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In selecting among the many statements that were made in the ‘War of Words’, it is important to choose only those that contained practical proposals for administrative reform and redirection of Government policy. Only then can we assess the extent to which they were in tune with or diverged from the plans being developed within the Board of Education. These were the ones that, because of their focused nature, draftspersons in the Board of Education might conceivably have felt constrained to take into account, and either to incorporate in, or exclude from, their own designs. In this way it is possible to be precise about what scientists wanted in 1914–17, and to estimate their degree of realism and the likely scope of their influence.
The Fellows of the Royal Society and the Chemical and Engineering societies must, Sir William Ramsay (FRS, chemist) urged in October 1914, be co-ordinated. They need, he said, to ‘work together at what for us is the supreme problem of all – how to conquer the Germans?’. The British Science Guild was to be included and the Royal Society was to ‘set the example’. Committees should be created; experts from other societies were to be added.
In March 1915 Ramsay prepared a ‘Draft Scheme for a Chemical Council of State’. It was to comprise twenty-four members, one-third technical chemists, one-third scientific investigators and one-third analytical and consulting chemists. It was to collect information on all aspects of the industry; to bring universities into contact with manufacturers; and to advise Government. Members were to be paid a small retainer. Agents were to be employed to visit factories and colleges. Eight members were to retire each year. The proposed Council was ‘to resemble to some extent a Royal Commission’. It would be appointed for ten years in the first instance. It would report annually to the Crown, but would not be attached to any Government department, although it would be associated with several. Non-political, it would be appointed by and directly responsible to the Crown. The president of the Royal Society would initially nominate two technical chemists and two scientific chemists. They, chaired by him, would choose twenty others.
In the essay review by Arne Hessenbruch published in our September 1999 issue, a proof reading error occurred on p. 356. The second sentence of the last paragraph on that page should have read ‘It demotes the importance of the scientific context, and so the biographer and the reader do not really have to understand it’. We apologize to Dr Hessenbruch for this error.
‘Morgan's canon’ is a rule for making inferences from animal behaviour about animal minds, proposed in 1892 by the Bristol geologist and zoologist C. Lloyd Morgan, and celebrated for promoting scepticism about the reasoning powers of animals. Here I offer a new account of the origins and early career of the canon. Built into the canon, I argue, is the doctrine of the Oxford philologist F. Max Müller that animals, lacking language, necessarily lack reason. Restoring the Müllerian origins of the canon in turn illuminates a number of changes in Morgan's position between 1892 and 1894. I explain these changes as responses to the work of the American naturalist R. L. Garner. Where Morgan had a rule for interpreting experiments with animals, Garner had an instrument for doing them: the Edison cylinder phonograph. Using the phonograph, Garner claimed to provide experimental proof that animals indeed spoke and reasoned.
After 1700, astrology lost the respect it once commanded in medical circles. But the belief that the heavens influenced bodily health persisted – even in learned medicine – until well into the nineteenth century. The continuing vitality of these ideas owed much to the new empirical and mechanical outlook of their proponents. Taking their cue from the work of Robert Boyle and Richard Mead, a number of British practitioners amassed statistical evidence which purported to prove the influence of the Moon upon fevers and other diseases. Such ideas flourished in the colonies and in the medical services of the armed forces, but their exponents were not marginal men. Some, like James Lind, were widely respected and drew support for their views from such influential figures as Erasmus Darwin.
This paper explores the careers of several British women astronomers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. I postulate that the only category of scientific practice open to most of these women was that of an ‘amateur’. They would have become professionals had they had the opportunity but since they were barred from professional status they used their talents to promote the importance of amateur science. I propose the term ‘obligatory amateur’ for these women who, unlike men, were unable to choose amateur or professional status. I explore this concept of a ‘gendered’ amateurism through the life and works of Annie Maunder, with references to British women astronomers contemporary with her.
There are many reasons why someone can be persuaded to become editor of a journal such as BJHS. Not least among them for this new editor is the challenge of emulating the high standards set by a succession of editors, and in particular those of his immediate predecessor. Janet Browne has, as all BJHS readers know, worked long and hard since 1994 to maintain and enhance the quality of the journal. It is therefore my very real pleasure to pay tribute to all her efforts on behalf of the Society and to add my own personal thanks for the numerous ways in which she has made possible a seamless transition to the new regime. It will also be apparent that her sure touch will be discernible upon many of the articles forthcoming in 2000.
Augustin Fresnel and François Arago are typically credited with jointly establishing the wave theory of light in early nineteenth-century France. Yet the two men, working in different traditions, brought to their collaboration vastly different conceptions of what light was and how it should be studied. This paper traces the work that went into co-ordinating these disparate approaches into a united front, as well as the dissolution of the alliance after 1821. Although the fruits of their alliance proved remarkably stable, in fact agreement between them was never more than partial.
