The Lusitanians at first did not have a worthy leader, and thus were easily defeated in the war with the Romans, but later, after they found Viriathus, they inflicted great damage on the Romans.1 He was one of the Lusitanians2 who lived near the Ocean and was a shepherd from childhood, accustomed to a life in the mountains. He was assisted by the nature of his body, since in his strength, quickness, and agility he was far superior to the rest of the Iberians. He was accustomed to little food and much exercise, and only as much sleep as was necessary. In general, by living under arms and always contending with wild beasts and brigands, he became famous among the people and was chosen to be their leader, and in a short period gathered a group of brigands around him.3

Nabis, the tyrannos of the Lakedaimonians, killed Pelops the son of King Lykourgos, who was a child at the time.1 This was a matter of precaution, since the child, when he came of age, might restore the freedom of his country, using the assurance of his noble birth. He also selected the most accomplished Lakedaimonians and put them to death, and gathered mercenaries of the worst type from everywhere to guard his power. Thus temple robbers, thieves, brigands, and those sentenced to death came to Sparta from every place. He had made himself tyrannos through his impiety, and he believed that only by such people could he best be guarded.

In Tusculans 1 Cicero gives a lengthy rebuttal of the thesis that death is an evil. This raises a puzzle: how can such a one-sided presentation aspire to reveal whether it is more plausible that death is or is not an evil? Invoking the Tusculans’ practical aim – the removal of emotional disturbance – does not fully satisfy, since it is unclear how effective persuasion can be if the contrary position does not receive a fair hearing. I show that as main speaker in the book Cicero warns against over-confidence in embracing positions that one wishes to be true; and I argue that as author Cicero portrays the interlocutor of Tusculans 1 as a salutary example of how not to approach the kind of questions about death with which the work engages. We are encouraged to see the interlocutor’s failure as one not of character but of inexperience in philosophical method.

Philip [V],1 the Macedonian king, persuaded Dikaiarchos of Aitolia, a man of daring, to become a pirate, and gave him twenty ships.2 He ordered him to levy tribute on the islands and to aid the Cretans in their war against the Rhodians. According to these instructions, he plundered merchants and through robbery exacted money from the islands.

On the same day the senate voted a declaration of war against Perseus, and even though it gave an audience to his envoys, it gave no reply to them.1 It also ordered the consuls to make an explicit proclamation to the assemblies, and that the envoys and all the Macedonians were to leave Rome on the same day, and Italy within thirty days.

The definitions of the emotions in Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations 3 which refer to magnitude are not meant to represent Stoic orthodoxy, and should not be read as direct evidence for the Stoic theory. Cicero’s aims and methods in the Tusculans led him to use non-Stoic accounts of the emotions, in order to offer a kind of consolation that is neutral between Stoic and Peripatetic theories of value. This chapter also discusses the structure of the Tusculans as a unified whole.

The final book of the Tusculans is intended to bring together the results of the preceding books in two ways. It concludes the argument that virtue is sufficient for happiness, where that is understood as invulnerable tranquillity and peace of mind. The book also fills out its opening praise of philosophy, understood as Academic sceptical method. However, the forceful final coda raises problems of philosophical consistency which, when examined carefully, cannot be reconciled with the book’s initial aims.

In Tusculans 2 the interlocutors discuss the value of physical pain. They swiftly agree that it is not the greatest evil but take longer to consider whether it is bad or, as the Stoics think, merely indifferent. Enduring pain is taken to be an indication of courage and manliness (virtus) and this is undermined by the claim that physical pain is not bad. Therefore neither the Epicureans nor the Stoics provide a wholly satisfactory account of the value of physical pain and its relationship to virtue.

(1) Marcus Antonius made peace with the Cretans, which was observed for a while.1 Later they considered how best to structure matters for their own benefit, and the oldest and wisest advised that an embassy should be sent to Rome in order to defend themselves against the charges that had been made, and to attempt to propitiate the senate with reasonable words and petitions.2 Thus thirty of their most distinguished men were sent to Rome as envoys. They went around individually to the homes of the senators, and by putting forth every kind of vocal entreaty, they won over the leaders of the senate. (2) Then they were brought before the senate and made a sensible defense against the charges, recounting precisely their own services and alliance with the empire, calling upon them to consider these to merit their restoration to their previous favor and alliance.

The Carthaginians, by bringing Masanassa into the war, were believed to have terminated their treaty with the Romans. When they sent envoys, they were given the answer that they knew what must be done.1 The answer was obscure, which left the Carthaginians deeply disturbed.2

This chapter focuses on Cicero’s treatment of the emotions in Books 3 and 4, and more specifically on his account of the dispute between the Stoics and the Peripatetics. At first sight, the dispute seems uncomplicated: the Stoics advocate the complete absence of emotions whereas the Peripatetics hold that emotions should rather be moderated or controlled. But Cicero’s stress on the idea that emotions are beliefs seems to come at the expense of other central parts of the theory of emotions, most prominently the theory of action.  I argue that these features of his presentation serve him in securing a thesis that he is keen to defend in Book 5: that virtue guarantees happiness and that this happiness is invulnerable to the accidents of fortune.

An introduction to the historical and philosophical context of Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations and an overview of some general questions to be investigated in the volume, particularly: the question of Cicero’s ‘Socratic method’, his use of dialogue, his claim to argue on both sides of a question, and the relationship between this and his Academic scepticism.