In this section, we turn to the last phase of pagan ancient philosophy. The date 529 ce when the Emperor Justinian officially closed the Academy in Athens is conventionally taken to be the terminus of non-Christian philosophy. Of course, this is something of an overstatement. The philosophers Olympiodorus, Damascius and Simplicius all lived up to a generation beyond this date. They were apparently, however, not allowed to teach in public. We have no record of any openly non-Christian philosopher in the ancient world after the last quarter of the sixth century ce. Nevertheless, ancient Greek philosophy itself did live on within the Church and in the seventh century, within the early schools of Islamic philosophy. The history of ancient philosophy as intellectual infrastructure for religion as opposed to autonomous enterprise will be canvassed in the last two sections.

Here we are concerned with those philosophers, mainly in Athens and Alexandria, who sought to articulate and defend the Platonic inheritance. Scholars in the early part of the twentieth century sometimes maintained that the Alexandrian and Athenian ‘branches’ of Platonism differed in their focus on either religion or metaphysics. This view is generally regarded today as mistaken or greatly oversimplified. Modern research has led to the view that the interchanges between Athens and Alexandria were frequent and fruitful during this period. The supposed emphasis on religion among the Alexandrian Platonists is probably to be accounted for by the strong Christian political domination.

LIFE AND WORKS

Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius was descended from an established Roman elite. His date of birth is unknown but must have been c. 480, perhaps as early as 475. His father, (? Narius) Manlius Boethius (cos. 487), came from a line that may have had its origins in the East, while his maternal lineage too went back to the Gens Anicia, which had converted to Christianity in the fourth century. Boethius himself was named Consul in 510, the Consulship being one of only two securely datable facts concerning his public life. He evidently lost his parents, or his father, when still young and was adopted by Q. Aurelius Memmius Symmachus (cos. 485), a descendant of Q. Aurelius Symmachus (cos. 391). Although the details of Boethius’ education remain obscure, we may be certain that Symmachus had a controlling hand in shaping it. At Variae 1.45.3 Cassiodorus mentions Boethius’ having ‘entered far away the school of the Athenians’ (Atheniensium scholas longe positus introisti), which, as Courcelle observed, probably indicates only that Boethius intellectually ‘enrolled’ in the school despite the distance from Athens. Courcelle alternatively proposed that Boethius studied under Ammonius in Alexandria, but his thesis is seriously undermined by the texts he adduced in support of it. Boethius’ commentaries are not mere copies of Ammonius’, and even if they were, to demonstrate that Boethius actually studied in Alexandria would be an entirely different matter.

Eriugena, master of the liberal arts, translator, philologue, poet, philosopher and theologian, developed the most systematic and radical form of Platonism in the Latin West until Maître Eckhart and Nicholas of Cusa – both, directly or indirectly, under his influence. His accomplishment is the more remarkable because made almost entirely without access to non-Christian authors, by drawing out philosophy largely from theological writings – into which genres his own works also almost entirely fall. After Boethius, he was the first to draw together the Greek and Latin Platonisms and the resulting system enabled his reconciliation of Latin and Greek Christian theology. For him the Latin Fathers were foundational – pre-eminently Augustine, importantly crucially Boethius, and also Ambrose. They are contained within a single logical structure with the Greek Fathers, whose writings are known to him and influential even before he made his famous translations. Eriugena’s reconciliation was accomplished by extending the primarily Plotinian and Porphyrian Platonism of the Latins in the direction of crucial notions from Iamblichus, Proclus and Damascius transmitted by the Greeks. The conclusion of Hellenic philosophy John encounters indirectly by way of Boethius, the Pseudo-Dionysius, Gregory of Nyssa and Maximus the Confessor – to name the most influential sources. In general, in the Latin Middle Ages, when the earlier Platonism of Augustine met the later, most authoritatively through the Pseudo-Dionysius, ‘this highest theologian’ (Expos. 4.189), the latter established the encompassing logic. Eriugena established the norm.

LIFE

Plutarch of Athens (d. 432 ce), son of Nestorius, was the philosophy teacher of Hierocles of Alexandria, Syrianus and the young Proclus. The story of the meeting between Plutarch, now advanced in years, and Proclus, who had not yet reached his twenties, is touching. It was Syrianus who introduced the young man to Plutarch, who immediately had such a favourable impression of him that he wanted, without delay and despite his advanced age, to give the new disciple some lessons in philosophy.

Plutarch made Proclus read Aristotle’s De anima and Plato’s Phaedo, and talked to him about these works. He encouraged the young student to take notes, in order to produce a commentary on the Phaedo. This fact, transmitted to us from Marinus (who in turn was Proclus’ pupil and biographer, cf. Proclus 12 pp. 14, 1–15, Saffrey and Segonds = Fonte 2 Taormina), might imply that Plutarch had already composed his own written commentary on the De anima (which, as we shall see, is confirmed by several sources), but this was not the case for the Phaedo, for which Plutarch wanted a new commentary to be composed by his ambitious disciple.

