This introductory chapter provides a rationale for the book, presents definitions of co-management and considers its theoretical foundations, identified as common property theory and decentralisation. These informed the identification of concepts reviewed, which are set out in a section explaining the content and structure of the book. Reflections are also included on related approaches and terminology to co-management, noting that even community-based natural resource management approaches involve collaboration between communities and government and so the term ‘co-management’ is used in a broad sense, referring to multiple forms of collaborative natural resource governance. The chapter also includes a section on what concepts are understood to be and the processes suggested for forming, reconstructing and analysing concepts. These processes informed the method undertaken in reviewing the meaning and use of concepts, and in generating insights into co-management from concept definitions and applications presented in the subsequent chapters.

Government is inevitably a key actor in the co-management of renewable natural resources. However, government is not monolith and many parts of government and the state may be involved in co-management, including multiple government ministries, local as well as central government, the judiciary and police. This chapter considers the roles of government in co-management and how these are influenced by political ideology on the size and remit of government. The chapter examines how the concepts of state and bureaucracy have been defined and how bureaucrats, referred to as ‘street-level bureaucrats’, involved in policy implementation have been associated with interpreting and adjusting policy and legislation. The chapter introduces the related concept of ‘interface bureaucrats’, referring to officials at the level of decentralized government navigating the government–citizen interface. Implications of insights on the role and nature of central and local government for the practice and outcomes of co-management are identified.

In certain circumstances, parties are relieved from performance of their contractual obligations on account of supervening events. Where such circumstances exist, performance stands frustrated, and the contract is automatically discharged. Section 56 of the Contract Act is the relevant statutory provision. It defines such supervening events as those that render performance impossible or unlawful. As we shall see, Section 56 has been interpreted more widely to also cover events which render performance impracticable in the sense of being radically different from what was originally contemplated.

The law on frustration of contract is one area where Indian courts have professed to steer clear of the nuances of English law, and have instead asserted that

However, by interpreting the statute to include cases of impracticability (and not just impossibility and illegality), the Indian courts have effectively aligned Indian law with English law.

Indian courts have set a high threshold for when such supervening events would frustrate a contract. But most cases are decided on their individual facts, with little attempt to develop doctrine in a consistent manner. The development of doctrine is further inhibited by the fact that modern commercial contracts usually contain elaborate force majeure clauses. Those clauses specify qualifying force majeure events and the effect of such events on performance.

In addition to the general rule on illegality set out in Section 23, the Contract Act also specifically proscribes four categories of agreements, namely, (a) agreements in restraint of marriage, (b) agreements in restraint of trade, (c) agreements in restraint of legal proceedings and (d) wagering agreements. It provides that each of these four categories of agreement are ‘void’. In the remainder of this chapter, we describe the scope of these four prohibitions and the issues which have arisen when applying these prohibitions in practice.

AGREEMENTS IN RESTRAINT OF MARRIAGE

An agreement in restraint of marriage is declared to be void under Section 26 of the Contract Act.

The case law on this provision is sparse and has revolved around three questions. First, does Section 26 only apply to restraints that emanate from agreements, and not, for example, from bequests? Second, to what extent must Section 26 be limited to ‘total’ restraints or can it also contemplate ‘partial’ restraints? And third, does Section 26 apply to restraints on remarriage or is it confined to restraints on a first marriage?

We discuss each of these matters in what follows.

Source of restraint

In Khorsed Maneck v. The Official Trustee Bombay, a Parsi gentleman had executed a will making certain bequests. The will contained a condition, a defeasance clause that if any of the beneficiaries married someone outside the Zoroastrian faith, the interest bequeathed to such person would be deemed to have lapsed and would go to such next person as if the person marrying outside the faith had died prior to the testator.

Three concepts associated with ‘good governance’, referring to the quality of governance processes and outcomes, are examined in this chapter: accountability, legitimacy and trust. For each concept, definitions are reviewed and characteristics identified. The chapter investigates accountability through key themes of complexity and challenges associated with delivering on downward accountability in the context of decentralisation. Complexity arises from the number and range of actors involved in co-management, situated at different administrative levels, with multiple demands on and mechanisms for accountability. Different forms of legitimacy and trust are introduced and reviewed, including input, output and throughput legitimacy and dispositional, rational, affinitive and procedural forms of trust. Challenges to delivering and maintaining legitimacy and trust in the context of co-management and solutions to these are identified.

