To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
THE TRANSMISSION OF THE GREEK LEGACY TO THE ARAB WORLD: AN OUTLINE
It is widely acknowledged that the origins of Arabic-Islamic philosophy are to be found in the transmission of a great amount of texts both from classical Greece – some Plato and virtually the whole of the Aristotelian corpus – and post-classical Greek thought, from Hellenism to late antiquity. In this chapter, we shall see that post-classical thought has been of momentous importance in the Arab interpretation of Plato’s and Aristotle’s doctrines. Predictably, the transmission of their works was made possible through the spread of classical Greek philosophy in the Mediterranean area during the Hellenistic and imperial ages, and then again through the scholastic tradition of late antiquity. However, post-classical thought was decisive for the rise of Islamic philosophy even from a more substantial point of view: the main problems dealt with by Muslim philosophers can be understood only against the background of the rethinking of Plato and Aristotle which took place in the imperial age, chiefly thanks to Alexander of Aphrodisias and Plotinus. Furthermore, the systematic structure into which Aristotle’s doctrines were moulded in the curricular teaching in the schools of late antiquity paved the way for their transmission to Latin and Arabic thought.
Late antique philosophy grew out of the mé'lange of cultures and traditions flourishing during the Augustan pax Romana. It took its quintessential attributes in the pressures besetting the late Roman Empire, and it quietly came to an end when the Mediterranean no longer linked but divided the shores it washed, becoming a barrier separating the Islamic Abbasids, the Byzantines and the Frankish empire. According to the church historian Eusebius of Caesarea, when the long period of republican civil strife found its resolution in the principate of Augustus, 'old dissensions' and 'national' boundaries disappeared, and ideas then spread easily throughout an empire at peace. Eusebius was referring to Christianity, of course. Numenius, Apuleius' contemporary, even more vividly represents philosophical trends under the Antonines. The failure of the persecution to turn Romans against Christianity shifted power away from the group favouring sacrifice, and provided favourable conditions, not only for the rise of Constantine, but for the empire's acceptance of Christian rule.
Nemesius was a Christian bishop of Emesa, a major city of the Roman province of Phoenicia Libani, in the territory of Syria. Nemesius seems to have an excellent knowledge of medical science; in De natura hominis in particular one can trace the influence of treatises of Galen, of which he reveals a notable mastery. The De natura hominis is built upon a skilful reworking of pagan philosophical doctrines, many of which had already become part of the heritage of Christian thought. Nemesius brings to the forefront a complex question which had been introduced into philosophical debate by late Platonism and in particular by Porphyry. Far from being an unoriginal restatement of doctrines, the De natura hominis, develops a specific anthropological project, one that derives from the traditional mould of the Christian culture of the time but is capable of putting into question certain philosophical choices to which the Church had restricted itself.
According to Philostratus in his Vitae sophistarum, the Second Sophistic 'sketched the types of poor and rich men, princes and tyrants, and handled arguments in speeches for which history leads the way'. Thus Philostratus applies the term to a style of rhetorical performance, which, he writes, was invented by the fourth-century Athenian orator Aeschines. Generally the Second Sophistic is construed as a historical period ranging from 50 to 250 CE, roughly covering the time period when this rhetorical style was popular in nearly every part of the mid-Empire. Most of those authors familiar with Plato in the Second Sophistic looked to the philosopher as a literary model. In the early first century, Philo of Alexandria was responsible for adding essential support to the Christian incorporation of Plato: the ideological connection between Moses and Plato. The tradition of the Platonic rhetor would live on after the Second Sophistic in both Plotinus' Platonism and in the work of the Christian writers.
Numenius of Apamea is a thinker whom we know only from the reports of later witnesses who were anything but dispassionate historians of philosophy. Pythagorean is the most common epithet for Numenius. From the first book On the Good, Eusebius transcribes an arresting simile, which may, as its position in the arrangement of des Places implies, have served as an exordium to the main argument. Numenius can be reconciled with Plato if his cosmogony is interpreted as the playful or symbolic exhibition of an evergreen paradox. Numenius may be an eccentric Platonist, but it would be more eccentric still to call him anything other than a Platonist. Numenius seems not to have anticipated the Later Platonic postulate of a First Cause higher than intellect and being, but his fusion of metaphysics and psychology shows that he, like Plotinus, regarded the deliverance of the soul from its worldly attachments and the purification of the mind from error as inseparable goals.