Intellectual and professional reforms in evolutionary studies between 1935 and 1950 included substantial expansion, diversification, and realignment of community infrastructure. Theodosius Dobzhansky, Julian Huxley and Alfred Emerson organized the Society for the Study of Speciation at the 1939 AAAS Columbus meeting as one response (among many coming into place) to concerns about ‘isolation’ and ‘lack of contact’ among speciation workers worried about ‘dispersed’ and ‘scattered’ resources in this newly robust ‘borderline’ domain. Simply constructed, the SSS sought neither the radical reorganization of specialities nor the creation of some new discipline. Instead, it was designed to facilitate: to simplify exchange of information and to provide a minimally invasive avenue for connecting disparate researchers. Emerson served as SSS secretary and was its principal agent. After publishing one block of publications, however, the SSS became ‘quiescent’. Anxious to promote his own agenda, Ernst Mayr tried to manoeuvre around Emerson in an effort to revitalize the project. After meeting impediments, he moved his efforts elsewhere. The SSS was too short-lived to merit a claim for major impact within the community; however, it reveals important features of community activity during the synthesis period and stands in contrast to later efforts by George Simpson, Dobzhansky, and Mayr.
In 1860 Samuel Butler, a young Englishman later famous as a novelist, sailed into Lyttelton harbor with the Bible and The Origin of Species in his baggage, leaving far behind an angry clergyman father and the Anglican Establishment. Within two years, Butler, now a high-country farmer, began enlightening New Zealanders on the merits of Darwin's theory. His first article, published in The Press of Christchurch, presented a dialogue between free thinker “F,” an ardent Darwinian speaking for Butler himself, and “C,” a devout and simple-minded Christian, who found evolution “horrid” and “utterly subversive of Christianity.” Free thinker attempted to enlighten Christian by pointing out that illustrations of evolution could be observed everywhere in New Zealand. For example, the competition within a population of wild cats on sheep stations such as Butler's own Mesopotamia illustrated Darwin's struggle for life. Competing with one another for a diminishing supply of quail, only the fittest cats survived.
The Reverend C. J. Abraham, the Anglican bishop of Wellington, writing under a pseudonym, picked up the gauntlet that Butler had thrown down. As far as he was concerned, the Origin of Species, which he had recently read, simply rehashed the speculations of earlier writers such as Erasmus Darwin. “Were it not for their supposed effect upon religion,” Abraham declared, “no one would waste his time in reading about the possibility of polar bears swimming about and catching flies so long that they at last get the fins they wish for.”
In recent years there has been a remarkable “spatial turn” among students of society and culture. The genealogy of this twist of events is both multifaceted and complex. Among philosophers, social theorists, and historians of science there has been a renewed emphasis on the significance of the local, the specific, the situated. Some philosophers thus argue that what passes as a good reason for believing a claim is different from time to time, and from place to place. Rationality, it turns out, is in large measure situation specific, such that what counts as rational is contingent on the context within which people are located. Good grounds for holding a certain belief are evidently different for a twelfth-century milkmaid, a Renaissance alchemist, and a twentieth-century astrophysicist. Among social theorists there has also been a recovery of spatiality. The importance of the diverse locales within which social life is played out has assumed considerable significance with such writers as Clifford Geertz, Erving Goffman, and Anthony Giddens. In Geertz's telling, for example, law turns out not to be ecumenical but local knowledge – local in terms of place, time, class, issue, and what he terms “accent.” For Goffman, the situations facilitating human assemblages – gatherings, social occasions, informal encounters, and so on – furnish agents with those repertoires of structural meaning that they draw upon to constitute communication. In Giddens's case it is because of the routinization of everyday life that he sees human agents as transacting their affairs in a variety of locales – settings of interaction which are themselves frequently zoned to facilitate routine social practices.
In 1931, not long after the theory of evolution by means of natural selection had gained widespread acceptance in the scientific community, the Catholic Encyclopaedic Dictionary rendered the official Roman Catholic teaching on the subject as follows:
EVOLUTION, EVOLUTIONISM. Transformism, or Evolutionism, means the theory of the transformation of species only, but evolution is a more general and universal theory which is applied to the physical world, to the realm of ethics, to man and to society (Spencer). Absolute evolutionism is not justified by physical science which has established without doubt the stability of species, without ever discovering veritable specific transformations; moreover, it is condemned by metaphysics which refuses to admit that effects can be more perfect than their efficient causes; and “extreme” evolution denies the special act of creation of life, attributing the whole process to a natural development from inorganic matter. The doctrine of the natural development of all the species of the animal and vegetable world from a few primitive types created by God is moderate evolution. Catholics are free to believe in moderate evolution, excluding the evolution of man. Animals, as distinguished from man, are devoid of reason. Hence the animal soul, i.e., the principle which gives an animal life, is essentially material. Hence, man's soul, though depending on material things for its activities, being essentially spiritual, the evolution of man as a whole from the lower animal is impossible.