It is almost impossible to provide a clear historical basis for all the many ways that “high speed” has been introduced into the marine world. Inventors have tumbled over themselves in conceptualizing, building, testing and otherwise trying out their designs. History has been constantly repeating itself as new designs appear that are frequently nothing more than a reappearance of some earlier design but have gained status because the earlier designs were either lost in the patent offices or abandoned by the original inventor for say, financial burdens or personal crises and other reasons. Sometimes the “new” design came into being simply because the “time was right” and the original inventor is lost to antiquity. In some cases, the speed improvement is overshadowed by the introduction of a new and unexpected technology. The “invention” of the Clipper Ship that was so successful in the 1840s was soon eclipsed by the invention and application of the steam engine for marine use. In these days of seeking “alternative energy sources” perhaps the use of sails may come back!

There are many books already written that document the ways that “high speed” has been introduced in the marine field and it is not the purpose here to repeat such documentation. Christopher Dawson's book, “A Quest for Speed at Sea”1 published in 1972 provides an excellent treatment of advances in sail, engine propulsion, hull form and the start of the “dynamic lift” ships such as hydrofoils and air cushion craft. Dawson shows how the conflicting requirements for speed, load carrying, seaworthiness, endurance, economy and reliability have greatly influenced each of the various designs from historical times to the present day. Although Dawson's book was published over 40 years ago, not much has changed in these conflicting requirements since that time. Frequently, in modern day developments, time and money has been spent on re-living this history.

Another respected historian is H.F.King, a noted former editor of (now defunct) Flight International and Air Cushion Vehicles. King in his 1966 book “Aeromarine Origins”2 documents the results of his research into many of the designs used today.

The US Maritime Administration (MARAD) must be credited with taking bold initiatives in the late 1950s and early 1960s to seek novel forms of ships aimed at revitalizing the ailing American Merchant Marine. In the late 1950s the US Maritime Administration (MARAD) embarked upon several programs that included different approaches to the ship construction subsidy program; the use of standardized containers; improved data processing for handling ship operating information on board ship; more efficient shoreside operations; improved cargo handling means; and other ways of reducing costs and improve efficiency of American ships. The decline of the American Merchant Marine had been underway since the end of World War II. By 1964, the world merchant shipping fleet was moving around 200 million deadweight tons of cargo and goods. At that same time, the cargo and goods being shipped by the US fleet was only about 15% of that world value at a modest 35 million deadweight tons. In addition to the wide ranging initiatives being pursued by the US Maritime Administration there were three specific programs designed to seek new hull forms for the transport of goods over transoceanic routes at both reduced cost and with more efficient operation. These programs were:

1. (1) Nuclear Powered Ship (N.S.Savannah) (1959–1972)

2. (2) High speed Hydrofoil (HS Denison) (1958–1964)

3. (3) High speed Surface Effect Ship (Columbia and VRC–1 Project) (1961–1965)

The first program (N.S. Savannah) was aimed at reducing the operating costs of ships by switching from fossil fuel to nuclear power for propulsion. The second two programs (hydrofoil and surface effect ship) were aimed at incorporating vastly superior high speeds into ocean commerce with a goal of 100 knots or more. This goal for the hydrofoil and surface effect ship programs was based on in-house economic analyses that showed that such ships from 100 tons to 3,000 tons displacement traveling at 100 knots over transatlantic distances (approx 3,600 nautical miles) would offer Direct Operating Costs (DOC) between those experienced by conventional displacement ships and those of transport aircraft. The aim was to move cargo and goods faster “to market” at speeds much greater than the 20–30 knots of conventional displacement ships but at costs much less than transporting by air.

Before proceeding with this Chapter, the reader might pause for a moment and glance again at the photograph in Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2 and imagine a wing-in-ground-effect (WIG) craft (or “ship”) flying close to the water to obtain the lift advantage from “ground or surface effect” in those same sea conditions. One might also wonder why all the photographs that have appeared in the literature from the small personal aircraft using the WIG principle to the largest sizes in the Russian, Chinese and German work on WIG, and with the US PAR WIG and other variants of wing-in-ground-effect, are all taken in calm waters or in relatively calm seas. This is a problem that needs to be addressed and will be referred to in this chapter on this promising concept to achieve high speed over the seas of the world.

