To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
The nature and importance of the Nachlass from Kierkegaard's hand is not well known, especially to researchers outside Denmark. At his death, Kierkegaard left behind an enormous amount of unpublished material in various folders, journals, and notebooks, and on loose pieces of paper. This material includes observations and analyses on various topics, sketches and outlines for possible works, reading and lecture notes, as well as autobiographical reflections. This Element is an attempt to make this rich and interesting material better known to international Kierkegaard readers. It shows how Kierkegaard's posthumous writings are interesting and valuable on their own and serve to illuminate his well-known published works.
Hegel referred to Geist as 'self-conscious life' as a being which exists within a 'web' of sense it spins for itself both collectively and individually. As Geist collectively develops itself in history and in theory, it ties 'knots' in various parts of its web which then form the settled basis for further progress. John Dewey spoke of the fundamental 'deposits' laid down in history in the same way Hegel spoke of 'knots.' Both Hegel and Dewey thought that the kinds of obligations necessary in modern political life could only be actualized in terms of a larger conception of the good life individually and collectively led. However, Dewey argued that given the fact of democracy as a 'way of life' and not merely a form of government was the necessary replacement for Hegel's concept of Sittlichkeit (ethical life) as the living good in which the watchword is freedom.
This element is a study on Hegel's dialectic. One motivation for turning to dialectic is the idea that in order to understand the complex and dynamic structure of reality and of our thinking itself, we need a different way of thinking from that provided by standard logic and by traditional philosophy. The aim of the book is to present Hegel's basic idea of dialectic and to explain it through an interpretation of the text, an account of its reception, and a survey of themes in the secondary literature. The main theses discussed are that Hegel's dialectic is primarily a method of thinking and that he develops a unified theory of dialectic in his various writings.
This chapter examines how Sophoclean tragedy approaches and conceptualises the relationship between divine and mortal. It demonstrates that Sophocles builds on the early Greek theological, philosophical and literary tradition outlined in Chapter 1, but steers his own, distinctive course. It argues that Sophocles’ tragedies deploy ideas and beliefs about humans and gods in three, closely interconnected ways: in the explicitly theological and philosophical discourse uttered by characters and choruses; in the trajectories and experiences of individual characters on the stage; and in the broader, religious and ethical patterns that underlie these trajectories, which are occasionally and partially revealed to audiences. As part of its attempt to foreground the close interrelation of dramatic structure, form and content, the chapter devotes considerable space to a new interpretation of dramatic irony. This general discussion relies on readings of four Sophoclean plays, Oedipus Tyrannus, Ajax, Philoctetes and Oedipus at Colonus, as well as on brief comparative analyses of some Aeschylean and Euripidean examples.
This chapter offers an interpretation of early Greek conceptions of divine and human as a coherent constellation of ideas organised around the core notions of human vulnerability, short-sightedness and mutability. Beginning with Achilles’ speech to Priam in Iliad 24, I discuss these key principles and their expressions in genres including epic, elegy, choral lyric, philosophy and historiography. I analyse some of their specific formulations and inflections, with a particular focus on perceptions of the unpredictable and unstable nature of human affairs, the conception of human beings as ephēmeroi (‘creatures of the day’), ideas of divine retribution and the ‘archaic chain’ linking prosperity, greed, arrogance, delusion and disaster. In a second step, I examine the relationship between these ideas and the narratives in which they are embedded, mainly using the examples of the Iliad and Solon’s Elegy to the Muses (fr. 13W).
This chapter offers a detailed reading of Sophocles’ Trachiniae. It begins by analysing the characters’ use of theological and philosophical discourse in the tragedy’s first half, paying close attention to its function and its relationship with its broader dramatic context. It then focuses on the scenic experiences and trajectories of the characters (in particular Deianeira), demonstrating that the play, through its presentation of the interplay between knowledge and ignorance and the experience of reversal, dramatises traditional Greek notions of vicissitude and short-sightedness. Finally, the chapter attempts to trace some of the broader patterns and forces underlying and shaping the play’s events, the means by which these patterns emerge and the characters’ efforts to understand them. It argues that the characters are all, in their own way, pitiful victims of a shifting world that cannot be bent to their will, and is governed by distant, uncaring gods.
Sophocles’ extant tragedies are all characterised by a pervasive concern with the relationship between divine and mortal and with the conditions of human existence in a world dominated by powerful, inscrutable and unpredictable gods. Each play enacts this concern within, and through, its unique narrative, dramatic and communicative structures, which instantiate specific theological and philosophical questions and open them up to their audiences.
This chapter combines a focus on the scenic trajectories of Antigone and Creon with analyses of the tragedy’s choral songs. It traces the ways in which the characters’ actions, speech and deliberations are conditioned by the extent to which they understand (or misunderstand) the play’s complex reality. It argues that beyond the ethical conflict between them and questions of law and justice, both characters are presented in their own way as paradigms of human vulnerability and the limits of reason. Although Antigone’s action is eventually vindicated, it is not explicitly acknowledged by the gods, at least in her lifetime; instead, by the end of the play, her sacrifice appears to have been mere collateral damage in the gods’ plan to seek compensation for the exposure of Polynices’ corpse. Creon, because of his error of judgement in forbidding Polynices’ burial, undergoes a violent reversal of fortune from powerful and authoritative ruler to a ghost of a man. In the background, a pattern of divine control is interwoven with human agency in ways that are difficult to disentangle, both for the characters and Chorus and for the audience.
This chapter demonstrates that Sophocles’ Electra is pervaded by a strong sense of the fragility of human language and perception, drawing the spectators’ attention to the characters’ partial and often superficial understanding of events and conceptual categories such as familial strife, ancestral suffering, revenge and justice. The chapter focuses in turn on Orestes, Electra and the Paedagogus, analysing their experience of the tragedy’s reality and attempting to trace the larger networks of agency at work in their lives. Like Deianeira, Antigone or Creon, these characters operate in a world that is characterised by obscurity and constant upheaval; yet in Electra, the gods and the broad causal patterns governing the cosmos are more remote and elliptical than ever. Thus, the play can be located within the same intellectual, religious and philosophical traditions as other Sophoclean tragedies – but it engages with, and builds on, these traditions in a different way and to different effects, particularly in its radical questioning of humans’ ability to communicate successfully with the divine, and thus to access any kind of reality.
This chapter introduces the main argument and themes of the book, and positions it within earlier and existing scholarship on archaic and classical Greek literature, religion and philosophy. Particular points of focus include the relationship between Greek tragedy, ritual and theology, and influential mid-twentieth-century research on Sophocles (the ’classics’ of Sophoclean scholarship). The chapter also discusses ancient biographical traditions surrounding Sophocles’ religiosity and piety.
This Element discusses the relation between the ethical and religious as key concepts in Kierkegaard's works. Instead of viewing the ethical and religious mainly as different stages on life's way, it identifies different connections between ethical and religious considerations, reasons, and values. By discussing Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac in Fear and Trembling, it argues that – despite appearances – religion does not undermine but rather supports moral constraints. However, Kierkegaard is clear that our moral requirements exceed our natural capabilities, something that makes divine assistance morally necessary. Thus, religious belief seems supported by moral reasons. Still, we often recognize moral truth without seeing the metaphysical and theological implications of morality. Therefore, moral agents need not be religious believers, although morality nevertheless has metaphysical and theological implications if Kierkegaard is correct. Specifically, Kierkegaard seems to combine realism regarding value with the view that some moral requirements are divinely commanded.