In this section, we turn to the last phase of pagan ancient philosophy. The date 529 ce when the Emperor Justinian officially closed the Academy in Athens is conventionally taken to be the terminus of non-Christian philosophy. Of course, this is something of an overstatement. The philosophers Olympiodorus, Damascius and Simplicius all lived up to a generation beyond this date. They were apparently, however, not allowed to teach in public. We have no record of any openly non-Christian philosopher in the ancient world after the last quarter of the sixth century ce. Nevertheless, ancient Greek philosophy itself did live on within the Church and in the seventh century, within the early schools of Islamic philosophy. The history of ancient philosophy as intellectual infrastructure for religion as opposed to autonomous enterprise will be canvassed in the last two sections.
Here we are concerned with those philosophers, mainly in Athens and Alexandria, who sought to articulate and defend the Platonic inheritance. Scholars in the early part of the twentieth century sometimes maintained that the Alexandrian and Athenian ‘branches’ of Platonism differed in their focus on either religion or metaphysics. This view is generally regarded today as mistaken or greatly oversimplified. Modern research has led to the view that the interchanges between Athens and Alexandria were frequent and fruitful during this period. The supposed emphasis on religion among the Alexandrian Platonists is probably to be accounted for by the strong Christian political domination.
Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius was descended from an established Roman elite. His date of birth is unknown but must have been c. 480, perhaps as early as 475. His father, (? Narius) Manlius Boethius (cos. 487), came from a line that may have had its origins in the East, while his maternal lineage too went back to the Gens Anicia, which had converted to Christianity in the fourth century. Boethius himself was named Consul in 510, the Consulship being one of only two securely datable facts concerning his public life. He evidently lost his parents, or his father, when still young and was adopted by Q. Aurelius Memmius Symmachus (cos. 485), a descendant of Q. Aurelius Symmachus (cos. 391). Although the details of Boethius’ education remain obscure, we may be certain that Symmachus had a controlling hand in shaping it. At Variae 1.45.3 Cassiodorus mentions Boethius’ having ‘entered far away the school of the Athenians’ (Atheniensium scholas longe positus introisti), which, as Courcelle observed, probably indicates only that Boethius intellectually ‘enrolled’ in the school despite the distance from Athens. Courcelle alternatively proposed that Boethius studied under Ammonius in Alexandria, but his thesis is seriously undermined by the texts he adduced in support of it. Boethius’ commentaries are not mere copies of Ammonius’, and even if they were, to demonstrate that Boethius actually studied in Alexandria would be an entirely different matter.
Eriugena, master of the liberal arts, translator, philologue, poet, philosopher and theologian, developed the most systematic and radical form of Platonism in the Latin West until Maître Eckhart and Nicholas of Cusa – both, directly or indirectly, under his influence. His accomplishment is the more remarkable because made almost entirely without access to non-Christian authors, by drawing out philosophy largely from theological writings – into which genres his own works also almost entirely fall. After Boethius, he was the first to draw together the Greek and Latin Platonisms and the resulting system enabled his reconciliation of Latin and Greek Christian theology. For him the Latin Fathers were foundational – pre-eminently Augustine, importantly crucially Boethius, and also Ambrose. They are contained within a single logical structure with the Greek Fathers, whose writings are known to him and influential even before he made his famous translations. Eriugena’s reconciliation was accomplished by extending the primarily Plotinian and Porphyrian Platonism of the Latins in the direction of crucial notions from Iamblichus, Proclus and Damascius transmitted by the Greeks. The conclusion of Hellenic philosophy John encounters indirectly by way of Boethius, the Pseudo-Dionysius, Gregory of Nyssa and Maximus the Confessor – to name the most influential sources. In general, in the Latin Middle Ages, when the earlier Platonism of Augustine met the later, most authoritatively through the Pseudo-Dionysius, ‘this highest theologian’ (Expos. 4.189), the latter established the encompassing logic. Eriugena established the norm.
