This book has a primary focus. It is to document the history, with all its successes and failures, of the US Navy's efforts to achieve the “100 knot Navy”. It includes the critical decade 1969–1979 when the Navy spent more than $650 million (and closer to $1 billion if all related technologies are included) to develop a 3,000 ton displacement (frigate size) ship capable of conducting navy missions at 100 knots. The Navy program was canceled on 9 January 1980 after failed technological development and the Navy turned its attention to ships with much lower speeds.

This book also has a second major focus which is to examine the various hydrodynamic and aerodynamic theories and substantiated data of various forms of marine craft designed for high speed other than just “100 knots”. This fall-out from that intensive effort produced a wealth of data and information on innovative forms of high speed marine craft. This has been an important byproduct that is included and expanded upon in the various chapters of this book.

The average speed of naval fleets using conventional displacement ships is about 25 knots. The goal to quadruple that speed to 100 knots proved to be a “bridge too far”. Immediately following the cancelation in 1980 of those intensive efforts, the Navy re-directed its attention to advanced design ships with speeds closer to 50 knots – a mere doubling of the current fleet speeds! But even that “goal” has not yet gained a foothold for either commercial or naval fleets in any sustainable manner. The Navy, after some sketchy and limited beginnings in 1965, initially in consort with the US Maritime Administration, had concluded that the best way of achieving a “100 knot Navy” was to select one form of non-amphibious air cushion craft out of several other advanced marine vehicle concepts available at that time to achieve such a capability.

In the 1960s, the studies by the US Maritime Administration on the economics of high speed ships showed definite advantage to ships that could transport goods at speeds approaching 100 knots. Later, studies by the US Navy recognized the military value of “high speed” but could not be specific about such a classification as “a 100 knot Navy” in general and only in specific missions could the advantage of such a speed be quantified. The one navy mission area that could show benefit was the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) mission where it could be shown that a ship that sprinted ahead of the fleet; drop to “listening speeds” with a towed array; and sprint ahead again such that the average speed of such a ship would be comparable to the “fleet speed” of the naval force was of value if the sprint speed was close to 100 knots. In this instance, taking into account the characteristics of the platforms and sonar technology at the time, the speed capability of “100 knots” appeared to be an advantage. Other navy missions did not show a specific need and other ship characteristics played an equal or greater role than just speed.

In earlier centuries, there was no question that being a fast ship “that goes in harm's way” was a definite advantage, but as technology advances in weapon systems blossomed, the speed of the platform became less a factor than that of the weapon. It may have been possible, in yesteryear, by ship maneuvering to avoid an enemy's cannon ball – but not from today's anti-ship missile. In the 1970s some tests were done with high speed hydrofoils where, by taking advantage of the hydrofoil's high maneuverability capability, some successes were achieved in “dodging” (break lock) a single anti-ship second generation missile but this was not the general case. Advances in missile technology since the 1970s would most certainly negate any high speed ship's maneuverability defense against today's brand of missiles (cruise or ballistic). The value of “high speed” and in “100 knots in particular” would have to stand the scrutiny of a broad based mission analysis.

The two decade period 1960–1980 was the crucial period in the US where first, the US Maritime Administration (MARAD) and second, the US Navy sought large ships capable of operating at 100 knots on the high seas for both economic and military advantage. During that two decade period there were two key review milestones when the then current Administration became nervous about the choice of concept and called for a re-evaluation of the MARAD and US Navy choice. The first occurred in 1965 when the US Department of Commerce directed that a re-evaluation be made of the many high speed ship concepts available. This was the Surface Effect Ships for Ocean Commerce (SESOC) Committee. The results of that committee's work are discussed in detail in Chapter 4.

The second “call for a re-evaluation” was in 1975, exactly one decade later, when the Office of the Secretary of Defense called for a major review because after a decade of development, the choice by the US Navy was not performing as advertised. This resulted in the US Navy's Advanced Naval Vehicles Concepts Evaluation (ANVCE) Project (1976–1979). The ANVCE Project wrapped up its work and published its findings just before the US Navy canceled the high speed SES program on 9 January 1980. This chapter outlines the results from the ANVCE Project.

On 30 June 1976, the sidehull Surface Effect Ship SES-100B attained a speed of 91.9 knots in a slight choppy sea off the coast of Panama City, Florida. Despite that achievement many in the technical community and in The Pentagon were becoming concerned that the claims of the “100 knot Navy” advocates simply did not hold water. The technological problems that were surfacing based on analysis and test and operational experience both in the US and in the UK (where hovercraft technology and operation was quite advanced) produced “red flags” about the viability in several key areas of technical maturity in the US Navy choice. At the same time, the issue of the form of the proper Navy mission requirements was also raising questions in the Defense and Congressional community.

The rise and fall of the US Navy's “large high speed SES” program covered a decade from 1969 to 1979 at a cost of more than $650 million (and closer to $1 billion if all related R&D is included). The original goal was to achieve a ship of “large tonnage” sufficient for transoceanic operation (2000–3000 tons) at an operational speed in Sea State 3 of 80 knots or more, with a “desired goal” of 100 knots.

The US Navy officially began its Surface Effect Ship (SES) activities when it jointly formed, in 1967, with the US Maritime Administration (MARAD) what was called the Joint Surface Effect Ship Project Office (JSESPO) headed by Marvin Pitkin, a respected industrial executive and Assistant Administrator for Commercial Development at MARAD. In the beginning, it was believed that both MARAD and the US Navy had common interests of developing a high speed ship of high tonnage. The MARAD interests based on its studies, believed that large ships (of up to approximately 15,000 ton displacement), capable of delivering some 500–5,000 tons of containerized cargo at speeds of 100 knots in calm seas was an attractive commercial possibility to revitalize the American marine industry (see Chapter 4 for the MARAD program).

The US Navy were more circumspect of their mission needs but saw the value of high speeds in the range of 80–100 knots for military advantage and in the 2,000–5,000 ton displacement class. Earlier visions were of a frigate size ship. Various missions such as ASW and Sea Control were being evaluated at that time. Both MARAD and the US Navy were aware of the significant progress that was already underway in England since the late 1950s with developments in both amphibious and sidehull type surface effect ships (although they were known under different names in England, such as hovercraft and sidewall hovercraft based on the original work by Sir Christopher Cockerell).

Based on these common interests, both MARAD and the US Navy agreed to jointly fund a program to explore the various applicable technologies and to develop a prototype ship and set up the Joint Surface Effect Ship Program Office (JSESPO) in 1967.