Owners generally get to decide what happens to their property, and this is reflected in legal discussions of property rights and in how children and adults view ownership. Owners’ control over property fits with the idea that ownership serves to reduce conflicts over resources. This chapter first briefly reviews experimental research that fits with this side of ownership. However, the chapter then reviews ways that ownership can take control away from owners. One line of research work shows that children and adults think that nonowners are sometimes allowed to access and even modify property without the owner’s permission. A second line of research shows that whereas people normally have some choice in acquiring ownership or giving it up, people sometimes are viewed as acquiring and retaining ownership even when they do not want to.

This chapter pursues the idea of a moral psychology of guilt promoted by Bernard Williams and Herbert Morris in their opposition to orthodox political and normative views. It follows Williams’s view that modern liberal society involves a ‘peculiar’ political morality of voluntary responsibility and his underdeveloped line that a naturalistic understanding of ‘psychological materials’ like anger, fear and love is needed. It notes his recognition of the psychological role of the internalised other in human guilt. It pursues Morris’s philosophical account of guilt as involving psychological feeling: ‘rotten, depleted of energy, and tense’ (Morris 1976: 99). It notes the importance of ‘atonement’ and identification with another in his account, the former involving being ‘at one with’ oneself. It identifies the reaction he notes to deep-seated psychological problems and cycles of violence as ‘quantum guilt’. Williams and Morris push philosophy beyond itself to the brink of a new psychological understanding. Following Jonathan Lear, the moral psychology they initiate renders psychoanalysis part of a broader conception of philosophy in line with its original Greek self-understanding. It gives the ancient Socratic principle that we should know ourselves a modern post-Freudian twist.

Gender stereotyping has captured public attention, from the courtroom to the everyday workplace – but the term encompasses a variety of beliefs, motivations, and contexts. This chapter first discusses prominent theories of gender stereotyping that have been primarily used in employment discrimination contexts (e.g., social role theory, the stereotype content model). I then identify how adjudicators across a variety of legal contexts (e.g., judges, juries, employers, social services officers) behave in a stereotyped fashion, according to those theories. An understanding of where stereotyping occurs across underexplored contexts is ultimately valuable for our understanding of how and where researchers might intervene in disparities research.

Given how common portrayals of vigilantism are in history books, literature, cinema, television, and the popular press, it is surprising how little we know about the public’s attitudes and beliefs about the phenomena. While there is a fair amount of research by historians, political scientists, sociologists, and cultural anthropologists on various forms of vigilantism, only a limited number of psychological studies have explored people’s moral judgments about vigilantism in a controlled and systematic way. Our goal was to build upon the work that has been done by probing people’s moral, legal, and political judgments about what we call “retributive vigilantism” – that is, vigilante acts that are intended to give the deserved suffering to those who have harmed other people.

This study considers ethical questions of freedom and reconciliation in Jimmy Boyle’s autobiographical A Sense of Freedom (2016). A Scottish life prisoner, Boyle describes a moral phenomenology of freedom and reconciliation through his life and his time in prisons, including Glasgow’s Barlinnie Special Unit. Promoting mature democratic relations between prisoners and staff, the Unit enabled development and change in participants’ moral psychology. Boyle’s ‘sense of freedom’ moves from negative forms of refusal, resistance and withdrawal to ever more positive forms: abstract ideal freedom, emancipatory agency, trust, collective empowerment, taking responsibility, coming alive and loving creativity. Reconciliation recognised the human in the enemy, mature engagement, democratic involvement and thinking socially and politically beyond the prison. This metaphysics transcending violence was grounded in Boyle’s metapsychology as one capable of love. The chapter draws on earlier discussions of freedom and reconciliation in the young Hegel, recognition and complex victimhood, atonement and mature retributivism. The penal system is seen as combining a persecutory impulse in the major key and humanistic traces in the minor, a ‘structure in dominance’ of the former over the latter. Barlinnie Special Unit inverted this structure briefly, pointing to a deep abolitionist tendency inside what became ‘the loving prison’.

