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Why are states evil? In Chapter 17 I approach this question in relation to Plato’s analogy between soul and city, as this analogy was interpreted by Platonists in Late Antiquity. I indicate first that individual souls belong originally, according to the Platonists, to a transcendent, intelligible community, a city of souls where they enjoy an ‘intelligible love’, a ‘divine friendship’. However, souls, in their presence in the material world, can become alienated by this world, alienated from their original community and from each other. I show that a relation is made between Plato’s account of successive stages of degradation in political constitutions in the Republic Books VIII and IX and stages of moral alienation in souls. Corrupt souls produce corrupt states and corrupt states can corrupt souls.
The Introduction describes the curriculum of sciences taught in the Neoplatonist schools of Late Antiquity and the purpose of this curriculum as a divinization of the human soul. The textbooks which were read as part of the curriculum are identified, the image of a ‘ladder’ of the sciences is introduced and disagreements about the division of the sciences are indicated. The second part of the Introduction provides an overview of, and context for, the following chapters, organized in five parts: rhetoric (not as part of the curriculum, but as an instrument of philosophy), ethics, politics, mathematics, metaphysics. The arrangement of the chapters within each of the five parts is presented and the main themes of each chapter are introduced.
Chapter 15 compares the personifications of philosophy which we find in Synesius’ De regno and in Boethius’ Consolation of Philosophy. I describe the relationship between philosophy and politics, as presented by Synesius, as ‘tense’. Synesius, ambassador for Cyrene at the court of Constantinople at the beginning of the fifth century (and later bishop of Cyrene), asserts the superiority and independence of true philosophy in relation to politics, while asserting the advantages that philosophy can bring to politics. Boethius, a high-ranking Roman official awaiting his execution in 524, is consoled by Philosophy; his mission to bring philosophy and rulership together was not in vain. I mention three factors which can limit the intervention of philosophy in the political sphere.
Proclus did not accept Plotinus’ position that matter is absolute evil and responsible for other evils. I return to his position in Chapter 12, as it is followed by Simplicius in explaining the evils of his period, the reign of the Emperor Justinian, a period which was afflicted by a series of natural catastrophes (earthquakes, fires, the plague) and human disasters (military, social, economic). Natural disasters, Simplicius explained, are part of the compensatory balance of forces of the natural world and are not evil, as such; human moral evil can be of benefit to those who suffer it. I contrast this account of evil with that given by a contemporary, Procopius of Caesarea, who explains the same evils of his time in terms of the Justinian’s demonic nature.
Chapter 18 introduces the theory of natural law to be found in Plotinus and in Proclus in connection with the interpretation of Plato’s Timaeus. Natural law derives from the ‘law of being’ which is divine Intellect and from souls which, in their nature, are laws unto themselves (autonomous). Divine and natural law are considered as paradigmatic for human law. I explore this relationship as it is presented in Proclus and as exemplified in the idea of rulership for women. Appropriate knowledge in metaphysics and physics is required of the legislator in formulating corresponding human law.
Chapter 20 presents the way in which Proclus interpreted the figure of the tyrant in Plato’s dialogues. Tyranny is based on force, violates law, both cosmic and human, and is motivated by a misled desire for power, power divorced from goodness and knowledge. I argue that Proclus and other Platonists, Damascius and Simplicius, could use this interpretation of Plato to describe the political regimes of their period, in particular the rule of Emperor Justinian, as tyrannies. These tyrannies, in their metaphysical ignorance and moral turpitude, violated divine order and law in destroying pagan temples and statues. I consider finally the cases of two authors, John Lydus and Procopius of Caesarea, who describe Justinian’s rule in terms of kingship or tyranny.
Hegel famously argues that the patriarchal, bourgeois nuclear family is a rational institution worth defending. Scholars have asked what exactly to do with this seemingly outdated part of his social and political philosophy. In particular, they have wondered whether Hegel's concept of the family can accommodate changes to our understanding of what counts as a family and what constitutes family relations. In this Element, I ask whether Hegel's defense of the family can be reconciled with family abolition, the project not of reforming the family as an institution, but of radically transforming it beyond recognition. By examining the three relationships that Hegel associates with the family – brothers and sisters, husbands and wives, and parents and children – I argue that Hegel's concept of the family can be reconciled with family abolition so described. What Hegel provides is an account of the family as a site at which important goods have been discovered and eveloped, without claiming that the family as an institution is necessary for, or even ideally suited to, their continued realization. These goods are singular individuality, ethical love, and material resources.
