What we usually call Cyrenaic ‘epistemology’ is not an epistemology in the sense that other ancient and modern theories are. It is not a systematic theory exploring coherently and in depth the provenance, nature and structure of knowledge, objective or subjective. Nor, when it comes to scepticism, do we find the Cyrenaics coming to grips with the range of epistemological issues that both Academic and Pyrrhonian enquirers raise in order to cast doubt on the possibility of knowledge. The epistemology of the school basically consists of a two-fold epistemological theme – namely that we have knowledge of our pathē but cannot have knowledge of things in the world – and of a number of elaborations upon that theme. Too often in the course of this study we shall see the Cyrenaics in possession of the conceptual tools that would allow them to raise epistemological issues that are recognisably modern, only to realise thereafter that, nonetheless, they do not go much further than their one basic theme. Those who go through the ancient testimonies may experience a sensation not altogether different from bumping their heads repeatedly against a glass door – a feeling that there is an obstacle there, only it is not immediately obvious what it is.

THE ASSUMPTION OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD

The thesis that the pathē alone can be known, while the nature of external objects is unknowable, raises questions concerning the scope of Cyrenaic scepticism. The most important one is whether the Cyrenaics challenged not only our knowledge, but also the existence, of anything external to the perceiver's pathē. If they did, and if they envisaged the hypothesis that each and every individual pathos may be a logical construction of one's mind and may have nothing to do with external reality, they prefigured a problem central to the formulation of modern scepticism, the problem of the external world.

In what follows, I shall argue that, although they denied that we can have cognitive access to the properties of the external objects, they do not take the next step of challenging the existence of the objects themselves in a general and systematic way. At the outset, I should like to stress that I do not take a definitive position as to whether the Cyrenaics need the assumption that there is a reality external to the perceiver; the point is not so much that they need to presuppose it, but that they do not have a philosophical motive to raise doubts about its existence.

There is no evidence that the members of the school formulated definite views about the existence of external objects.

The next parallel, between the epistemology of the Cyrenaic school and Protagorean relativism, was attempted both in ancient and then in modern times. However, there is little evidence as to how precisely the relation between the two theories should be determined.

Cicero clearly considers that there are differences between the two schools since he reports that they have different positions concerning the criterion of truth.

A similar statement is made by Eusebius.

Cyrenaic philosophy is related to two ancient traditions: the Socratic movement and Greek scepticism. It belongs to the former on historical grounds, since it is one of many attempts made by the intimate associates of Socrates and their followers to endorse his ethical outlook and to explore implications of the principles of his teachings. It fits into the latter by virtue of the close philosophical relations linking the Cyrenaic epistemological views with the two main varieties of scepticism encountered in Greek philosophy, the one reaching back to Pyrrho of Elis in the fourth century bc and the other associated with a particular phase in the history of Plato's Academy.

From the systematic point of view, the Cyrenaic doctrine introduced a form of subjectivism which in some ways appears to pre-announce the subjectivism of Descartes, as endorsed by Malebranche and Hume and developed by Kant. The Cyrenaic conception of subjective knowledge constitutes the philosophical underpinnings of the scepticism of the school, summarised by the thesis that we are unable to know anything at all about objects in the external world. In contrast to the moderns, the Cyrenaics assumed that empirical objects exist and that they act upon us in various ways. Nevertheless, their scepticism, more than any other epistemological position in antiquity, resembles what modern philosophy calls scepticism about the external world.

In the introductory chapter (chapter 1), I maintained that the Cyrenaics consider the exploration of epistemological issues instrumental to their hedonism and that this is partly dictated by their understanding of the Socratic project. They follow the model of Socrates (Cicero, Tusc. v.10–11) in that they consider ethics the only study worth pursuing, and commend other intellectual endeavours only in so far as these may help us lead the good life. Further, they espouse the Socratic idea that we should ground our choices on knowledge, limited as that may be, not on belief and conjecture. In the close of this study, I wish to take up a little further the topic of the Socratic identity of the school by asking a question which has less to do with the overall ethical project of the Cyrenaics and more with the character of Cyrenaic epistemology itself. Is there anything recognisably Socratic about it?

Historically, the preface to Sextus' presentation of the Cyrenaic doctrine in Mvii.191–200 may indicate that in antiquity the doctrine was taken to have a Socratic affiliation: ‘But now that an account of the Academic doctrine from Plato onwards has been rendered above, it is not perhaps out of place to go over the position of the Cyrenaics. It seems that the school of these men has sprung from the philosophy of Socrates, from which also emerged the succession of Plato's school’ (190 [T6b]).

The subjectivism of the Cyrenaics and their scepticism with regard to knowledge of the real properties of objects are related to the position that they adopted with regard to our knowledge of other people's pathē. In connection with their discussion of other minds the Cyrenaics also made some remarks about language. Sextus provides the only surviving piece of evidence on both these subjects, which I shall cite immediately below. In this chapter I shall discuss the evidence concerning other minds, and I shall dedicate the next chapter to the remarks about language.

It seems that the Cyrenaics did not have detailed linguistic and semantic views. However, the Sextus passage (T6b) cited in the previous chapter (pp. 89–90) indicates that some Cyrenaic positions are relevant to language. These are the following: (i) the pathē are private; (ii) nobody has access to the pathē of anyone else: in that sense the pathē are incommunicable; (iii) there is no common criterion, which on one interpretation entails that no proposition is evidently true of an object or state of affairs in the world, but on another interpretation (outlined at the end of the previous chapter) entails that we cannot establish truths about shared experiences. On the other hand, (iv) the onomata which we use are koina, commonly shared; also, the text suggests that (v) there is a disparity between the lack of a common criterion and the use of commonly shared onomata. The point appears to be that, when I and my neighbour both use the word ‘white’ in relation to the same thing, we tend to assume that the content of our pathē is qualitatively identical; yet we should not assume this, because of (i), (ii) and (iii).

