The book finishes with a concluding chapter that identifies and brings together key insights from the earlier chapters. From a review of these key insights, four cross-cutting themes are identified: co-management as process, the relevance of power, the context of co-management and co-management as social relationships. Following discussion of these themes, a new definition is offered for co-management, inspired by the centrality of social relationships to the foundational concepts of co-management. A conceptual framework elaborates on this definition and offers a guide for the analysis and practice of co-management, one that seeks to deliver on rights and justice, as well as shared goals, accountability and legitimacy. Implications of this new, or alternative, definition of, and perspective on, co-management for practising co-management are identified and an agenda for supportive research set out.

The conclusion addresses the three questions asked. (i) What are the powers of the EU to regulate unhealthy lifestyles and how have these powers been used to date? (ii) How does EU law balance the objective of building a market for unhealthy products with that of reducing and eliminating their consumption? (iii) How does EU law balance market uniformity with the diversity and scientific uncertainty associated with lifestyle practices? It argues that EU legislation in this field remains framed predominantly in economic terms. As a result, debate continues to revolve largely around the relationship between the internal market and scientific or public health concerns. The book concludes that future EU intervention should be accompanied by reforms to the constitutional framework of competence and by greater recognition of the political, moral and cultural dimensions of unhealthy lifestyles.

Chapter 8 approaches diversity through cultural and moral lenses. It concerns the acceptance of EU intervention, the legitimacy of its action in a sensitive field, ripe with moral and ethical controversies. The EU’s approach can broadly be divided into three strands, which are not mutually exclusive. The first is the Europeanisation of choice, most apparent in tobacco regulation, where the EU has adopted a quasi-prohibitionist stance with seemingly broad support from Member States. Strikingly, this occurs in the absence, both legally and politically, of arguments grounded in individual rights and autonomy. The second is an approach of insulation, relevant to alcohol and certain ‘heritage’ foods, where national regulatory choices remain shielded from European influence, either because of the EU’s reluctance to act or because of political deadlock. The third concerns the application of proportionality in free movement cases, and the extent to which cultural and moral arguments are accommodated in the adjudication of national restrictive measures.

The scale of social-ecological systems – spatial and temporal – matters for co-management as very often multiple actors and sectors are involved, operating at and across different administrative levels, including across national boundaries. This creates challenges for building relationships, delivering on accountability and transparency, and for fair and effective participation. Geographically dispersed actors involved in collaborative governance may lead to fragmented systems and processes. Responses to such challenges within natural resource governance have included the adoption of multilevel, network and polycentric governance. Collaboration in relation to each of these approaches is investigated, with review of the concepts of scale, networks and polycentricity to identify implications for the concept and practice of co-management.

Errors of a certain kind have the potential of releasing parties from their contractual obligations. In such circumstances, the contract is said to be vitiated on account of ‘mistake’. The errors are principally of three kinds.

First, the parties may be agreed as to the terms of the contract, but may be labouring under a shared mistaken assumption about some fact that is essential to the agreement. The statute offers a simple example where one party agrees to buy a horse from another party, but neither party is aware that the horse was dead at the time of the bargain. The agreement is void. We refer to this as ‘common mistake’, and it is addressed in Section 20 of the Contract Act.

Second, where only one of the parties was labouring under a mistaken assumption of fact regarding the terms of the contract and the other party knew of that mistake, the contract may be voidable at the instance of the mistaken party. We refer to this as ‘unilateral mistake’. Section 22 sets out the rule that unilateral mistake of one party will not normally render a contract void. In our view, any exception to that rule on account of a party's knowledge of a mistake as to terms made by the other party must be generated through judicial development of the Indian common law of contract. Third, there may be a lack of consensus between the parties as to the terms of the contract, such that there is no agreement at all. The parties are at cross-purposes. This is less a case of mistake (because there is no mistaken assumption as to a fact) and more a case where there is no correspondence between offer and acceptance. We refer to it as ‘mutual misunderstanding’.

In the remainder of this chapter, we elaborate on each of these types of mistakes and assess the extent to which they will lead to the vitiation of a contract.

