes to scepticism, do we find the Cyrenaics coming to grips with the range of epistemological issues that both Academic and Pyrrhonian enquirers raise in order to cast doubt on the possibility of knowledge. The epistemology of the school basically consists of a two-fold epistemological theme – namely that we have knowledge of our pathē but cannot have knowledge of things in the world – and of a number of elaborations upon that theme. Too often in the course of this study we shall see the Cyrenaics in possession of the conceptual tools that would allow them to raise epistemological issues that are recognisably modern, only to realise thereafter that, nonetheless, they do not go much further than their one basic theme. Those who go through the ancient testimonies may experience a sensation not altogether different from bumping their heads repeatedly against a glass door – a feeling that there is an obstacle there, only it is not immediately obvious what it is.

THE ASSUMPTION OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD

The thesis that the pathē alone can be known, while the nature of external objects is unknowable, raises questions concerning the scope of Cyrenaic scepticism. The most important one is whether the Cyrenaics challenged not only our knowledge, but also the existence, of anything external to the perceiver's pathē. If they did, and if they envisaged the hypothesis that each and every individual pathos may be a logical construction of one's mind and may have nothing to do with external reality, they prefigured a problem central to the formulation of modern scepticism, the problem of the external world.

In what follows, I shall argue that, although they denied that we can have cognitive access to the properties of the external objects, they do not take the next step of challenging the existence of the objects themselves in a general and systematic way. At the outset, I should like to stress that I do not take a definitive position as to whether the Cyrenaics need the assumption that there is a reality external to the perceiver; the point is not so much that they need to presuppose it, but that they do not have a philosophical motive to raise doubts about its existence.

There is no evidence that the members of the school formulated definite views about the existence of external objects.

The next parallel, between the epistemology of the Cyrenaic school and Protagorean relativism, was attempted both in ancient and then in modern times. However, there is little evidence as to how precisely the relation between the two theories should be determined.

Cicero clearly considers that there are differences between the two schools since he reports that they have different positions concerning the criterion of truth.

A similar statement is made by Eusebius.

Cyrenaic philosophy is related to two ancient traditions: the Socratic movement and Greek scepticism. It belongs to the former on historical grounds, since it is one of many attempts made by the intimate associates of Socrates and their followers to endorse his ethical outlook and to explore implications of the principles of his teachings. It fits into the latter by virtue of the close philosophical relations linking the Cyrenaic epistemological views with the two main varieties of scepticism encountered in Greek philosophy, the one reaching back to Pyrrho of Elis in the fourth century bc and the other associated with a particular phase in the history of Plato's Academy.

From the systematic point of view, the Cyrenaic doctrine introduced a form of subjectivism which in some ways appears to pre-announce the subjectivism of Descartes, as endorsed by Malebranche and Hume and developed by Kant. The Cyrenaic conception of subjective knowledge constitutes the philosophical underpinnings of the scepticism of the school, summarised by the thesis that we are unable to know anything at all about objects in the external world. In contrast to the moderns, the Cyrenaics assumed that empirical objects exist and that they act upon us in various ways. Nevertheless, their scepticism, more than any other epistemological position in antiquity, resembles what modern philosophy calls scepticism about the external world.

In the introductory chapter (chapter 1), I maintained that the Cyrenaics consider the exploration of epistemological issues instrumental to their hedonism and that this is partly dictated by their understanding of the Socratic project. They follow the model of Socrates (Cicero, Tusc. v.10–11) in that they consider ethics the only study worth pursuing, and commend other intellectual endeavours only in so far as these may help us lead the good life. Further, they espouse the Socratic idea that we should ground our choices on knowledge, limited as that may be, not on belief and conjecture. In the close of this study, I wish to take up a little further the topic of the Socratic identity of the school by asking a question which has less to do with the overall ethical project of the Cyrenaics and more with the character of Cyrenaic epistemology itself. Is there anything recognisably Socratic about it?

Historically, the preface to Sextus' presentation of the Cyrenaic doctrine in Mvii.191–200 may indicate that in antiquity the doctrine was taken to have a Socratic affiliation: ‘But now that an account of the Academic doctrine from Plato onwards has been rendered above, it is not perhaps out of place to go over the position of the Cyrenaics. It seems that the school of these men has sprung from the philosophy of Socrates, from which also emerged the succession of Plato's school’ (190 [T6b]).

The subjectivism of the Cyrenaics and their scepticism with regard to knowledge of the real properties of objects are related to the position that they adopted with regard to our knowledge of other people's pathē. In connection with their discussion of other minds the Cyrenaics also made some remarks about language. Sextus provides the only surviving piece of evidence on both these subjects, which I shall cite immediately below. In this chapter I shall discuss the evidence concerning other minds, and I shall dedicate the next chapter to the remarks about language.