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For the Attalid dynasty, royal mothers were central figures in royal monuments and public honors. While other dynasties I have discussed thus far – the Argeads, Ptolemies, and Seleucids – likewise stressed the importance of maternal qualities in queens through their emphasis on fertility, continuity of a dynastic line, and care for subjects and communities, much of the Attalid kingdom’s dynastic monument-building stressed the queen’s role as a mother, and all that entailed. So much so that the Attalid queen’s maternal qualities were even highlighted in monuments commemorating military victory and dynastic kingship. This emphasis not only augmented Attalid themes of “self-conscious filial, fraternal, and conjugal ‘values’” of monarchy, as scholars have already explored, but also articulated key notions of Attalid queenship. In this chapter, I build on this robust scholarship by considering how the Attalid royal mother (as well as other queenly and maternal figures) fit into visual narratives and monument landscapes of divine and dynastic triumph, and how this figure shaped cultic life and commemorative practices.
In his Republic, Plato claims that we always do whatever we do in pursuit of the good. But in Book IV of the Republic, Plato shows that people can have attractions and aversive reactions at the same time toward the same objects or actions. In this essay, I argue that Plato’s recognition and use of aversion as a motivating response cannot be squared with what I call his ‘motivational monism’, that is, with the view that the pursuit of the good is the only thing that motivates us. Rather, as Plato’s own arguments show clearly, sometimes we don’t pursue what is good; instead, we act so as to avoid what is bad. I contend that this negative motivation cannot be wholly understood in terms of our positive interest in what is good.
This chapters argues that Plato’s notion of personal autonomy is closely linked to his understanding of the social dimension of rational deliberation. It begins with an assessment of Miranda Fricker’s influential account of epistemic authority and social power and raises some objections against the discursive notion of reason she develops. To substantiate these objections, it turns to Plato’s Cratylus and to Socrates’ analysis of logos as a language mediated form of rational deliberation. It argues that while Socrates suggests that the constitutive parts of language, the names (ta onomata), are ambivalent and deceptive, leaving discursive reason in doubt, Plato, at the same time, shows that it nevertheless can function to identify unwarranted claims of epistemic authority, as a form of codependent philosophical conversation. From this emerges a notion of Platonic autonomy closely tied to Plato’s analysis of the social dimension of rational deliberation and its embodiment in the Platonic dialogue.
Plato’s Socratic dialogues depict Socrates as advocating for two conflicting requirements. Socrates sometimes says that a non-expert is required to retain autonomy and to think for herself. On other occasions he suggests that the non-expert is required to defer to the expert’s opinion. This paper offers a way to resolve the tension between these requirements. For Socrates, both intellectual requirements are dependent on the one’s intellectual aim. Socrates thinks that one is required to think independently if one’s aim is to acquire the expertise that the interlocutor professes to have. However, if one’s aim is simply to make a correct decision in a particular situation, one is required to defer to an expert opinion. If one’s epistemic aim determines which requirement one should comply with, then, for Socrates, what counts as a reason for belief is sometimes dependent on one’s (epistemic) aim.
In the Republic, Socrates sets up rational self-rule, archein hautou, as the ideal state, with what we might call rational other-rule as second best (590d3-5). This paper will focus on the role of dialectic in the process of establishing self-rule from two perspectives: an agent having been raised by an educational program under ideal political conditions, focusing on the Republic; and an agent trying to engage in philosophical self-improvement under non-ideal political conditions, focusing on the Hippias Major. This may be seen as a contrast between a top-down and a bottom-up approach to establishing rational self-rule. My thesis is that, in both cases, an intermediate or provisional form of rational self-rule needs to be established in order to achieve full self-rule, and that, in both approaches, the provisional state of rational self-rule shares some important features of the final state of rational self-rule, what we might call wisdom, but these are different features in the two cases.
This chapter explores the archaeology of late antique Syria, emphasising its historical significance and research challenges. Syria has one of the highest concentrations of late antique sites, particularly in the Limestone Massif, yet modern national borders obscure historical connections with Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey. Drawing on historical texts, travel accounts and archaeological surveys, the chapter traces the development of research from early European explorers to twentieth-century French-led excavations. It examines the influence of colonial mandates and political changes, including the impact of the Syrian civil war on archaeological preservation. A central argument is that late antique Syria has been overlooked in favour of earlier Roman and later Islamic studies. Limited excavations, instability and destruction have further hindered research. However, the chapter stresses the importance of studying Syria’s role in connecting the Roman, Persian and early Islamic worlds. Instead of focusing solely on elite monuments, the chapter calls for research on everyday settlements to provide a fuller picture of Syrian society during Late Antiquity.
The Encyclopaedia of Late Antique Art and Archaeology seeks to fill a significant gap in historical research by placing art and archaeology at the forefront of late Roman and late antique studies. Recognising the need for a comprehensive and accessible reference, this work moves beyond the traditional focus on ‘early Christian archaeology’ to adopt a broader perspective. It highlights the dynamic interplay of Christianity, Judaism and Islam, challenging outdated notions of a fully Christianised Late Antiquity. Organised into six sections – architecture and iconography, artefacts and material evidence, urbanism and rural landscapes, regional and ethnic diversity, and key issues and debates – the encyclopaedia offers a structured, in-depth exploration of the field. With contributions from leading scholars, it synthesises archaeological discoveries to challenge narratives of decline, instead presenting Late Antiquity as an era of transformation and cultural fusion.
It is natural to see in the Republic’s concern with self-mastery a Platonic account of autonomy. But Plato’s understanding of self-rule in the Republic has more to do with cognition, and rather less to do with independent agency. Indeed, in the ethically motivated epistemology of the Republic, it is aiming at ideal knowledge that transforms one ethically and engenders many of the features centrally associated with the notion of ‘autonomy’. Being able to explain reality independently makes one independent of the illusions and confusions caused by pleasure, pains, and public pressures, and even restructures the desires, pleasures and other affects liable to arise. Moreover, the ability to give accounts is what makes us accountable to one another for our cognitive condition — and for the judgements, feelings and actions based on this.
This chapter explores late antique wall painting, with special emphasis on its stylistic transformation, evolving iconography and the challenges of preservation and interpretation. It traces the shift from illusionistic Roman painting to the more abstract, linear styles that characterised Late Antiquity. A central argument is that late antique wall painting represents not a decline in artistic quality but rather an adaptive response to new cultural, religious and spatial demands. The chapter examines the rise of Liniendekoration (linear decoration), a geometric style that became dominant in funerary contexts, particularly in Roman catacombs, Egyptian monasteries and Mediterranean hypogea. It also explores the coexistence of early Christian imagery with traditional pagan motifs, emphasising continuity rather than abrupt change. In analysing these shifts, the chapter highlights how late antique painters simplified classical techniques in response to changing workshop practices, economic factors and environmental constraints. It also addresses key methodological challenges, including dating wall paintings, identifying regional styles and assessing the influence of early Christian and Jewish artistic traditions. This study stresses the crucial role of wall painting in Late Antiquity as a medium for shaping religious and social identities, demonstrating its artistic innovation and cultural significance.