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How and why did the European Convention turn from a neglected legal tool into one of the most important human rights documents in legal practice? This book argues this remarkable development wasn't merely the result of a top-down movement initiated by the European Court, but of a far more dynamic process in which the national and European spheres engaged in constant co-creation. Focusing on the Netherlands and uncovering little known archival sources, it lays bare how the Convention was received over time throughout the entire Kingdom. In doing so, it incorporates insight into how European human rights were perceived in Europe and beyond. A much more varied story comes to light in which contingency and interaction take centre stage, and which uncovers the choices that continue to shape the character of the Convention as we know it today.
An initial glance at the intricate web of the English legal system may perceive human rights and private law as paths leading to different realms. In this vision, contract law, shaped by economic concerns, is confined to a role of enforcing agreements. Yet, given ageing population trends and the increase in the number of people with mental health conditions, such as dementia, entering into grossly asymmetrical contracts, we must re-assess the lens through which we perceive contract law. This book calls for a re-examination of the role of contract law in light of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD), insisting on an approach that responds to both economic and social concerns. The book aims to contribute towards bridging the areas of disability equality and contract law, questioning the compatibility of key principles and doctrines in contract law with UNCRPD values, including autonomy and human dignity.
This chapter introduces the vision of contract law adopted in this book, based on two concentric spheres: an inner sphere encompasses an economic realm rooted in values such as freedom and sanctity of contract, reflecting a non-interventionist approach that can accommodate imbalanced transactions and an outer sphere shaped by public policy concerns, which embodies social values such as the protection of relational autonomy and human dignity. The chapter justifies the structure of the book, the choice of legal frameworks examined, as well as the relevance of this study for disability equality and contract legal research.
This chapter highlights the interconnection between economic and social values in the contractual realm, rooted in a perception of people as holder of rights and a broad interpretation of autonomy and human dignity that looks beyond individualistic values. With a focus on grossly asymmetrical contracts, it promotes an understanding of vulnerability in the contractual context based on the circumstances of the transaction, rather than on people’s medical conditions. The chapter reflects on the merits and drawbacks of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) as a potential benchmark for promoting a vision of contract law that responds to both economic and social concerns and recognises the equality of all human beings. The second part considers how English contract law could be brought closer to the equality vision promoted by the UNCRPD, proposing an understanding of the contractual realm based on concentric economic and social spheres, shaped by fluid boundaries, and reflecting on the relevance of contract law as part of a broader set of measures to ensure a fairer society.
This chapter brings together the idea of bridges between economic and social concerns. The discussion reinforces the need to recognise the outer sphere of contracting in holding these connections together, recognising the role of contract law in protecting both economic values (including freedom and sanctity of contract) and social values (including relational autonomy and human dignity). A suggested path to succeed in these endeavours is to embrace the idea of complementarity in contract law, which enables us to accept the coexistence of ideas that may appear, initially, to be mutually exclusive. The idea of complementarity in contract law enables us to see economic and social values not as antagonistic, but as coexisting parts of interconnected spheres.
This chapter focuses on the second bridge between economic and social values in contract law, examining the role played by regulation in bringing together these values. The discussion questions the effectiveness of regulatory responses to business to consumer (B2C) relations in English consumer contract law, in protecting people not just as economic actors, but also as citizens, and in safeguarding values such as autonomy and human dignity. The analysis focuses on the regulation of unfair contract terms, unfair commercial practices, implied terms in contracts for the provision of goods, services and digital content, and on information and cancellation rights in business to consumer (B2C) contracts. This chapter also examines the concept of consumer vulnerability in trader– consumer relations.
If English Contract Law had its own version of a ‘periodic table’, vitiating factors would form one group of elements. These include, among others, incapacity, nonest factum, mistake, misrepresentation, duress, undue influence and unconscionability. These factors could enable innocent parties, including parties who find themselves in a position of vulnerability due to absence of accessible and appropriate information, to escape the consequences of disadvantageous transactions. A narrow interpretation of these factors, focused on preserving the sanctity of contract and holding parties to their transactions, would restrict intervention solely to procedural grounds. On the other hand, a broad interpretation focused on both procedural and substantive fairness, would be closer to the values pursued by the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD), including the protection of (individual and relational) autonomy and human dignity. This chapter calls for a broad interpretation of vitiating factors, perceiving them as ‘conduits of fairness’ in English contract law.
The third bridge is explored in chapter five and focuses on the connection between constitutional values and private law. The analysis concentrates on the values of autonomy and human dignity and their interplay with the principle of freedom of contract in English contract law. The discussion also reflects on the link between the UNCRPD, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998, and English contract law, and suggests that rather than looking for a seamless bridge that links the UNCRPD directly with English contract law, we should look for steppingstones connecting the UNCRPD, the ECHR, the HRA and domestic private law. This chapter also discusses the values of participation and inclusion, with a focus on the idea of influence vulnerability explored in the previous chapter, and reflects on the need to enhance the influence of persons with disabilities and DDPOs in shaping legislative developments in English law, including consumer contract law.
Take two positions, both of which we take to be popular ways of thinking about law. First, some norm N is part of the law only if, and in virtue of, N being ultimately recognized or validated by the rule of recognition. Call this Hartian Orthodoxy. Second, statements about legal rights are best understood as claims about the existence of moral rights according to law. Call this legal perspectivalism. Here we show that the two are incompatible. Our argument is that, to account for certain arguments that mix legal and factual claims, perspectivalism must close the legal perspective according to some inference rule. As it happens, however, the only defensible candidates render perspectivalism incompatible with Hartian Orthodoxy.
In this groundbreaking work, Jean d'Aspremont undertakes the first study of the epistemology of the secret of international law, which is a specific intellectual posture whereby international law is considered to be replete with secrets that international lawyers ought to reveal. In addition to arguing that the epistemology of the secret of international law is everywhere at work in international legal thought and practice, d'Aspremont demonstrates why this posture must be scrutinized, given how much it enables certain sayings, thoughts, perceptions and actions while simultaneously disabling others, making it complicit with the worst forms of capitalism, colonialism, racism, bourgeois ideology, phallocentrism, virilism and masculinism. This book should be read by anyone interested in how international law came to do what it does and why it must be rethought.