As co-management often involves resource-using community participation, understanding of what is meant and understood by the concept of community is critical. The chapter therefore begins by recognising the contested nature of the concept of ‘community’, noting critique of assumptions regarding shared interests and priorities, and reflects on different forms of community, how communities may emerge over time and recognition of ‘delocalisation’ of communities in relation to natural resource governance. Different bases of social cohesion are then considered and forms of the related concept of social capital reviewed. Insights from research into how cohesion and social capital influence co-management emphasise the centrality of relationships. Given that co-management may involve multiple and diverse communities, representation of actors is generally necessary. The section on representation considers what representation implies and what bases of representation have been found within the experience of co-management.

In a general sense, it is up to the parties to make their agreement; a court will not create an agreement for them if they have failed to agree in clear terms. This principle is embodied in Section 29 of the Contract Act which provides that ‘[a]greements, the meaning of which is not certain, or capable of being made certain, are void’. Section 29 goes on to provide six illustrations of certain and uncertain agreements.

The application of Section 29 raises three issues: (a) what methods do courts use in their attempt to resolve apparent uncertainty in a contract, (b) what is the test applied to determine whether a contract will be too uncertain to enforce and (c) to what extent does the doctrine of severability apply in connection with Section 29. We deal with each of these matters below.

METHODS OF RESOLVING APPARENT UNCERTAINTY

The starting point is that the courts will strive to remove uncertainty. This predisposition is reflected in Lord Wright's statement in the English case of Hillas & Co. v. Arcos:

This statement (of English law) has been cited in approval by the Supreme Court and by various High Courts. Similar views have also been independently expressed by High Courts.

The parties themselves can release each other from all remaining obligations under a subsisting contract, thus bringing about the discharge of that contract.

• • Discharge can be by agreement, and this is provided for in Section 62 of the Contract Act. Under Section 62, discharge can take the form of a simple mutual termination or, alternatively, the parties may agree to substitute new contractual obligations in place of their old contract.

• • Discharge can also be unilateral(in circumstances where performance is outstanding from only one party). In this situation, Section 63 provides that the party which has rights to receive performance may wholly dispense with performance (by the party that has outstanding obligations).

This chapter discusses these two modes of discharge. Contractual variations short of complete discharge are not addressed in this chapter (but have been addressed in Chapter 14).

SECTION 62: DISCHARGE BY AGREEMENT

Section 62 states that ‘if the parties to a contract agree to substitute a new contract for it, or to rescind or alter it, the original contract need not be performed’. The key feature underpinning the application of Section 62 in discharge situations is the agreement of the parties to terminate the original contract. Referring to Section 62, the Supreme Court has observed1 that ‘one of the modes by which a contract can be discharged is by the same process which created it, i.e. by mutual agreement’.

Institutions are considered as ‘rules of the game’ in this chapter, which is informed by two approaches taken to the analysis of institutions in natural resource governance. The first approach centres on viewing co-management itself as an institution. This section draws on common property theory and Ostrom’s design principles for sustainable common property regimes. The section also considers insights from literature on ‘institutional fit’ as a response to scale mismatch to identify lessons for co-management. The second approach is concerned with investigating which institutions shape co-management and how, from formal, bureaucratic institutions of policy and legislation to informal, socially embedded institutions, such as customary systems, kinship ties and gender norms. Critical institutionalism suggests that bureaucratic and socially-embedded institutions may interact through processes referred to ‘institutional bricolage’, with implications for how co-management evolves and performs.

This chapter clarifies the substantive scope and core content of the right to science as enshrined in Art. 15 ICESCR. By employing a reverse-engineering methodology grounded in the core obligations identified by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in General Comment No. 25, the chapter systematically derives the core rights of the right to science. The analysis identifies four distinct yet interrelated substantive rights: the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications (Art. 15(1)(b) ICESCR; the right to the conservation, development and diffusion of science (Art. 15(2) ICESCR); freedom of science (Art. 15(3) ICESCR); the right to international scientific ollaboration (Art. 15(4) ICESCR) and the right to equality and non-discrimination in science. Each dimension incorporates essential, immediately enforceable core rights, which constitute the non-derogable nucleus of the right to science, thereby making them inherently justiciable irrespective of resource limitations. The findings contribute to bridging gaps between theoretical frameworks and practical adjudication, enhancing the protection and realisation of the right to science.