Aerodynamic Underpinnings

The basic aerodynamic principles that apply to aerodynamic air cushion craft can be traced to before the Wright brothers first flew at Kitty Hawk on 17 December 1903. In the late 1800s several scientists and renowned engineers were developing the theory of flight and building practical man-powered gliders. Sir George Cayley (1773–1857) in Scarborough, Yorkshire, England is frequently referred to as “the father of aeronautics” because of his extensive work in determining the four basic forces for flight: lift, drag, thrust and weight and building the first glider to carry a man aloft. The first flight was in 1849 with a young boy as pilot. A much larger glider that flew across Brompton Dale (near Scarborough, Yorkshire) was in 1853 with a grown man as pilot. Historical records are not clear as to who the pilot was but possibly an employee or probably Sir Cayley's grandson. A history of Sir George Cayley and his work may be found in Richard Dee's excellent 2007 book.1 Sir George Cayley was a prolific inventor and well versed in basic research methods. An interesting and prescient set of short articles written by him appears in the 1809 and 1810 Journal of Natural Philosophy2 where he outlines the governing principles for flight.

The design principles of high speed marine craft are much less established than the well-established techniques honed over centuries of practice in the design of low speed marine craft with their displacement hull origins. High speed marine craft design, on the other hand, involves study of different hull form concepts, each requiring an understanding of four basic forces resulting in the lift and the drag of the craft. These four forces are: hydrostatic (buoyancy); hydrodynamic; aerostatic and aerodynamic. Each of these four forces scale by different laws of physics making scaling difficult from small models to large ship sizes. The combination of those forces applies differently in each case depending on the choice of concept being considered. In a broad sense, for the hydrofoil, the hydrodynamic forces dominate; for the amphibious air cushion craft, the aerostatic forces dominate; for the wing-in-ground-effect craft (WIG), the aerodynamic forces dominate. Coupled with these different forces, the high speed marine craft must also contend with the physics of subcavitating and supercavitating flows in both the hull hydrodynamics and in the propulsion schemes envisaged.

This influence of the four forces has a significant impact on the size and speed of the craft and its use or mission. This intrinsic triad of “size-speed-mission” is a key consideration when asking what is achievable in attaining high speed at sea. This relationship is expanded upon throughout the book. Because of these complex interactions between the various forces and choice of craft concept, the programmatic history of developing high speed marine craft has been somewhat sporadic with isolated successes among various setbacks caused by both technology issues and programmatic stumbles.

Upper limits of low speed marine craft speeds using displacement hulls have remained relatively unchanged over several centuries with typical values of 25–35 knots, depending on ship size and sea conditions. The “speed limits” for high speed marine craft vary widely depending on the concept selected but speeds from 50 to 250 knots covers the experience base under discussion.

Two major thrusts in the US for high speed marine craft were by the US Maritime Administration (MARAD) for commercial shipping, and by the US Navy for military ships and craft. MARAD conducted two major thrusts; first a surface piercing hydrofoil with planned speeds of 60–100 knots and subsequently, a combination hovercraft and WIG design for 100–150 knots.

Declining American Marine Industry

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the American marine industry was in trouble. Nicolas Johnson1, US Maritime Administrator (1964–1965) discussed the problems of the high cost of shipping exports overseas which also meant an increase in the cost of American goods to the foreign consumer. In 1960, the US Share of world shipping was less than 10% despite a major shipbuilding program that had been underway in the US during World War II. Unfortunately, most of the shipbuilding in the US during WW II was embodied in the American Liberty Ship, a standard dry cargo vessel (approx 10,902 dwt) and the T2 tanker (16,543 dwt). The Liberty ship was a wide bodied, bulbous ship with a disappointing top speed of 11 knots. Most of the foreign ships at that time were designed for higher speeds (14 knots and more). This placed the US at a disadvantage in capturing any significant share of the world shipping trade.

This decline in the US share of world shipping, that continues to this day, is shown in Figure 7.1. In addition, there was the problem of high labor and high capital costs, which caused the US government to subsidize the shipbuilding industry at rates at different times through this period of 30% and 50%. The US Maritime Administration needed to find another solution. At that time, the only alternatives available to the shipper was “By Sea” or “By Air” with vastly different costs. The two choices available to the shipper, whether it be a manufacturer of say automobile parts in Detroit or a grain supplier in the mid-West; were to ship by air at 20 cents per ton mile and have his goods arrive within 24 hours, or ship by sea at 5 cents per ton mile and have his goods arrive say, 5 days later. Issues of weight and bulk (space) and needs of roll-on, roll-off capability also entered into the decision of which shipping method to use, but the cost was a significant driver.