This chapter identifies and analyses the duty bearers responsible for realising the right to science, challenging claims that the inherently ‘unbounded’ nature of science is incompatible with the traditionally ‘bounded’ structure of human rights obligations. Instead, it argues that difficulties in assigning responsibilities arise from the complexity and diversity of the modern scientific ecosystem. The analysis categorises duty bearers into three main groups: states (and their agents, including universities and funding agencies), international organisations (particularly those influencing intellectual property and trade, such as WIPO and WTO) and non-state actors (comprising private corporations, individual researchers, publishers and private funding institutions). Employing a doctrinal approach rooted in international human rights law, the chapter clarifies the varying degrees of legal and moral obligations incumbent upon these actors.

This chapter traces the historical evolution and terminology of the right to science within international human rights law, exploring its emergence post-Second World War and highlighting the pivotal role of UNESCO and the recent General Comment No. 25. It critically analyses essential terminology such as the scientific process, scientific progress and the benefits of science, both material and immaterial. Special attention is given to defining the scope of protected scientific knowledge, extending beyond traditional academic disciplines to encompass citizen science and Indigenous and traditional knowledge, while clearly distinguishing legitimate scientific knowledge from pseudoscience.

The context of natural resource governance is often of uncertainty and change, even more so as the effects of climate change become ever more experienced. Adaptive governance and adaptive co-management have emerged as responses to the need to cope with and adapt to new information and changing situations. The chapter reviews what is understood by these terms and approaches, and identifies key characteristics and related concepts, such as resilience and uncertainty. The centrality of knowledge for adaptive approaches is recognised, with the role of, and challenges to, community, or participatory, monitoring and use of local and traditional knowledge in co-management reviewed. Forms of social, or collective, learning are then identified, recognising that social learning may occur through experimental approaches or deliberation and that feedback from learning is essential for adaptive governance.

Tobacco, alcohol and foods of poor nutritional quality are major drivers of non-communicable diseases, and their regulation has become a central public health priority. Yet, unlike many hazardous products, they remain lawful, widely available and deeply embedded in social, cultural and economic life. The book explores how EU law mediates between these three competing dimensions of unhealthy lifestyles: health protection, market integration and ethical or cultural diversity. It addresses three core questions: the extent of the EU’s regulatory powers in this field, the balance struck between market-building and health objectives, and the accommodation within EU law of national diversity, moral choices and scientific uncertainty surrounding lifestyle practices.

This chapter examines the justiciability of the right to science, identifying historical, conceptual and legal factors that have contributed to its marginalisation. It first addresses the historical evolution of human rights from the unified Universal Declaration of Human Rights into two distinct Covenants, leading to misconceptions around ESC rights’ justiciability. Clarifying the concept of justiciability, the chapter distinguishes between formal justiciability existing mechanisms for adjudication – and material justiciability, concerning clarity and enforceability of the right’s normative content. The analysis systematically challenges misconceptions about ESC rights’ alleged non-justiciability and evaluates contemporary international, regional and national enforcement mechanisms. Highlighting a significant gap between established formal justiciability and underdeveloped material justiciability, the chapter argues for greater definitional clarity regarding the normative content of the right to science, setting the stage for the subsequent chapters which further articulate this right’s substantive elements and promote its practical enforcement.

This chapter examines the permissible limitations on the right to science under Art. 4 ICESCR, emphasising the delicate balance between protecting scientific freedom and safeguarding broader societal interests. It first situates the right within the ICESCR’s general limitations framework, distinguishing it from rights-specific limitation clauses in instruments like the ICCPR. The chapter analyses key criteria governing legitimate limitations – legality, compatibility with the nature of the rights, necessity, proportionality and promotion of general welfare in a democratic society – and clarifies their application specifically to the right to science. It further distinguishes limitations from related concepts, such as progressive realisation and retrogressive measures. Moving beyond the human rights limitations framework, the chapter critically assesses the role of scientific self-regulation, arguing that ethical norms governing research should not merely be voluntary or professional standards but rather grounded in international human rights obligations.

This book has addressed the question of what constitutes the justiciable normative content of the right to science – particularly its core content – for the subjects and addressees under international human rights law. By focusing on the core content, this book further contributes to the broader discourse in human rights law. Analysing the right to science includes challenging outdated and reductive notions concerning the dichotomy and categorisation of human rights, demonstrating that the discussions around ESC rights and their consequently presumed non-justiciability are overly simplistic and equate to a legal fiction. This effort reinforces the view that ESC rights, including the right to science, are indeed amenable to judicial scrutiny. This perspective not only serves to clarify the substantive legal status of the right to science and the principles of indivisibility, interdependence and interrelatedness of ESC rights specifically and other human rights in general but also underscores advocacy for moving beyond the dichotomy and categorisation within human rights law.