This study examines the evidence for the celestial afterlife in Greek philosophy before Plato. Starting from Plato’s Phaedo myth, where we find evidence for three levels of life for souls (our level, the ‘aithêr-dwellers’ above us, and, above that, a more mysterious third level), it argues that such a stratified cosmos was not original to Plato, but can be found in certain of his predecessors. The two best-documented instances of it occur in Heraclitus and the new, Strasbourg papyrus of Empedocles. Both thinkers, in attempting to frame the place of soul in the order of nature, also adopt a stratified, hierarchical cosmic scheme, with rewards and demotions along the vertical axis. But they also thereby take up positions on the nature of soul: What stuff is it made of? Is it (essentially) immortal or not? And if not, can its immortality be secured? Against Plato’s later doctrine of an essentially immortal soul, both conceive of soul as somehow physical and, for different reasons, appear to deny its full or essential immortality.

This chapter deals again with the influence of law on philosophy, now with regard to a substantive issue. Under the influence of the Roman jurists, for whom private property was an important topic, the ‘Roman’ Stoics followed suit, and awarded private property a novel, central place in thinking about justice, a place which would have a decisive influence on modern, Western political thought.

In dialogues ranging from the Symposium to the Timaeus, Plato appears to propose that the philosopher’s grasp of the forms may confer immortality upon him.  Whatever can Plato mean in making such a claim?  What does he take immortality to consist in, such that it could constitute a reward for philosophical enlightenment?  And how is this proposal compatible with Plato’s insistence throughout his corpus that all soul, not just philosophical soul, is immortal?  In this chapter, I pursue these questions by applying the distinction between general and earned immortality to the Phaedo and the Symposium.  I argue that, while Plato attributes general immortality to all souls in the Phaedo, he proposes in the Affinity Argument that the philosopher’s soul can achieve earned immortality through contemplating forms.  It is this form of immortality that Plato claims is unavailable to humankind in the flux passage of the Symposium.  At the same time, in the ascent passage, he holds out the possibility – albeit with significant reservations – that the philosopher’s soul may transcend its humanity and achieve earned immortality through its communion with the forms.

I argue that the conversation in Plato’s Phaedo operates on two levels, and appeals to two different notions of immortality, one temporal (continuing life after death or before birth) and one atemporal (immunity from death, time and all sequential events). Socrates and his friends are concerned about whether the soul will survive beyond the present life, and whether it existed prior to birth. While this looks like a concern about temporal survival, I argue that Plato, as author, is identifying another kind of immortality, proper to the soul alone, as a being outside time, to which 'before' and 'after' do not apply. By examining exactly what is meant by its immunity to death (in a number of senses of ‘death’) and its association with life (in one sense of ‘life’), I consider in what sense the soul could have a kind of atemporal being akin to that which pertains to the Forms, and examine some puzzles about how such a being could enter into temporal experience in conjunction with a sequence of bodies.

The Jewish exegete Philo of Alexandria speaks of death and immortality in several different ways. He may refer to the higher or lower part of the soul or the body, and mean either moral or ontological death. Not all combinations are possible; e.g., Philo never says the soul’s leading part could cease to exist, and the body can neither undergo moral death nor avoid the physical one. Three types of Philonic discourse are discussed: human mortality caused by the body, the soul’s moral corruption that Philo calls its death, and the ontological immortality of the mind. Despite the last one, Philo speaks of attaining immortality. This is not an inconsistency but refers to the mind’s liberation from its mortal companions (the body and the mortal portion of the soul) so that only its congenital immortality remains. Attaining immortality also means the end of the repeated deaths in the cycle of reincarnation, and the mind’s restoration to its original state of blessedness.

This chapter rounds off the volume in two ways. It deals with, first, the more sporadic interaction between jurists and philosophers in the early imperial period, and second, with the influence of the late Republican interaction on law and philosophy as they are both practised today.

In this chapter, the influence of Hellenistic philosophy on Roman law is discussed in terms of method: with the help of the Stoic dialectical methods of classifying and defining the Roman jurists could start to systematise the organically grown output of their civil law and turn the resolution of disputes into a scientific enterprise, producing systematic overviews along the way. In the 6th century CE, the Roman Emperor Justinian took the influential decision that an updated version of one of these accounts itself be given the status of law.

In the pseudo-Platonic dialogue Axiochus, Socrates deploys a variety of arguments to soothe Axiochus’ fear of death. One of these is the ‘symmetry argument’ that tries to demonstrate that the state we will be in post mortem is no more harmful than the state we were in before birth. This argument is often associated with Epicureanism and with their commitment to the mortality of the soul, and it is therefore sometimes thought that Socrates’ use of it here is inconsistent with his commitment in the dialogue to the claim that each of us is in fact an immortal soul. This is also sometimes thought to show that the dialogue as a whole is clumsily constructed. I show how Socrates may deploy a symmetry argument and remain consistent with his other commitments.

At first glance, Plotinus’ arguments for the immortality of the human soul, principally in Ennead IV 7 (2), constitute a straightforward defense of Plato against Peripatetic and Stoic attacks. And yet, his close reading of his predecessors, especially Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias, led him to confront the following deep problem. The best arguments for immortality rest upon the immateriality of intellect and hence its immunity from destruction along with the body. But, following Aristotle, Plotinus maintains that the nature of intellection is such that the contents of the objects of intellection both identify the agent of intellection and further will be identical for every disembodied intellect. For this reason, it is not clear what it would mean to insist on the personal immortality of anyone. Without personal immortality, though, the ethical dimension of Platonism is, for Plotinus, severely undermined. In the light of this difficulty Plotinus developed an apparently original doctrine that was repudiated by virtually all his successors. He argued that there are Forms of individuals, that is, of individual intellects, and that, since they are eternal Forms, they are ‘undescended’. He argued that the personal identity of any human soul is found paradigmatically in an undescended intellect.

Whereas the previous chapters dealt with the influence of Hellenistic philosophy on Roman law in terms of method, this chapter deals with the influence with regard to a substantive issue, the notion of person. The Roman jurists became interested in the abstract use of the notion of person in the slipstream of the philosophers, who combined the Greek understanding of person with a more indigenous, that is Etruscan, understanding thereof. ‘Person’ thus understood would become one of the central notions in Roman law and beyond.