As a further indication of the US Maritime Administration concern was the significant drop in the US shipbuilding construction.

A vast amount of experience in the technology of “ground or surface effect” for marine vehicles occurred during the half century 1950–2000. During that time, the hovercraft came into being in its birthplace in England and throughout the world. Both commercial and military uses benefited from these craft that typically operated at speeds up to 50 knots in littoral sea states. That history has been covered in the early chapters of this book (see Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 and throughout) as data from that era was used in the technical development chapters. A derivative of the hovercraft that became known as the surface effect ship enjoyed significant development during the two decades 1960–1980 most intensely in the US where speeds approaching 100 knots were achieved. That history has occupied many chapters in this book. The development of the aerodynamic air cushion craft has actually covered a much longer period from the original work by Prandtl and Wieselsberger in the 1920s to the present day. The most developed work in terms of operational craft was that done in Russia in the 1960–1990 period when such craft operated at speeds in excess of 200 knots (see Chapter 11).

Each of those key periods produced significant work in theories of ground effect, substantial experimental data and many operational vehicles. Copious references to that work appear in the various chapters and used in the development of the simple theories provided here in the understanding of a “100 knot at sea capability”.

It is in the critical period, 1960–1980, when the most intense and fruitful development was undertaken to achieve a practical 100 knot capability, that the stumbles began to occur. They can be grouped under the two main headings of (1) unresolved technical problems and (2) neglecting to follow well-established R&D management practices. These issues have been addressed in the preceding chapters. It is believed that it would have been possible to have achieved a high speed marine craft for practical missions capability within the time and money expended if a few simple established procedures had been followed.

This book has a primary focus. It is to document the history, with all its successes and failures, of the US Navy's efforts to achieve the “100 knot Navy”. It includes the critical decade 1969–1979 when the Navy spent more than $650 million (and closer to $1 billion if all related technologies are included) to develop a 3,000 ton displacement (frigate size) ship capable of conducting navy missions at 100 knots. The Navy program was canceled on 9 January 1980 after failed technological development and the Navy turned its attention to ships with much lower speeds.

This book also has a second major focus which is to examine the various hydrodynamic and aerodynamic theories and substantiated data of various forms of marine craft designed for high speed other than just “100 knots”. This fall-out from that intensive effort produced a wealth of data and information on innovative forms of high speed marine craft. This has been an important byproduct that is included and expanded upon in the various chapters of this book.

The average speed of naval fleets using conventional displacement ships is about 25 knots. The goal to quadruple that speed to 100 knots proved to be a “bridge too far”. Immediately following the cancelation in 1980 of those intensive efforts, the Navy re-directed its attention to advanced design ships with speeds closer to 50 knots – a mere doubling of the current fleet speeds! But even that “goal” has not yet gained a foothold for either commercial or naval fleets in any sustainable manner. The Navy, after some sketchy and limited beginnings in 1965, initially in consort with the US Maritime Administration, had concluded that the best way of achieving a “100 knot Navy” was to select one form of non-amphibious air cushion craft out of several other advanced marine vehicle concepts available at that time to achieve such a capability.

In the 1960s, the studies by the US Maritime Administration on the economics of high speed ships showed definite advantage to ships that could transport goods at speeds approaching 100 knots. Later, studies by the US Navy recognized the military value of “high speed” but could not be specific about such a classification as “a 100 knot Navy” in general and only in specific missions could the advantage of such a speed be quantified. The one navy mission area that could show benefit was the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) mission where it could be shown that a ship that sprinted ahead of the fleet; drop to “listening speeds” with a towed array; and sprint ahead again such that the average speed of such a ship would be comparable to the “fleet speed” of the naval force was of value if the sprint speed was close to 100 knots. In this instance, taking into account the characteristics of the platforms and sonar technology at the time, the speed capability of “100 knots” appeared to be an advantage. Other navy missions did not show a specific need and other ship characteristics played an equal or greater role than just speed.