Plutarch of Athens (d. 432 ce), son of Nestorius, was the philosophy teacher of Hierocles of Alexandria, Syrianus and the young Proclus. The story of the meeting between Plutarch, now advanced in years, and Proclus, who had not yet reached his twenties, is touching. It was Syrianus who introduced the young man to Plutarch, who immediately had such a favourable impression of him that he wanted, without delay and despite his advanced age, to give the new disciple some lessons in philosophy.
Plutarch made Proclus read Aristotle’s De anima and Plato’s Phaedo, and talked to him about these works. He encouraged the young student to take notes, in order to produce a commentary on the Phaedo. This fact, transmitted to us from Marinus (who in turn was Proclus’ pupil and biographer, cf. Proclus 12 pp. 14, 1–15, Saffrey and Segonds = Fonte 2 Taormina), might imply that Plutarch had already composed his own written commentary on the De anima (which, as we shall see, is confirmed by several sources), but this was not the case for the Phaedo, for which Plutarch wanted a new commentary to be composed by his ambitious disciple.
In any case, this information confirms Plutarch’s interest in the study of the soul, that is, in Platonic and Aristotelian psychology. The evidence which we have about his position with respect to two passages in the Phaedo (Plato, Phd. 66b2 and 108c6) confirms his exegetical activity on this text, but it does not explicitly refer to a written commentary (Damascius, in Phaedonem §100, p. 67 and §503, p. 255 Westerink = Fonti 59–60 Taormina).
During the years immediately following the deaths of Plato (348/7 BC) and Aristotle (322/1 BC) Athenian philosophical life was dominated by four large schools: the Academy, the Peripatos, the Stoa and the Garden (Kēpos) of Epicurus. Alongside these were the Pyrrhonian sceptics, named after their founder Pyrrho of Elis, and certain representatives of the so-called minor Socratic schools – in particular the Cyrenaics, the Dialecticians and the Cynics.
The reconstruction of the chronology of the members of all these schools up to about 100 BC presents a series of difficulties, which often make dating proposals necessarily vague or at least subject to possible changes as studies develop. In the following pages I do not intend simply to reproduce the lists of scholarchs who succeeded each other as heads of individual schools, but rather to give a concise bird's-eye sketch of the principal events in the lives of the more important personalities in correlation with the more secure dates in the chronology.
The Academy
On Plato's death (348/7) he was succeeded as head of the Academy by his nephew Speusippus, who held the post until 339/8 (Lysimachides' archonship), when Xenocrates of Chalcedon was chosen by the younger members of the Academy as his successor. The third scholarch was Polemo of Athens, chosen in 314/3, the year of Xenocrates' death. Young, rich and dissolute, Polemo was converted to philosophy after listening to a lecture by Xenocrates on temperance (sōphrosunē). His chronology should be examined alongside those of Crantor of Soli in Cilicia and of Crates of Athens, both important members of the Academy, connected with Polemo by their school ties and by friendship.
[1a] Lactantius, On the Workmanship of God 1.11–13: Since reference has been made to the body and the mind, I will try to explain the rationale of each within the limited understanding of my feeble intelligence. I think it particularly important to take up this task, because Marcus Cicero, a man of outstanding talent, tried to do this in the fourth book of On the Commonwealth but compressed a vast amount of material within a narrow compass and only touched lightly on the main points. Indeed, he removes any excuse for not having dealt with the topic thoroughly by saying himself “that he had lacked neither the will nor the effort”: in the first book of On the Laws, when he was equally cursory on the same topic, he says: “As far as I am concerned, Scipio dealt adequately with this subject in the book which you have read” [1.27]. Even so, he tried to give a fuller treatment of the same subject in the second book of On the Nature of the Gods.
