This chapter comprises two parts. The first addresses the physical natural and social function of archaic and classical Greek roads. Of key importance is the fact that ancient Greek roads were not paved on the surface of the earth but were ruts inscribed into it; when a vehicle set out on such a road, it was thus locked into these ruts as a tramcar is locked onto its tracks. I gesture towards the bearing that this will have on Parmenides’ use of road imagery to develop and articulate a notion of what we would call logical necessity. The second half of this chapter examines the semantics of the word hodos. Notably, the word can signify both an object (especially the rut road just discussed) and an activity. This activity is teleological, a characteristic I explore in terms borrowed from discussions of linguistic aspect and the Kenny–Vendler typology of situations; I conclude that the activity signified by the word hodos is a kind of accomplishment in that it is both durative and telic. Exploiting the two meanings of hodos and harnessing the distinctive features of each, Parmenides imparts a distinctive shape to his ‘Route to Truth’ and endows it with specific qualities characteristic of what we would call an extended deductive argument and a demonstration

The present volume is the ‘successor’ to The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus (1996). Over the last twenty-five years, there has been an enormous increase in published work on Plotinus and on late ancient Platonism generally. In addition, many scholars who had not even begun their careers twenty-five years ago are now working intensely in this area. This fact is reflected in the list of authors of this volume, none of whom appeared in the previous work and most of whom had not yet even begun their careers when the original Companion appeared.1

Plotinus places emphasis on the intelligible world since it is the paradigm of truth, beauty, and being. Porphyry even orders the treatises in a way that mirrors the ascent to the intelligible world and beyond to the One. This has created the impression for generations that Plotinus is uninterested in the natural world. This is an oversimplification. Plotinus has a sophisticated natural philosophy but it can be difficult to piece together into a coherent whole because much of his comments occur in polemical contexts where he is arguing against a rival school, and they are spread throughout numerous, seemingly unrelated treatises. This is especially the case for his doctrine on sensible bodies. The departure for Plotinus’ view is Timaeus 49d–50a, where Timaeus claims that only the receptacle can be called a ‘this’ (tode) or a ‘that’ (touto), but a thing that enters and leaves the receptacle, such as a primary body, is a ‘what is such’ (toiouton). Plotinus, however, develops Plato’s view by critically engaging with Aristotle and the Peripatetic tradition and reinterpreting the Platonic view in the scheme of his hierarchical metaphysics.

Self-knowledge for Plotinus concerns the general features of what it is to be a self – a being capable of such self-relations as self-reflexivity and unified consciousness of one’s activities, both mental and bodily. Besides conducting sophisticated discussions on the structural problems of these relations, Plotinus carries on the Socratic interest in care of the self, or in elevation of oneself towards ideal knowledge and virtue – that is, in self-ennobling. In self-improvement, the role of knowledge is central; self-knowledge will reveal the activities typical for different epistemic conditions. Although Plotinus operates with the metaphysical division of soul, body, and the embodied composite he inherited from Classical Greek philosophers, he reshapes the discussion in two important ways: by concentrating on the soul’s power of self-identification – of choosing or attending to itself – and on the way different cognitive activities include a self-reference.

Plotinus focuses on eternity (aiôn) and time (khronos) in treatise 3.7 On Eternity and Time.1 His views are rooted in the earlier tradition and are developed through an interpretation of both Plato (in particular the Timaeus) and Aristotle (in particular Physics 4). Yet Plotinus does not merely resume what had previously been stated by his authorities; his exegetical approach is based on the presentation of distinctive views that are connected to Plotinus’ metaphysical outlook, in particular to his theory of intelligible principles. Plotinus’ discussion of eternity and time is actually centred on (1) the notion of eternity as the lack of duration and extension in time (so Plotinus distinguishes eternity from everlastingness), (2) the idea that time is associated with the activity of the soul rather than with the movement of bodies, (3) the notion of ‘life’ as a mode of being that characterizes, in different ways, both the Intellect and the soul and accounts for the nature of eternity and time as well as for the derivation of time from eternity.

When Plotinus began his teaching career after moving from Alexandria to Rome in 245 ce, he was faced with the task of defending the correctness of his views not only against the teachings of rival philosophical schools, such as those of the Stoics, Peripatetics, and Epicureans but also against the popular religious movements of his day, chief among them Christianity and Gnosticism. We do not know whether his audience, comprised of people from a range of professional backgrounds, such as doctors, literary critics, and aspiring statesmen, would have included any Christians. But in all likelihood, he would have come into contact with proponents of the new faith at some point during his life.1

At their first meeting, Porphyry took Plotinus for ‘a complete fool’ and a sophist. This reaction was by no means exceptional.1 The leading Platonists of the time, most notably Longinus, misclassified Plotinus as a representative of an Oriental, Pythagoreanizing version of Platonism.2 Admittedly, it was not easy to understand the novelty of his views. At stake in the discussions with Porphyry and Longinus was the claim that the intelligibles are not outside the Intellect. Marginal as it might appear at first sight, Plotinus’ thesis actually paved the way to a new interpretation of Plato’s Forms, the kernel for any Platonist system. After an intense exchange, Porphyry ‘finally managed to understand what he was saying’,3 wrote a retraction, and became one of his most faithful pupils for the years to come. Most of the other Platonists, however, continued to endorse their traditional interpretation. But in the meantime, the history of ancient Platonism had entered a new phase.

The concept of number is treated at some length in Ennead 6.6, though it is less conspicuous in the rest of the Enneads. This may explain why it does not usually make the headlines of Plotinus’ metaphysics and epistemology – the focus of this part of the Companion – nor of their concomitant scholarship.1 The specialized studies of the concept of number in Neoplatonism in the last twenty years, however, have revealed the essential role of number in the Neoplatonic model of the universe.2 This chapter demonstrates that, below each headline in the Enneads, number writes the story.

Bad things happen in an imperfect world. This, and in particular the fact that they happen to our souls, was a matter of great concern for Plotinus. Near the end of his life, when he was already severely ill, Plotinus wrote a treatise On What Evils Are and Where They Come From (1.8 [51]).1 The text picks up themes and arguments discussed in several other works and will serve as the basis for our discussion of Plotinus’ views on badness. In his view, matter is primary evil and the cause for badness in souls and bodies.