In what follows, I shall first specify what the expression ‘common names’ (koina onomata) may mean, what entities are ‘the things’ designated by these ‘names’, and what semantic relation is indicated by the statement that common names are ‘assigned’ (tithesthai) to things.

In the two subsequent chapters, I shall turn to the parallels drawn by ancient authors between the Cyrenaic position on the one hand, and the doctrines of Epicurus and of Protagoras in Plato's Theaetetus on the other hand. My aim is to show where the Cyrenaic position approaches certain varieties of empiricism and relativism, and also where it diverges from either of these positions. If this is achieved, we may reach a better understanding of the bounds and limitations of the Cyrenaic doctrine.

I shall start with Plutarch [T1], who raises the issue of the relation between Cyrenaic scepticism and Epicurean empiricism. Plutarch's testimony [T1] consists of two parts. In chapter 6 I discussed the first part of the testimony (1120c–f), in which Colotes comes out as an unreliable and even malicious historian, but as a good philosopher. This picture changes in the second part of Plutarch's passage (1120f–1121e), in which Colotes is accused of philosophical naivety on two accounts. First, Plutarch maintains that Colotes fails to see that he is attacking the very tenets which, as an Epicurean, he is bound to endorse.

The evidence on Cyrenaic epistemology comes from secondary sources and consists entirely of testimonies, not of fragments. None of the titles mentioned in the lists of the doxographers seems to be of an epistemological treatise. But the lists refer only to the works of Aristippus of Cyrene, Theodorus and Hegesias, and none of them is known to have had detailed epistemological views. The epistemology of the school may have been developed in treatises of Aristippus the Younger and Anniceris, probably under the heading of ethics.

Although the testimonies are second-hand and occur principally in polemical contexts, they are often based on good sources and constitute reliable evidence about the Cyrenaic positions. Also, the polemical arguments brought against these positions by ancient authors are frequently enlightening. In my selection of texts, I have included the epistemological testimonies, and also materials on psychology and ethics that have a bearing on the topics that I discuss.

COLOTES AND PLUTARCH

Our earliest source on the Cyrenaic theory of knowledge is Colotes, a young contemporary of Epicurus. After Epicurus' death (271 bc) and Arcesilaus' ascent to the leadership of the Academy (some time in the 260s bc), Colotes wrote a book entitled On the Fact that it is not Possible even to Live according to the Doctrines of the Other Philosophers, in which he criticised the doctrines of Parmenides, Empedocles, Socrates, Melissus, Plato, Stilpo, and two schools which he does not name but which are easily identified as the Cyrenaics and the followers of Arcesilaus.

The Cyrenaics employed two different types of locution to designate pathē. I shall call these types verbal and adverbial.

The verbal expressions consist of present-tense passive verbs. We find them in the testimonies in the first and third persons, singular and plural, and in the infinitive. Colotes attempts to ridicule the Cyrenaics by attributing to them the claim that ‘they are themselves being walled (toichousthai) and horsed (hippousthai) and manned (anthrōpousthai)’ (1120d [T1]); Plutarch denounces Colotes for intentional inaccuracy, and reports what he claims to be the true letter of the doctrine: ‘they say, we are being sweetened (glykainesthai) and bittered (pikrainesthai) and chilled (psychesthai) and warmed (thermainesthai) and illuminated (phōtizesthai) and darkened (skotizesthai)’ (1120e [T1]); the anonymous Theaetetus commentator attests the locution ‘I am being burnt’ (kaiomai: 65.33 [T3]), and Sextus mentions the expressions ‘we are being whitened (leukainometha) and sweetened (glykazometha)’ (M v11.191. [T6b]), ‘he is being reddened’ (erythrainetai: 192), ‘they are being yellowed (ōchrainontai) or reddened (erythrainontai) or doubled (dyazontai)’ (193), and ‘being whitened’ (leukainesthai: 197).

The adverbial formulas are constituted by a present-tense passive verb and an adverb. According to Sextus' testimony in T6b, the Cyrenaics maintained that ‘it is probable that one is disposed whitely (leukantikōs diatethēnai) even by what is not white’ (Sextus, M v11.192 [T6b]). They also assumed that ‘the person who suffers from vertigo or jaundice is moved yellowly’ (ōchrantikōs kineitai: ibid.).

PHYSIOLOGY

Pleasure and pain are pathē (singular, pathos). The term pathos is related to the Greek verb paschein (‘to undergo’, ‘to suffer a change’), and denotes effects upon a subject, usually caused by contact with an external object. Depending on the context, a pathos may occur in inanimate substances or in animate beings, and may be an entity or an occurrence of various kinds: a stone heated by the sun undergoes a pathos and becomes warm; the diagnosis of a disease is sometimes effected by observing the pathē or physical symptoms displayed by the patient; and the pain that the patient feels is a pathos as well.

Although the Cyrenaics focused on pathē in connection with perceivers, their analysis preserves physicalistic overtones. These are reflected, I believe, in the definitions of pleasure and pain as smooth and rough motions located in the flesh (Sextus, PH 1.215 [T6a]) or in the soul (D.L. 11.90 [T7c]), which are somehow related to pleasurable and painful feelings. There is little direct evidence about the nature of these motions, but, in my view, ‘smooth’ and ‘rough’ designate empirical properties of physical changes in the body and do not refer to the way these changes feel to the perceiver. First, pleasure does not feel smooth but pleasurable, and pain does not feel rough but painful.