In any case, this information confirms Plutarch’s interest in the study of the soul, that is, in Platonic and Aristotelian psychology. The evidence which we have about his position with respect to two passages in the Phaedo (Plato, Phd. 66b2 and 108c6) confirms his exegetical activity on this text, but it does not explicitly refer to a written commentary (Damascius, in Phaedonem §100, p. 67 and §503, p. 255 Westerink = Fonti 59–60 Taormina).

Introduction

During the years immediately following the deaths of Plato (348/7 BC) and Aristotle (322/1 BC) Athenian philosophical life was dominated by four large schools: the Academy, the Peripatos, the Stoa and the Garden (Kēpos) of Epicurus. Alongside these were the Pyrrhonian sceptics, named after their founder Pyrrho of Elis, and certain representatives of the so-called minor Socratic schools – in particular the Cyrenaics, the Dialecticians and the Cynics.

The reconstruction of the chronology of the members of all these schools up to about 100 BC presents a series of difficulties, which often make dating proposals necessarily vague or at least subject to possible changes as studies develop. In the following pages I do not intend simply to reproduce the lists of scholarchs who succeeded each other as heads of individual schools, but rather to give a concise bird's-eye sketch of the principal events in the lives of the more important personalities in correlation with the more secure dates in the chronology.

The Academy

On Plato's death (348/7) he was succeeded as head of the Academy by his nephew Speusippus, who held the post until 339/8 (Lysimachides' archonship), when Xenocrates of Chalcedon was chosen by the younger members of the Academy as his successor. The third scholarch was Polemo of Athens, chosen in 314/3, the year of Xenocrates' death. Young, rich and dissolute, Polemo was converted to philosophy after listening to a lecture by Xenocrates on temperance (sōphrosunē). His chronology should be examined alongside those of Crantor of Soli in Cilicia and of Crates of Athens, both important members of the Academy, connected with Polemo by their school ties and by friendship.

[1a] Lactantius, On the Workmanship of God 1.11–13: Since reference has been made to the body and the mind, I will try to explain the rationale of each within the limited understanding of my feeble intelligence. I think it particularly important to take up this task, because Marcus Cicero, a man of outstanding talent, tried to do this in the fourth book of On the Commonwealth but compressed a vast amount of material within a narrow compass and only touched lightly on the main points. Indeed, he removes any excuse for not having dealt with the topic thoroughly by saying himself “that he had lacked neither the will nor the effort”: in the first book of On the Laws, when he was equally cursory on the same topic, he says: “As far as I am concerned, Scipio dealt adequately with this subject in the book which you have read” [1.27]. Even so, he tried to give a fuller treatment of the same subject in the second book of On the Nature of the Gods.

[1b] And the mind itself, which foresees the future, also remembers what is past. [+ Nonius 500.9]

[1e] … and finally that by its regular interposition it also creates the shade of night, something that is useful not only for the reckoning of days but for rest from toil. [+ Nonius 234.14]

Linguistics

The study of language

In the classical period, the Greek language was studied by philosophers, sophists and rhetoricians, and the contributions of Aristotle and Theophrastus in particular are very valuable. But only in the Hellenistic era does grammar show significant development and almost becomes a discipline in its own right. Although their origin as students of poetry is never forgotten, grammarians now start to be acknowledged as teachers and scholars in the fields of phonology and morphology. To some extent they also study syntax and pragmatics, while semantics provides, as it were, their basic approach. This development is the result of the concurrence of three kinds of linguistic analysis: in philosophy, rhetoric and scholarship. Students of each of these disciplines look at language from their own specific point of view and in a different context. Thus, philosophers, especially Stoics, are interested in the nature of language and its relationships to reality and knowledge, and analyse speech in the context of their study of logic, which analysis has its consequences for their physics and ethics. Rhetoricians are more concerned with ways of manipulating people by means of language; and scholars develop tools for language analysis in order to edit and explain the texts of Homer and other poets. These different concerns greatly advance the study of language although the complete emancipation of grammar as a discipline to be studied for its own sake, like mathematics, is not achieved in this period.

Introduction

On a goblet found in Boscoreale two philosophers are depicted as skeletons: Zeno the Stoic, and Epicurus. According to the inscription on the goblet they are engaged in discussion as to whether pleasure is the goal of all actions (telos). It is clear from Zeno's attitude that he is eagerly trying to persuade Epicurus. Epicurus is depicted in a rather more casual pose. His attention is concentrated less on the person opposite him than on a piece of cake lying on a table in front of him. This scene encapsulates the popular image of the two schools in a mixture of true insight and false understanding. The contrasting attitudes of the two philosophers in fact symbolize a fundamental distinction between Stoa and Garden: Zeno's tense bearing is appropriate as a representation of the Stoic school, whilst the casual pose suited the Epicureans. The Epicureans believed it was folly to dwell in the mind on evils which might possibly occur or have already occurred. In their view this leads to aggravation of our distress. Alleviation will result if as well as taking our minds off what troubles us (avocatio a cogitanda molestia) we give our attention to what brings pleasure (revocatio ad contemplandas voluptates) (Cic. Tusculanae disputationes III.32–3). But it is equally interesting to consider the misconception of Epicurean ethics which is suggested by the scene on the goblet. Epicurus allows himself to be distracted by a piece of cake; he is thus presented as honouring physical pleasures. As if to confirm this interpretation, at his feet a piglet is depicted, reminiscent of Horace's ironic description of himself as ‘a true hog of Epicurus’ herd’ (Hor. Ep. I.4.16).