The chapter’s first section develops the book’s underlying argument that the moral psychology of violation involves synthesising metaphysical expression and its metapsychological grounds. Its second section engages with Martha Nussbaum’s argument in Anger and Forgiveness (2016) that we should understand guilt and forgiveness without reference to metapsychology, and only in terms of unconditional love leading to eudaimonic social ‘Transition’. Against this, I argue that guilt and forgiveness remain morally important and we see this in the parable of the prodigal son. Where Nussbaum argues that the father’s unconditional love sets aside questions of forgiveness, I suggest that such moral questions between a father and son remain at stake. A third section offers a ‘case study’ of guilt and forgiveness in the dialogue between Jo Berry, whose father died in the IRA Brighton bombing of 1984, and Patrick Magee, one of the bombers. This shows how difficult moral dialogues around blame, guilt and forgiveness are central to reconciliation, though this may be blocked by surrounding unresolved social and political questions. Overall, connecting metaphysics and metapsychology enables us to see why moral transactions (distinguished from legal ones) and social transitions are both necessary for reconciliation.

The reasonable person standard is key to both Criminal Law and Torts. What does and does not count as reasonable behavior and decision-making is frequently deter- mined by lay jurors. Hence, laypeople’s understanding of the term must be considered, especially whether they use it predominately in an evaluative fashion. In this corpus study based on supervised machine learning models, we investigate whether laypeople use the expression “reasonable” mainly as a descriptive, an evaluative, or merely a value-associated term. We find that “reasonable” is predicted to be an evaluative term in the majority of cases. This supports prescriptive accounts, and challenges descriptive and hybrid accounts of the term – at least given the way we operationalize the latter. Interestingly, other expressions often used interchangeably in jury instructions (e.g. “careful,” “ordinary,” “prudent,” etc.), however, are predicted to be descriptive. This indicates a discrepancy between the intended use of the term “reasonable” and the understanding lay jurors might bring into the courtroom.

The COVID-19 pandemic has made health law and disability law prominent in every area of life. Health law and disability law were therefore upgraded to the status of popular law school classes as well as to more mainstream legal scholars’ research agendas. Experimental jurisprudence scholarship has also gained momentum in recent years. Yet while the use of experiments to study policy and legal issues related to health and disability is off to a promising start, the potential of this approach remains far from being realized. In this essay, I will first show how the use of experiments has helped revisit core concepts in the fields of health law and disability law. I then review three strands of work that emerged in the existing literature on “experimental health and disability law”: the study of framing – the language of public health messaging; measuring perceived deservingness of government benefits; and testing efficacy of physicians’ conflict of interest disclosures. I conclude by pointing to new directions scholars should explore in future work.

The last several years have featured the development of legal longtermism – the set of theories associated with the view that law should be concerned with ensuring the long-term future goes well. Although recent literature has shown that the principles underlying legal longtermism are widely endorsed across the Anglosphere, it remains an open question whether these principles are endorsed across cultures. Here we surveyed laypeople (n=2,938) from ten countries – Australia, Canada, Chile, Japan, Mexico, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, United Kingdom and United States – regarding law’s role in protecting future generations. We find participants in our sample widely endorse (a) increasing legal protection for future humans beyond current levels; (b) extending personhood and standing to some subset of humans living in the near and far future; and (c) prioritizing the interests of future people over those of present people in some national and international lawmaking scenarios. Taken together, these results suggest the notion of granting rights and legal protection to future generations is endorsed cross-culturally, carrying wide-ranging implications for legal theory, doctrine, and policy.

Recent empirical work demonstrates that some instances of material deception are perceived by ordinary people as consent-defeating, whereas other instances are not. One hypothesized account of these divergent lay intuitions draws on the notion of “essence”: Roughly speaking, lies that pertain to the “core” or “nature” of a consented-to act are perceived as precluding consent, whereas lies that pertain to features that are “nonessential” or “collateral” to the act are perceived as compatible with consent. To assess this hypothesized account, an independent measure of “essence” – one that does not rely with problematic circularity on notions of consent – is needed. This chapter draws on an emerging cognitive science literature that deploys linguistic probes to investigate how people intuitively represent human action. Here, we will consider two such probes, the “by” test and the “basically doing” test, and observe that whereas the former predicts judgments of consent, the latter does not.

