Dante refers to Aristotle as “il maestro di color che sanno,” the master of those who know. But Aristotle typically refers to the works that have come down to us as ‘inquiries’ or ‘investigations,’ and in the pages that follow, I will make a case for Aristotle as “il maestro di color che cercano,” the master of those who inquire. The chapters to follow attempt to get clarity on Aristotle’s conception of inquiry, insofar as the goal of inquiry is scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). Does Aristotle see inquiry, as he clearly sees explanation, as a process constrained by epistemic norms – norms of inquiry, as I am calling them? That is, given that Aristotle has clearly articulated ideas about what the goal of scientific inquiry looks like, does he also have clearly articulated norms that must be adhered to if one is to achieve that goal?

Chapter Summary. In this chapter, we turn to Aristotle’s inquiry into the formation of uniform bodies in Mete. iv and explore the ways in which the investigations reported in PA ii and GA ii and v are dependent on it. Aristotle often insists on the paramount importance for natural inquiry of searching for ends as causes of natural processes, and thus of teleological explanations in understanding the natural world. Yet, as we are about to see, in Mete. iv he develops independent, material-level explanations of the formation of uniform bodies, including the uniform parts of animals. Looking carefully at this text will thus further our understanding of the normative constraints on inquiry into nature. What are the limits on material and teleological explanation in an Aristotelian science of nature? Moreover, looking at the interplay between Mete. iv and the biological study of the coming to be and being of uniform parts provides a second rich case study by which to explore the nature of the dependence of one natural inquiry on the results of another.

Chapter Summary. Both Aristotle’s investigation of animals and his investigation of soul begin with long and detailed methodological discussions, and both of those discussions eventually take the form of a series of questions that the investigation needs to answer. The two discussions are quite different, and the questions that are highlighted are also different – and yet both are recognizably framed in terms of Aristotle’s Analytics and Metaphysics. In the next two chapters we will focus on PA i and de An. i.1 as case studies of how Aristotle’s views about the way differences in the target of inquiry, as well as our epistemic access to, and our qua-perspective on, the target, must influence the norms that govern that inquiry. These case studies will also be an opportunity to investigate the ways in which the ‘erotetic shape’ of an inquiry is provided by Aristotle’s metaphysics and epistemology and to explore the way in which Aristotle’s methodological approach to an investigation is influenced by the ‘state of the art’ in a given domain.

Chapter Summary. Aristotle uses the word μέθοδος in a variety of crucial passages in the works that constitute his studies of nature, and in two distinct, yet overlapping, ways: it can refer to the norms of research appropriate to a domain-specific investigation, and it can refer to such an investigation carried out according to such domain-specific norms. It thus forms a conceptual bridge between the domain-neutral norms of APo. ii discussed in the previous chapter and the domain-specific norms that will be discussed in the remaining chapters. In this chapter, I investigate the uses of this concept in Aristotle’s writings on nature. By comparing them with his use of the term in other fields, and the uses of ὁδός and μέθοδος in Plato and in the Hippocratic On Ancient Medicine, it emerges that Aristotle has rich and sophisticated views about ‘proper ways of proceeding’ in an investigation.

Chapter Summary. The second book of the Posterior Analytics is a sustained investigation of different modes of inquiry aimed at achieving scientific knowledge. So understood, it has far more unity than is typically claimed for it, and its last chapter is a fitting conclusion. But it does not present, let alone defend, substantive norms to guide distinct scientific inquiries. Those norms are domain-specific and as such are presented and defended in the introductions to Aristotle’s scientific treatises themselves. What, then, is accomplished by APo. ii? In this chapter, I introduce and defend the idea that APo. ii provides an erotetic framework for any inquiry, provided only that its goal is epistêmê, demonstrative knowledge. As such, it can be thought of as providing metalevel norms, for example, about how different inquiries ought to be staged, or about how inquiries aimed at formulating definitions are related to those aimed at achieving causal demonstrations.

In ancient Greece, philosophers developed new and dazzling ideas about divinity. These thinkers drew on a deep well of poetry, myth, and religious practices even as they set out to construct new theological ideas. Ancient Greek religion had a wondrous heterogeneity – rituals and cult practices varied dramatically in different geographical regions. Greek religion was far more open to diverse theological ideas than monotheistic religions. In contrast to the sacred scriptures of the monotheists, Greek religion relied on a vast array of myths handed down from one generation to another through poetry and song. These myths surrounded and sustained religious rituals and festivals. In Greek culture, there was no separation of religion and state – to live in a political community meant that one participated in religious rituals and festivals.1 Indeed, Greek city-states organized almost all public religious events.