Introduction

From the perspective of 100 BC the history of ethics in the Hellenistic period is dominated by Stoicism and Epicureanism. The sceptical Academy had also made a significant contribution by criticizing the Stoics and by classifying alternative theories of the summum bonum, but in the Peripatos social philosophy, though it remained alive, was scarcely vigorous. When Epicurus and Zeno first established their schools at Athens, these developments could not have been foreseen. At that time the Academy was still the centre of doctrinal Platonism, and Theophrastus at the Peripatos included ethics among the numerous subjects on which he wrote and lectured. Many other philosophers were also stimulating reflection on the foundations of happiness and attracting followers – Cynics, Cyrenaics, Menedemus, Stilpo, Pyrrho. Ethics was a hotly debated subject around the year 300 BC.

That fact helps to explain why Epicurus and Zeno were rapidly able to acquire an audience. Yet there was no reason to predict that the schools they founded would soon become the main ethical options. Why did those schools achieve such a dominating position? With hindsight it can be seen that they offered an informed choice between two radically different ways for persons to orient themselves. Antithetical though they are in cosmology, theology, attitude to politics and evaluation of virtue relative to pleasure, Stoicism and Epicureanism closely resemble one another in being comprehensive philosophies of life. Both their mutual exclusiveness and their comprehensiveness are factors that help to explain the remarkable success both philosophies achieved. These, of course, are also retrospective judgements.

Cicero's Career

Early in December 63 BCE, the consul Marcus Tullius Cicero, having unmasked the conspiracy of Catiline and supervised the execution of several of the leading conspirators, was hailed as Father of his Country and escorted home by a crowd of grateful Romans from all ranks of society; a public thanksgiving was decreed in his honor, the first such award ever made for nonmilitary service to the state. That moment was the summit of a remarkable career: not only had Cicero's consulate been distinguished by signal success and acclaim, but the very fact that he had achieved that office – the chief magistracy in republican Rome – and had done so at the earliest legal age of 42 was itself unusual. Cicero was born in 106 BCE to one of the leading families of the town of Arpinum, some 115 kilometers southeast of Rome; and although the town had had Roman citizenship since 188, no one in Cicero's family had ever held public office at Rome. Ties of friendship between Cicero's family and some of the leading aristocrats of Rome had permitted him to learn the ways of Roman politics and law under the tutelage of the leading orator (Lucius Licinius Crassus) and jurists (Quintus Mucius Scaevola the Augur and his cousin Quintus Mucius Scaevola the Pontifex) of the 90s and 80s; but in the first half of the first century BCE it was rare for a “new man” – the first in his family to achieve high office – to become consul.

[1] Augustine, City of God 2.21: Thus, when the Roman commonwealth was in the condition that Sallust describes, it was no longer terrible and highly criminal, as he says, but altogether no commonwealth at all according to the argument set out in the discussion concerning the commonwealth held by the greatest leaders of the time. Cicero himself, speaking at the outset of the fifth book, not using the voice of Scipio or one of the others but in his own voice, first quoted the verse of the poet Ennius in which he said:

The Roman state stands upon the morals and men of old.

He then said: “That verse, in its brevity and its truthfulness, he seems to me to have spoken as if from an oracle. For if the state had not had such morals, then the men would not have existed; nor, if such men had not been in charge, would there have been such morals as to be able to establish or preserve for so long a commonwealth so great and ruling so widely. And so, before our time, ancestral morality provided outstanding men, and great men preserved the morality of old and the institutions of our ancestors. [2a] But our own time, having inherited the commonwealth like a wonderful picture that had faded over time, not only has failed to renew its original colors but has not even taken the trouble to preserve at least its shape and outlines. […] ”

The possibility of knowledge

Stoic epistemology is best understood as a response to a twofold challenge. Socrates had assumed that whether one had a good life depended on whether one had managed to acquire a certain kind of knowledge, which he identified with wisdom, in particular the knowledge of what is good and what is bad. For this reason he had devoted his life to philosophical inquiry concerning the good, the bad and related matters. Yet, for all of his efforts, even he himself did not think that he had obtained this knowledge. At the same time Socrates had made it clear that we should not content ourselves with mere belief or opinion concerning these matters, even if this belief happened to be true. One would not want to rely for the success or failure of one's life on mere opinion which at best happened to be true. Moreover, the Socratic elenchus suggested that one was not entitled to any belief which one did not hold as a matter of knowledge. For Socratic refutation seemed to rest on the fact that somebody who holds a belief as a matter of mere opinion can be made to see that he has equal reason to espouse the contradictory belief.

A century of philosophers since Socrates had done no better. Indeed, as if oblivious to Socrates’ strictures against mere belief, they had rushed precipitously to produce thesis after thesis, theses often quite extravagant and often contradicting each other, and in any case all a matter of mere opinion, as closer scrutiny would reveal.