Representation was believed to serve as a filter on the passions and excesses of direct democracy, but representatives could be influenced and even become the leaders of political factions. A central concern was to assure that representatives were insulated from such influence and focused on the public interest. As with the selection of executive and judicial officials, the questions that most occupied the Framers were the method of selection of representatives (appointment or popular election) and their term of service and eligibility for reelection.

In recent years, the Brazilian judiciary has announced over 100 initiatives using artificial intelligence (AI) systems, while a mounting number of juridical decisions shape how AI can be used in the country. The chapter analyses how AI impacts the Brazilian judiciary. First, we introduce the Brazilian legal systems, and explore a selection of AI initiatives to expose their benefits and shortcomings. Then we proceed to examine the policy for the usage of AI within courts in the country, focusing on the recent Resolution of the Brazilian National Council of Justice, aimed at regulating the judiciary’s production and use of AI systems. Last, we argue that the integration of AI within Brazil’s judiciary has the potential to enhance procedural efficiency and innovation. Yet, we emphasise that the guarantee of transparency, accountability, legal certainty, and digital sovereignty largely depend on the adoption and coherent implementation of a new AI Regulatory Framework and a new AI Strategy.

This chapter focuses on the American Revolution of 1775–1783, which often appears as the first cause célèbre in the subsequent literature on the law of civil war. Studying closely the legal documents and case law during the revolution, it argues that the revolution of the thirteen colonies displayed a typical structure of transatlantic civil wars that was common with the early modern civil wars of Chapter 1 as well as the subsequent transatlantic revolutions. Its key features include the early emergence of an insurgent prize jurisdiction, the diplomatic disputes caused by the imperial counter-revolutionary responses, the question of foreign intervention, and ultimately the connection between sovereignty and state responsibility. It also links these phenomena with the rise of international arbitration as an essential technique of post-revolutionary settlements in the classical law of nations.

This chapter surveys developments related to the use of generative AI in courts in the United States. It discusses a range of current uses of generative AI by judges, lawyers, and ordinary citizens, and explains commonly cited concerns that these uses raise, such as worries about inaccuracy and bias, as well as newly emerging concerns. The chapter also surveys efforts to regulate these tools in the US, such as judicial bans and requirements of disclosure and certification.

This conclusion pulls together the previous chapters. Arendt’s moral philosophy is, first and foremost, a moral psychology that turns on the concepts of thinking, judging, and common sense, and the catastrophic consequences of their absence. Its normative core lies in respect for human dignity, which she roots in the human conditions of plurality and natality. The chapter explains why Arendt’s early ambivalence about morality rests on mistakes. It then returns to four issues catalogued in Chapter 1: the problems of incongruity between person and act; the problem of principles and particulars; the problem of judgment; and the problem of moral realism. The chapter summarizes and expands on the solutions Arendt offers to these problems. It concludes by explaining the connections between Arendt’s moral thought and her ideas about international law. Holding perpetrators accountable for core crimes is one crucial way of acknowledging human dignity and of realizing the “idea of humanity.” Although Arendt is objectionably purist about the mission of international criminal justice, her contributions to its theory are impressive. They include a deep analysis of the crime of genocide, a critique of sovereign immunity, a recognition that states can be criminals, and an understanding of why some crimes are of international concern.

The means by which factions persist are many, including political parties, lobbying, partisan media, passion and prejudice, rent-seeking, the permanent campaign, the politics of identity and principle, and today’s high-tech political campaigns.

The evolution of AI presents both challenges and opportunities for courts. To date, most discussion and examination of AI and courts has focused on decision-making tools, reflecting a broader trend in discourse around courts that unduly centres on courts’ adjudicatory functions. Yet courts perform a far wider set of functions and societal roles. This chapter examines the current and potential uses of AI, questions of suitability and ethics, and the challenges and opportunities that arise through this broader consideration of what it is courts actually do, beyond determining disputes. While AI may enhance access to justice, reduce costs, save time, and potentially improve the quality of justice, significant challenges arise, including the potential erosion of judicial respect, inaccuracy, and concerns for the separation of powers. Crucially, court users and the public ought to be more widely consulted in how AI is developed and deployed for courts to achieve better, fairer, and more effective justice.

Federalism, separation of powers, bicameralism, the electoral college, judicial review, constitutionally guaranteed rights, and the relative difficulty of amendment have all helped limit the influence of political factions.