This Element concerns Hegel's engagement with Spinoza's metaphysics, and divides into three main parts. The first enlists help from Hegel's interpretation to introduce and defend philosophical strengths in Spinoza's defense of metaphysical monism. The second defends Hegel's criticism of Spinoza, concluding that Spinoza's philosophy must eliminate all finitude and determinacy, leaving only a shapeless abyss. The third employs these defenses to open up an approach to the philosophical interpretation of Hegel's Logic, the core of his philosophical system, understanding the meaning of Hegel's ambitious claims in terms of reasons that make them more than the mere unpacking of assumptions.
Aristotle's Parts of Animals is a foundational text in both the history of philosophy and the history and philosophy of biology. Critically important for understanding his mature philosophical programme, the Parts of Animals has two chief aims. PA Book I is an introduction to the study of animals and plants and provides preliminary considerations for how to investigate all aspects of their nature. PA Books II-IV is the most comprehensive example of the application of Aristotle's philosophical methodology to real world examples of substances, that is, to animals. In this book, a team of international experts cover topics such as Aristotle's exhortation to study biology, his methodology in the study of natural entities and kinds, the study of mind as part of nature, his analysis and use of concepts such as essence, substance, definition, matter, form, species, analogy and teleology, and the influence and legacy of the text.
Augustine's Confessions, written between AD 394 and 400, is an autobiographical work which outlines his youth and his conversion to Christianity. It is one of the great texts of Late Antiquity, the first Western Christian autobiography ever written, and it retains its fascination for philosophers, theologians, historians, and scholars of religious studies today. This Critical Guide engages with Augustine's creative appropriation of the work of his predecessors in theology generally, in metaphysics, and in philosophy as therapy for the soul, and reframes a much discussed - but still poorly understood - passage from the Confessions with respect to recent philosophy. The volume represents the best of contemporary scholarship on Augustine's Confessions from a variety of disciplinary perspectives, and builds on existing scholarship to develop new insights, explore underappreciated themes, and situate Augustine in the thought of his own day as well as ours.
Speculative idealism is the end of transcendental idealism. Focusing on the problem of the beginning of philosophy, this thesis is substantiated in four chapters. The chapter on Kant exposes the problem of the beginning and its solution. The chapter on contemporary transcendental philosophy shows that even in the most advanced versions of transcendental philosophy, the problem of the beginning remains. The chapter on neo-Kantianism, so important for contemporary transcendental philosophy, renders explicit that here too the problem of the beginning is a paradigmatic burden of transcendental idealism. The first three chapters proof concerning all dimensions of Hegel's Logic (Being, Essence, Concept) that transcendental philosophy perishes due to the methodical profile of its reflection and requires its sublation by speculative idealism. For this reason, as becomes clear from the final chapter, a return to the late Fichte does not overcome the problem of the beginning either.
This Element offers a new historical account of Aristippus the Elder's views on pleasure and the present. Instead of treating Aristippus as merely proto-Cyrenaic or anachronistically modern, it uncovers in the ancient sources a neglected form of hedonism that endorses a present-focused therapeutic policy, while exploring its underlying motivations. Aristippan hedonism promotes a moment-to-moment disposition to pleasure rather than its maximization through future calculation, supporting a euthymic model of well-being that prioritizes the present. After distinguishing Aristippus from the later Cyrenaics regarding hedonic calculations to maximize pleasure, the Element yet supports continuity with his followers in the cognitive elements of the concept and the experience of pleasure, challenging his alleged sensualism in this way. Once the historical groundwork is in place, the Element introduces the hypothesis of the plasticity of the present, which moves beyond historical interpretation to offer an ethical-psychological account of a sustained focus on present time.
A range of sciences was taught in the Platonist schools of late antiquity (third to sixth centuries) with the purpose of leading the human soul up to a divine life. This curriculum constituted so to speak a ladder of the sciences. The ways in which these sciences were newly interpreted in this context have not, however, been fully appreciated. This volume brings together selected essays, some translated into English for the first time, which show how a new vision of these disciplines and sciences was reached as part of a Platonist philosophical education. They cover a wide range of topics, from rhetoric, ethics and politics to mathematics, music and metaphysics, and discuss the work of various philosophers. Dominic O'Meara is considered one of the foremost scholars of Platonism and this book provides readers with an indispensable tool for accessing his most important scholarship in this area.
Impaired consciousness is a topic lying at the intersection of science and philosophy. It encourages reflection on questions concerning human nature, the body, the soul, the mind and their relation, as well as the blurry limits between health, disease, life and death. This is the first study of impaired consciousness in the works of some highly influential Greek and Roman medical writers who lived in periods ranging from Classical Greece to the Roman Empire in the second century CE. Andrés Pelavski employs the notion and contrasts ancient and contemporary theoretical frameworks in order to challenge some established ideas about mental illness in antiquity. All the ancient texts are translated and the theoretical concepts clearly explained. This title is also available as open access on Cambridge Core.