of the final chapter recapitulates the Main Problem, its subdivision into the Problems (P1)–(P8), and motivates the steps that lead from the solution of one problem to raising and solving the next one. In this way, the reader may get a comprehensive look at our whole line of reasoning.infers our solution to the Main Problem from the solutions of the Problems (P1)–(P8), highlights the way in which the aims of the book have been reached, and paves the way for future research.

This chapter outlines the ways in which the philosophy of science handles the problem of inconsistency in scientific theorising. After raising this problem in ,will summarise the standard view of inconsistency in the analytical philosophy of science (SVI). In , we will touch on the break with the standard view of inconsistency in the analytical philosophy of science as initiated by Kuhn and continued by Lakatos and Laudan.will discuss the most recent trends that re-evaluate the emergence and the presence of inconsistencies in scientific theorising.will draw the conclusions that serve as guidelines for the next steps of our train of thought.

This chapter provides a survey of the most frequent methods of the treatment of inconsistencies in Optimality Theory (OT).raises the problem of whether our findings in the preceding chapters can be supported by the analysis of a linguistic theory that makes conscious and deliberate use of inconsistencies.will provide a brief overview of the basic ideas of OT. In , we will reveal the types of inconsistency in Optimality Theory with the help of an instructive case study without applying the terminology and the notation of the p-model. Some passages of René Kager’s argumentation in connection with the introduction of two correspondence constraints will be presented, which are quite simple but seem to be especially illuminating concerning the emergence and the treatment of inconsistencies in OT. In , we will analyse the structure and the treatment of these inconsistencies with the help of the p-model.will infer the solution to the problem mentioned.

The Introduction defines the aims of the book and raises the problems it will deal with. The first aim is that of the philosopher of linguistics, namely, to reveal basic characteristics of linguistic theory formation that have been unknown so far and would thus clarify important foundational issues. Second, the book also aims to show how our metatheoretical analyses will provide findings that are capable of substantially improving the practice of problem solving in theoretical linguistics. This aim is that of the linguist – however, supported and furthered by the metatheoretical findings of the philosopher of linguistics. In order to reach both aims, the book tackles the problem of how inconsistencies emerge in linguistic theorising, under what conditions they can be tolerated, and how they can be resolved. Since this Main Problem is very complex, we divide it into eight more easily accessible sub-problems, whose solution will in the long run lead, step by step, to the solution of our Main Problem.

The present chapter is devoted to the problem of how the limits of the paraconsistent treatment of inconsistency can be transgressed.anticipates some basic properties of the p-model. In , we will first offer a brief survey of the structure, the function, and the treatment of inconsistencies in Baltin’s () paper with respect to different analyses of degree word complement clauses. In , we will apply the paraconsistent logic introduced into Baltin’s argumentation. We will see, however, that this result is not satisfactory, because paraconsistent logic cannot grasp the process of the continuous emergence and resolution of inconsistencies. Consequently, in , we will briefly present the central terms and tenets of the p-model. In , we will apply this finding to the reconstruction of Baltin’s () argumentation, and into another case study on that of Zubizarreta (). Finally, in , we will summarise our solution to the problem raised.

In , we saw that the inconsistency between the data and the hypotheses as well as that between hypotheses can be resolved by paraconsistent tools.raises the problem of how to evaluate the paraconsistent treatment of inconsistency.will be devoted to a case study exemplifying the emergence and the usefulness of paraconsistency in generative syntax. In , we will discuss another two case studies that highlight the limits of paraconsistency. Finally, in , we will draw the conclusions from the case studies that evaluate the use of paraconsistency in linguistic theorising.

The Introduction to this chapter raises the problem of how to distinguish between tolerable and intolerable inconsistencies in linguistic theorising. In , Rescher and Brandom’s () logic will be introduced, which differentiates between paraconsistency, allowing for a special kind of inconsistency without ex contradictione quodlibet, and strong inconsistency, which is exposed to logical chaos. The workability of this distinction in theoretical linguistics will be exemplified by two case studies in Sections 4.3 and 4.4, respectively. They will illustrate, first, that tolerable inconsistency can be represented as paraconsistency, while the unavailability of a paraconsistent resolution may leave us with an intolerable strong inconsistency. Second, they will also show that in the cases examined the emergence of inconsistencies is closely related to the data handling techniques applied.summarises the solution to the problem raised in this chapter and highlights that there is a need to re-evaluate the way data are treated in theoretical linguistics; but tackling the question of how this should be done will be postponed to later chapters.