Negligence governs the legal obligations individuals and organisations owe to others to avoid causing harm. Once liability is considered, however, there are defences available that can reduce or even eliminate a defendant’s responsibility. These defences reflect the fact that the blame for that harm cannot – or should not – always be laid solely at the defendant’s feet and that the actions of the plaintiff themselves can affect legal outcomes.

In this chapter, we’ll explore the key defences to negligence, such as voluntary assumption of risk (volenti), the statutory defence provisions that exist in various jurisdictions and contributory negligence. By examining the legal principles and significant cases behind these defences, you’ll gain insight into how the courts deal with these defences and the impact they can have on liability.

Ever since the earliest Arabic writings on medicine we meet treatises on widespread illnesses or crowd diseases, including epidemics. Some of those works discuss the causes and treatment; others deal with the treatment only. This paper is limited to the works that deal with environmental pollution as a cause of such illnesses. They cover subjects like air and water contamination, solid waste mishandling and environmental assessments of certain localities. The treatises reviewed are those written by (1) al-Kindi, (2) Qusta b. Luqa, (3) alRazi, (4) Ibn al-Jazzar, (5) al-Tamimi, (6) Abu Sahl al-Masihi, (7) Ibn Sina, (8) Ali b. Ridwan, (9) Ibn Jumay’, (10) Ya’qub al-Isra’ili, (11) Abdullatif alBaghdadi, (12) Ibn al-Quff and (13) Ibn al-Nafis. Studying the contents of each work shows which authors were merely copying the Greek theory of humours and miasma, and which made genuine contributions to the field. The period covered in the paper is up to the end of the thirteenth century A.D. This is because the Black Death took place in the fourteenth century, and encouraged several authors of that time to write about epidemics and plagues. Other contemporary researchers have studied these later works.

This chapter discusses the importance of the audience in research on forensic performance. “Forensic performance” is taken here to include the dramaturgical techniques that inform Erving Goffman’s account of “the presentation of self in everyday life,” extending not only to ways of affirming one’s own position but also to ways of portraying the various figures or propositions in a legal dispute. These practices include the use of speech, gesture, and ritual to convey arguments, embody or criticize legal authority, and impersonate a party, witness, or any other participant in an actual or imagined scenario. The audience includes those in the courtroom and imagined observers in the larger public. The chapter begins by examining criticisms of forensic performance in the early modern period and then turns to the use of cross-examination in the nineteenth century. Finally, the discussion considers judges’ behavior, particularly when they encourage the audience to laugh in response to their questions. By doing so, judges merge the role of an impartial interlocutor attending to policy questions and the role of an individual to whom the law might apply.

The present chapter attempts a comparative analysis of three different legal systems and their approaches to environmental law, contributing to the extensive literature on this area of law in numerous areas of the world such as the United States, Europe, and the Middle East. However, that literature appears to have had little coverage of the treatment of environmental law in Islamic law, one of the three main global legal systems together with common and civil law. The bold spread of Islamic tendency in the Middle East that followed the so-called “Arab Spring” assures major changes in the political and economic sphere, including environmental and natural resource levels. Environmental threats are very pressing all over the world, as the Earth needs to be protected through the adoption of universally applicable legal rules and the right to a healthy environment needs to be elaborated on in international instruments. Man’s position in the universe is premised on two principles: the stewardship of man which means that man is not only a creature but also God’s khalifa (steward) on earth.

Artificial intelligence (AI) systems are used in court to analyse legal data, cite case law, evaluate and generate evidence, or support judges with prediction. As technological advancements enter the courtroom, assessing their impact on core judicial values is crucial. This chapter asks whether AI undermines procedural fairness in judicial decision-making. To address this question, it first presents procedural fairness as a normative concept studied across different disciplines. It shows why procedural fairness matters and what values fair procedures aim to foster. Drawing on case studies and scholarly work, it then illustrates how AI systems may impair these values. It then investigates how regulatory attempts and ethical frameworks for AI in judicial systems aim to address the resulting issues by analysing fundamental principles of technology regulation. The main argument of the chapter is that AI regulation must be complemented by specific procedural rules tailored to the judicial domain. In the age of AI, fair procedures should realise participation, increase trust, preserve neutrality, and provide mechanisms to detect errors in AI systems.