If Chapter 4 develops the ontology of guilt and forgiveness, this chapter explores its moral phenomenology as a practical engagement of love after violation. I argue first for an account of love based on Roy Bhaskar’s conception of its five circles: in terms of its relation to self, to the other, to the relation of self and other, to self, other and the wider community, and self and other in their ontological depth as unique individuals. These five forms of love are then explored in relation to the experiences of victims and perpetrators in The Forgiveness Project (Cantacuzino 2015). Forgiveness involves both a ‘giving to’ and a ‘giving up’, and this can lead to a profound sense of identification between a victim and a perpetrator. It is different for each person and how it develops also depends on the broader social setting in which it occurs. Forgiveness can be understood either as an ethical and metaphysical phenomenon (dispositive humility) or as a law-related institutional practice (an exchange relation). The latter recasts forgiveness in ways compatible with the criminal justice system and links it to the tendency to punish rather than reconcile those caught up in violation.

Should judges and other legal decision-makers follow the literal meaning of applicable legal rules even if there are compelling reasons to do otherwise? The question of the primacy of plain meaning in legal interpretation is one of the oldest and most persistent problems in the philosophy of law. In this chapter, we argue that new arguments are available in this debate, emerging from recent developments in experimental jurisprudence. We posit that legal interpretation is, to some extent, an exercise in coordination: Judges seek to interpret rules in a way that would match interpretations of their peers, of other legal officials, and of society at large. In such a strategic context, the plain meaning of law often constitutes a focal point around which different legal actors can coordinate – allowing them to promote the uniformity and predictability of law and, ultimately, to sustain the rule of law.

Kneer and Bourgeois-Gironde (2017) reported that legal experts’ intentionality ascriptions are susceptible to the “severity effect” (i.e., influenced by differently harmful side effects), which violates the outcome-independent legal concept of intentionality prevalent in many criminal law systems. This challenges the “legal expertise defense” (= legal experts are more competent users of legal concepts and their legal judgments are more reliable than those of laypeople). Prochownik, Krebs, Wiegmann, and Horvath (2020) hypothesized that the “severity effect” might be due to confounding features of the previously used vignettes (i.e., the somewhat bad cases not being perceived as harmful by legal experts). They created new stimuli with clear cases of harm that differed in the degree of harm across two conditions, and they did not observe any “severity effect” in legal experts or laypeople. Yet, the difference in harm ratings across conditions was not very large. The current study addresses this limitation: Even after increasing the difference in the perceived degree of harm, we still do not observe the “severity effect” in legal experts or laypeople.

Legal research is a repeat offender – in the best sense of the term – when it comes to making use of empirical and experimental methods borrowed from other disciplines. We anticipate that the field’s response to developments in eye-tracking research will be no different. Our aim is to aid legal researchers in the uptake of eye-tracking as a method to address questions related to cognitive processes involved in matters of law abidance, legal intervention, and the generation of new legal rules. We discuss methodological challenges of empirically studying thinking and reasoning as the mechanisms underlying behavior and introduce eye-tracking as our method of choice for obtaining high-resolution traces of visual attention. We delineate advantages and challenges of this methodological approach, and outline which concepts legal researchers can hope to measure with a toy example. We conclude by outlining some of the various research avenues in legal research for which we predict a benefit from adopting eye-tracking to their methodological toolbox.

In the common law tradition, legal decisions are supposed to be grounded in both statute and precedent, with legal training guiding practitioners on the most important and relevant touchstones. But actors in the legal system are also human, with the failings and foibles seen throughout society. This may lead them to take methodological shortcuts, even to relying on unknown internet users for determinations of a legal source’s relevance. In this chapter, we investigate the influence on legal judgments of a pervasive, but unauthoritative source of legal knowledge: Wikipedia. Using the first randomized field experiment ever undertaken in this area – the gold standard for identifying causal effects – we show that Wikipedia shapes judicial behavior. Wikipedia articles on decided cases, written by law students, guide both the decisions that judges cite as precedents and the textual content of their written opinions. Collectively, our study provides clear empirical evidence of a new form of influence on judges’ application of the law – easily accessible, user-generated online content.