Kuhn was part of the vanguard that ushered in the historical turn in philosophy of science which looked to the history of science as a source of data for developing a philosophy of science. This was a monumental change in philosophy of science, marking, if not causing, the demise of positivism. The historical turn had a wider impact, contributing to important developments in the sociology of science, including the rise of the Strong Programme in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge. In this respect, Steve Fuller (2000) is correct to claim that with the writing of Structure Kuhn unleashed a series of events that were no part of his intentions.

As Structure was subjected to criticism Kuhn changed his view about the relevance of the history of science to the philosophy of science. He came to believe that the key insight that philosophers could gain from the history of science was a particular perspective on science, a historical or developmental perspective. In this chapter, I aim to both trace the path that led Kuhn to this change of view and to clarify what it is that the historical perspective offers us.

In the previous chapter, I indicated that one of the things we need to understand better is how a new theory comes to displace an older theory. In particular, I indicated that we need to develop a better understanding of the social dimensions of changes of theory. I also suggested that sociological studies of science may be illuminating in advancing our understanding of how the process of theory change unfolds. After all, a change of theory not only involves the development of a new scientific lexicon, it also involves the acceptance of the new lexicon in the research community. For this to occur, an accepted lexicon must be abandoned.

In this chapter, I want to begin to investigate how a long-accepted theory gets replaced by a new theory in a research community. I want to start, though, by briefly examining some of Kuhn’s speculations on the process, in particular, his speculations about (1) the role that younger scientists play in the generation of a new theory, and (2) the role that older scientists play in the acceptance of a new theory. Then, I want to review some evidence that suggests that Kuhn’s speculations are mistaken. Finally, I want to examine a particular episode of theory change in the history of science in an effort to develop a better understanding of the nature of the social changes that occur with a change of theory. The object of my study will be the revolutionary change in geology in the 1960s that led to the acceptance of the theory of plate tectonics.

Are there any scientific revolutions? Such a question has been raised by some of Kuhn’s critics. Larry Laudan (1984), for example, argues that no changes in science are aptly described as revolutionary. Laudan claims that given Kuhn’s holistic account of paradigms a revolutionary change involves simultaneous changes in methods, goals, and theories. But, according to Laudan, Kuhn’s holism “leads to expectations that are confounded by the historical record” (84). Laudan argues that all changes in science are continuous enough with the traditions preceding them to make calling any of them “revolutions” inappropriate. The only reason one would be led to believe otherwise, he claims, is if one fails to look at the process of change in sufficient detail. This same criticism, which challenges the very existence of revolutions in science, was also raised earlier by Stephen Toulmin. Writing in the 1960s, Toulmin claims that “students of political history have now outgrown any naïve reliance on the idea of ‘revolutions’ ” (1970/1972, 47). Similarly, he argues, “the idea of ‘scientific revolution’ will have to follow that of ‘political revolutions’ out of the category of explanatory concepts” (47).

My aim in this chapter is to address this criticism. I aim to show that there really are Kuhnian revolutions in science. In an effort to argue my case, I will show how the concept of a Kuhnian revolution provides insight into the change that occurred in early modern astronomy, a change that has come to be called “the Copernican revolution.” In addition to showing that there are in fact scientific revolutions, I will demonstrate the value of the concept “scientific revolution,” and the aptness of Kuhn’s comparison of theory change to radical political changes. This case study is also important because this particular historical episode was important to Kuhn’s own thinking about scientific change. Five years before the publication of Structure Kuhn published a book-length treatment of the Copernican revolution in astronomy. This book was published without the benefit of the detailed account of theory change Kuhn presents in Structure. Consequently, Kuhn’s pre-Structure study of the Copernican revolution is rather unKuhnian in some respects. Further, given that Kuhn revised his understanding of scientific revolutions, it is important to determine the extent to which this episode fits Kuhn’s developed account of revolutionary change, the account articulated in the previous chapter.

Many of Kuhn’s critics think that Kuhn is the philosopher most responsible for emphasizing the impact of non-cognitive factors in science, and thus threatening the rationality of theory choice (see Lakatos 1970/1972; Laudan 1984; Boghossian 2006). Both the sociologists of science who were inspired by his work and many of his philosophical critics regard Kuhn’s view as a form of constructionism. But as Ian Hacking (1999) notes, “constructionism” connotes different things to different people. Many sociologists and historians of science self-consciously approach their subject as constructionists (see Latour and Woolgar 1986; Shapin 1996, 9–10; Golinski 1988/2005). Many philosophers of science, on the other hand, believe that constructionism entails a pernicious form of relativism (see, for example, Brown 1989, 37; Boghossian 2006, 118–22). Hence, for many philosophers of science calling someone a constructionist amounts to a refutation of their view.

In this chapter, I aim to clarify the relationship between Kuhn’s view of science and constructionism. In clarifying the nature of Kuhn’s constructionism, I also aim to clarify Kuhn’s relationship to both philosophy of science and sociology of science.