[1b] And the mind itself, which foresees the future, also remembers what is past. [+ Nonius 500.9]
[1e] … and finally that by its regular interposition it also creates the shade of night, something that is useful not only for the reckoning of days but for rest from toil. [+ Nonius 234.14]
In the classical period, the Greek language was studied by philosophers, sophists and rhetoricians, and the contributions of Aristotle and Theophrastus in particular are very valuable. But only in the Hellenistic era does grammar show significant development and almost becomes a discipline in its own right. Although their origin as students of poetry is never forgotten, grammarians now start to be acknowledged as teachers and scholars in the fields of phonology and morphology. To some extent they also study syntax and pragmatics, while semantics provides, as it were, their basic approach. This development is the result of the concurrence of three kinds of linguistic analysis: in philosophy, rhetoric and scholarship. Students of each of these disciplines look at language from their own specific point of view and in a different context. Thus, philosophers, especially Stoics, are interested in the nature of language and its relationships to reality and knowledge, and analyse speech in the context of their study of logic, which analysis has its consequences for their physics and ethics. Rhetoricians are more concerned with ways of manipulating people by means of language; and scholars develop tools for language analysis in order to edit and explain the texts of Homer and other poets. These different concerns greatly advance the study of language although the complete emancipation of grammar as a discipline to be studied for its own sake, like mathematics, is not achieved in this period.
On a goblet found in Boscoreale two philosophers are depicted as skeletons: Zeno the Stoic, and Epicurus. According to the inscription on the goblet they are engaged in discussion as to whether pleasure is the goal of all actions (telos). It is clear from Zeno's attitude that he is eagerly trying to persuade Epicurus. Epicurus is depicted in a rather more casual pose. His attention is concentrated less on the person opposite him than on a piece of cake lying on a table in front of him. This scene encapsulates the popular image of the two schools in a mixture of true insight and false understanding. The contrasting attitudes of the two philosophers in fact symbolize a fundamental distinction between Stoa and Garden: Zeno's tense bearing is appropriate as a representation of the Stoic school, whilst the casual pose suited the Epicureans. The Epicureans believed it was folly to dwell in the mind on evils which might possibly occur or have already occurred. In their view this leads to aggravation of our distress. Alleviation will result if as well as taking our minds off what troubles us (avocatio a cogitanda molestia) we give our attention to what brings pleasure (revocatio ad contemplandas voluptates) (Cic. Tusculanae disputationes III.32–3). But it is equally interesting to consider the misconception of Epicurean ethics which is suggested by the scene on the goblet. Epicurus allows himself to be distracted by a piece of cake; he is thus presented as honouring physical pleasures. As if to confirm this interpretation, at his feet a piglet is depicted, reminiscent of Horace's ironic description of himself as ‘a true hog of Epicurus’ herd’ (Hor. Ep. I.4.16).
From the perspective of 100 BC the history of ethics in the Hellenistic period is dominated by Stoicism and Epicureanism. The sceptical Academy had also made a significant contribution by criticizing the Stoics and by classifying alternative theories of the summum bonum, but in the Peripatos social philosophy, though it remained alive, was scarcely vigorous. When Epicurus and Zeno first established their schools at Athens, these developments could not have been foreseen. At that time the Academy was still the centre of doctrinal Platonism, and Theophrastus at the Peripatos included ethics among the numerous subjects on which he wrote and lectured. Many other philosophers were also stimulating reflection on the foundations of happiness and attracting followers – Cynics, Cyrenaics, Menedemus, Stilpo, Pyrrho. Ethics was a hotly debated subject around the year 300 BC.
That fact helps to explain why Epicurus and Zeno were rapidly able to acquire an audience. Yet there was no reason to predict that the schools they founded would soon become the main ethical options. Why did those schools achieve such a dominating position? With hindsight it can be seen that they offered an informed choice between two radically different ways for persons to orient themselves. Antithetical though they are in cosmology, theology, attitude to politics and evaluation of virtue relative to pleasure, Stoicism and Epicureanism closely resemble one another in being comprehensive philosophies of life. Both their mutual exclusiveness and their comprehensiveness are factors that help to explain the remarkable success both philosophies achieved. These, of course, are also retrospective judgements.