In earlier centuries, there was no question that being a fast ship “that goes in harm's way” was a definite advantage, but as technology advances in weapon systems blossomed, the speed of the platform became less a factor than that of the weapon. It may have been possible, in yesteryear, by ship maneuvering to avoid an enemy's cannon ball – but not from today's anti-ship missile. In the 1970s some tests were done with high speed hydrofoils where, by taking advantage of the hydrofoil's high maneuverability capability, some successes were achieved in “dodging” (break lock) a single anti-ship second generation missile but this was not the general case. Advances in missile technology since the 1970s would most certainly negate any high speed ship's maneuverability defense against today's brand of missiles (cruise or ballistic). The value of “high speed” and in “100 knots in particular” would have to stand the scrutiny of a broad based mission analysis.

The two decade period 1960–1980 was the crucial period in the US where first, the US Maritime Administration (MARAD) and second, the US Navy sought large ships capable of operating at 100 knots on the high seas for both economic and military advantage. During that two decade period there were two key review milestones when the then current Administration became nervous about the choice of concept and called for a re-evaluation of the MARAD and US Navy choice. The first occurred in 1965 when the US Department of Commerce directed that a re-evaluation be made of the many high speed ship concepts available. This was the Surface Effect Ships for Ocean Commerce (SESOC) Committee. The results of that committee's work are discussed in detail in Chapter 4.

The second “call for a re-evaluation” was in 1975, exactly one decade later, when the Office of the Secretary of Defense called for a major review because after a decade of development, the choice by the US Navy was not performing as advertised. This resulted in the US Navy's Advanced Naval Vehicles Concepts Evaluation (ANVCE) Project (1976–1979). The ANVCE Project wrapped up its work and published its findings just before the US Navy canceled the high speed SES program on 9 January 1980. This chapter outlines the results from the ANVCE Project.

On 30 June 1976, the sidehull Surface Effect Ship SES-100B attained a speed of 91.9 knots in a slight choppy sea off the coast of Panama City, Florida. Despite that achievement many in the technical community and in The Pentagon were becoming concerned that the claims of the “100 knot Navy” advocates simply did not hold water. The technological problems that were surfacing based on analysis and test and operational experience both in the US and in the UK (where hovercraft technology and operation was quite advanced) produced “red flags” about the viability in several key areas of technical maturity in the US Navy choice. At the same time, the issue of the form of the proper Navy mission requirements was also raising questions in the Defense and Congressional community.

The rise and fall of the US Navy's “large high speed SES” program covered a decade from 1969 to 1979 at a cost of more than $650 million (and closer to $1 billion if all related R&D is included). The original goal was to achieve a ship of “large tonnage” sufficient for transoceanic operation (2000–3000 tons) at an operational speed in Sea State 3 of 80 knots or more, with a “desired goal” of 100 knots.

The US Navy officially began its Surface Effect Ship (SES) activities when it jointly formed, in 1967, with the US Maritime Administration (MARAD) what was called the Joint Surface Effect Ship Project Office (JSESPO) headed by Marvin Pitkin, a respected industrial executive and Assistant Administrator for Commercial Development at MARAD. In the beginning, it was believed that both MARAD and the US Navy had common interests of developing a high speed ship of high tonnage. The MARAD interests based on its studies, believed that large ships (of up to approximately 15,000 ton displacement), capable of delivering some 500–5,000 tons of containerized cargo at speeds of 100 knots in calm seas was an attractive commercial possibility to revitalize the American marine industry (see Chapter 4 for the MARAD program).

The US Navy were more circumspect of their mission needs but saw the value of high speeds in the range of 80–100 knots for military advantage and in the 2,000–5,000 ton displacement class. Earlier visions were of a frigate size ship. Various missions such as ASW and Sea Control were being evaluated at that time. Both MARAD and the US Navy were aware of the significant progress that was already underway in England since the late 1950s with developments in both amphibious and sidehull type surface effect ships (although they were known under different names in England, such as hovercraft and sidewall hovercraft based on the original work by Sir Christopher Cockerell).

Based on these common interests, both MARAD and the US Navy agreed to jointly fund a program to explore the various applicable technologies and to develop a prototype ship and set up the Joint Surface Effect Ship Program Office (JSESPO) in 1967.