Chapter 18th is dedicated to a critical study of “democratic erosion”, an expression that became common among political scientists, in order to describe a political pathology of our era. The idea is that, in our time, democracies no longer “die” in one fell swoop, but rather slowly, “by a thousand cuts”: instead of succumbing from one day to the next after massive riots or a military coup, democracies nowadays are commonly dismantled piece by piece from within. I explain the importance but also the limits of this approach and the alternatives that are proposed as a remedy.

Most of comparative law uses countries as the units of comparison. However, in today’s world it is no longer appropriate to disregard rules that go beyond the level of domestic law, such as regional and international law (discussed in this chapter) and transnational and global law (discussed in Chapter 12). The term ‘comparative law’ is not restricted to laws at the country level. Moreover, even as far as contemporary domestic laws are concerned, it is frequently impossible to disregard the relationship to regional and international legal norms. Thus, it is the motivation of this chapter to explain how comparative law can be relevant at the levels of regional and international law.

[t]he coffee was from Costa Rica, the flour that made up the bread probably from Canada, the oranges in marmalade came from Spain, those in the orange juice came from Morocco and the sugar came from Barbados. Then, I think of all the things that went into making the production of those things possible – the machinery that came from [West] Germany, the fertilizer from the United States, the oil from Saudi Arabia …

Legal traditions frequently feature in the literature of both comparative law and legal history. They are relevant to comparative law as far as they relate the past to contemporary legal systems; thus, as a first limitation, this chapter will not deal with legal traditions that have no or little relevance today.1 Second, this chapter takes the position of traditional comparative law as a starting point; thus, it does not aim to address all possible legal traditions but follows the focus on major Western legal traditions. Third, this chapter is specifically interested in the diffusion of legal traditions. It therefore addresses the way laws have diffused across countries from both a conceptual but and also an empirical-historical perspective.

The statement that ‘comparative law is an “open subject” that can absorb further research not traditionally included’1 means that there is a high degree of flexibility in the method and scope of comparative law. However, this does not imply a methodological relativism where ‘anything goes’. Treating methods seriously leads to the need to reflect about the advantages and disadvantages of certain methods. This position is reaffirmed in this final chapter. It will continue the discussion about the role of other disciplines for comparative law while also providing some general suggestions for comparative law research.

‘Empirical legal studies’ refers to research which applies quantitative methods to questions about the relationship between law and society.1 It is conceded that, terminologically, it would also be possible to include qualitative methods, and that many projects indeed call for a mix of quantitative and qualitative empirical tools.2 However, pragmatically it makes sense to have a special research field on the quantitative methods of empirical legal studies as these use distinct tools in order to establish causal relationships.

Some traditional comparative lawyers denounce postmodern comparative law as being ‘incomprehensible’.1 Indeed, it is often fairly complex. Yet this chapter aims to show that it is possible to make it comprehensible. It also highlights both its strengths and limitations. To start with, Section A explains that ‘postmodernism’ is understood as a wide label for research that challenges the traditional method but does not merely suggest ‘modern’ adjustments.

According to Lord Kelvin (1883), ‘[w]hen you can measure what you are speaking about and express it in numbers, you know something about it; but when you cannot measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of the meagre and unsatisfactory kind’.1 Lord Kelvin was a natural scientist, but today many social scientists would agree that quantitative approaches are central to scientific progress. Legal researchers have joined in relatively late, but there is now also a growing use of quantitative studies in law.

The growing use of socio-legal comparative law responds to the lack of consideration given by traditional comparative law to both the law in practice and the relationship between law and society. It also reflects developments in general legal scholarship as many countries have seen a trend towards scholarship in socio-legal studies, law and society and empirical legal research, using qualitative or quantitative methods.